^. 


JAN  21  1918 


BL    200    .K49    1917 

Keyser,  Leander  Sylvester, 

1856- 
A  system  of  natural  theism 


OTHER   BOOKS   BY  DR.    KEYSER 

A  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIAN  ETHICS. 

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scholarliness,  in  its  doctrinal  saneness,  it  is  a  great  book." — 
J.  Henry  Harms,  D.D.,  President  of  Newberry  College. 

THE  RATIONAL  TEST. 

Biblical  Doctrine  upheld  by  Reason.  12  mo;  189  pages; 
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The  following  subjects  are  discussed  in  a  vital  way: 
Theism,  Biblical  Inspiration,  the  Trinity,  the  Creation  of 
Man,  the  Fall  of  Man,  the  Miraculous  Conception  of  Christ, 
the  Incarnation,  the  Vicarious  Atonement,  the  New  Birth,  the 
Resurrection,  the  Last  Judgment. 

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Examined  in  the  Light  of  Revelation  and  Reason.  12  mo; 
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A  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIAN  EVIDENCE. 

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tion. Paper  covers;  43  pages  (large);  25  cents;  in  lots  of 
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THEOLOGICAL  OUTLINES  AND  THESES. 

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Paper  covers;  52  pages  (large);  40  cents. 

THE  GERMAN  LITERARY  BOARD, 
P.  O.  Box  573, 

BUELINGTON,   lOWA. 


/  V- 

(      JAN  21  181 

A  SYSTEM     ^^imim 
OF  NATURAL  THEISM 


LEANDER  s/kEYSER,  D.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  THEISM,   ETHICS  AND  CHRISTIAN   EVIDENCE  IN   WITTENBERG 
COLLEGE  AND  OF  SYSTEMATIC  THEOLOGY  IN  HAMMA  DIVINITY  SCHOOL, 
SPRINGFIELD,  OHIO.     AUTHOR  OF  "A  SYSTEM  OF  CHRISTIAN 
ETHICS,"    "THE  RATIONAL  TEST,"  "a  SYSTEM  OF  CHRIS- 
TIAN EVIDENCE."  "election  AND  CONVERSION," 
"THEOLOGICAL  OUTLINES  AND  THF^ES,"  ETC. 


BURLINGTON,  IOWA 

THE  GERMAN  LITERARY  BOARD 

1917 


Copyright,  1917,  by 

E.  NEUMANN 
Burlington,  iowa 


FOREWORD 

Primarily  this  work  is  intended  for  a  text-book  in  col- 
leges, theological  seminaries,  and  other  schools  which  may 
arrange  for  such  a  discipline  in  their  curricula.  For  this 
reason  the  outlines  and  various  divisions  of  the  system  are 
made  conspicuous  by  means  of  numerals,  captions,  wide 
spaces,  and  different  fonts  of  type.  It  is  believed  that 
this  method  will  prove  helpful  in  a  number  of  ways.  It 
will  enable  the  reader  and  student  to  get  a  comprehensive 
view  of  the  whole  system  and  of  its  several  articulations. 
It  will  aid  the  instructor  in  the  assignment  of  lessons  and 
the  student  in  his  preparation  for  the  class-room.  The 
instructor  will  be  able  to  formulate  his  questions  in  a 
pointed  and  relevant  way,  which  is  an  essential  in  doing 
first-rate  pedagogical  work.  A  systematic  study  and  mas- 
tery of  any  subject  will  also  have  its  value  as  a  mental 
discipline.  In  this  way,  too,  the  student  may  be  led  to 
form  the  habit  of  making  a  scientific  arrangement  of  the 
various  subjects  he  desires  to  investigate.  Knowledge 
that  is  well  classified  and  co-ordinated  is  the  most  ser- 
viceable. 

The  author  also  believes  that  a  systematic  arrangement 
of  material  and  data  will  be  just  as  acceptable  to  the 
general  reader  who  may  care  to  study  such  a  theme  as 
scientific  Theism. 

Many  great  and  valuable  books  have  been  written  on 
the  subject  of  Theism,  and  the  author  has  no  criticism 

5 


6  Foreword 

to  pass  on  most  of  them.  However,  as  an  instructor  in 
this  discipHne,  he  has  found  that  most  of  these  works, 
valuable  as  they  are,  have  little  adaptation  for  text-book 
purposes,  and  are  often  too  abstrusely  expressed  to  en- 
lighten the  general  reader. 

The  author  is  convinced  that  the  positive  arguments 
for  the  divine  existence  set  forth  in  Part  II  of  this  work 
have  not  been  invalidated  by  any  of  the  latest,  well- 
attested  discoveries  of  science,  but  have  rather  been  cor- 
roborated by  them ;  and  in  this  respect  his  views  coincide 
with  those  of  many  of  the  most  profound  recent  writers 
on  Theism. 

That  there  is  need  today  of  thorough  and  well-reasoned 
teaching  on  this  subject — and  teaching,  too,  that  gives 
forth  no  uncertain  sound — is  patent  to  every  one  who  is 
conversant  with  present-day  college  ideals  and  tendencies. 
Indeed,  among  all  classes  of  thinkers,  whether  in  college 
or  out,  there  is  a  call  and  demand  for  a  clear  and  positive 
presentation  of  the  theistic  proofs.  A  questionaire  re- 
cently sent  out  by  Professor  James  H.  Leuba,  of  Bryn 
Mawr  College,  to  a  large  number  of  the  scientists  of  the 
country  elicited  the  response  that  a  majority  of  them  are 
either  agnostical  regarding  the  existence  of  God,  or  have 
become  actually  atheistic.  Professor  Leuba's  book  has 
thus  been  characterized  by  an  acute  reviewer :  "This  is  a 
plea,  or  rather  the  conclusion  of  a  plea,  for  atheism,  with 
its  logical  denial  of  immortality." 

We  believe,  therefore,  that  a  work  like  the  present  one 
is  sorely  needed — provided,  of  course,  we  have  been  able 
to  make  the  arguments  effective  and  convincing. 
Whether  we  have  succeeded  or  failed,  our  motive  has 
been  an  earnest  one.     It  has  been  to  furnish  a  book  for 


Foreword  7 

readers  everywhere  who  may  wish  to  have  at  hand  the 
arguments  by  which  the  dangerous  tendencies  to  agnosti- 
cism and  materiahsm  may  be  counteracted.  The  author 
is  especially  anxious  that  the  book  may  find  its  way  into 
the  curricula  of  many  of  the  colleges  of  the  country, 
whether  Church  or  State  institutions,  so  that  our  educated 
youth  may  be  thoroughly  grounded  in  theistic  belief,  and 
may  be  saved  from  plunging  into  the  maelstrom  of  mate- 
rialistic science.  The  work  might  also  be  used  as  a  sup- 
plementary text  or  reference  book  in  the  department  of 
Apologetics  in  theological  seminaries. 

The  Author, 
wittenberg  college, 
springfield,  ohio. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.     Introductory  Data  (Definitions,  Terms,  etc.)  15 
11.     General  Argument   (for  the  Divine  Exist- 
ence)      28 

III.  Teleological  Argument 34 

IV.  Cosmological  Argument 49 

V.     Ontological  Argument 59 

VI.     Moral  Argument 64 

VII.     Esthetic  Argument 76 

VIII.     Atheism  and  Materialism 84 

IX.     Deism    90 

X.     Pantheism 94 

XL     Idealism  100 

XII.     NaturaHstic  Evolution 108 

XIII.  Agnosticism,  Positivism,  Monism 115 

XIV.  The  Divine  Attributes  (Self-existence,  Eter- 

nity, etc.) 122 

XV.     Thesis  on  God's  Goodness 130 

XVI.     The  Divine  Relations 140 

Index 143 

9 


GENERAL  OUTLINE  OF  THE  SYSTEM 
PART  I 
Introductory  Data 

I.     Definition  and  Terms. 
II.     General  Principles. 
III.     The  Idea  of  God. 

PART  II 
Proofs  of  the  Divine  Existence 


I. 
11. 

General. 
Teleological. 

III. 

Cosmological. 

IV. 

Ontological. 

V. 

Moral. 

VI. 

Esthetic. 

PART  III 

Anti-Theistic  Theories 

I. 

Atheism  and  Materialism. 

11. 

Deism. 

III. 

Pantheism. 

IV. 

Idealism. 

V. 

Naturalistic  Evolution. 

VL 

Agnosticism,  Positivism  and  Monism, 

11 

12  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

PART  IV 
Divine  Attributes  and  Relations 

I.     The  Divine  Attributes. 
II.     The  Divine  Relations. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Most  of  the  books  in  the  following  list  will  prove  valu- 
able to  the  reader  who  wishes  to  consult  them.  The 
author  is  glad  to  acknowledge  his  indebtedness  to  a  num- 
ber of  these  works,  especially  in  the  way  of  suggestion 
and  inspiration. 

Flint:  "Theism"  and  "Anti-Theistic  Theories." 

Harris'  "The  Rational  Basis  of  Theism." 

Bowne:  "Studies  in  Theism." 

Janet-'  "Final  Causes." 

Martinean:  "Studies  of  Religion,"  2  vols. 

Diman'  "The  Theistic  Argument." 

Miiller  (Max):  "Natural  Religion." 

Valentine:  "Natural  Theology"  and  "Christian  Theol- 
ogy," Vol.  I. 

Fisher:  "The  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian 
Belief." 

Orr:  "The  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World." 

Fraser:  "Philosophy  of  Theism." 

Iverach:  "Theism  in  the  Light  of  Present  Science  and 
Philosophy;"  "Is  God  Knowable?" 

Mead-'  "Supernatural  Revelation,"  pages  1-64. 

MUey:  "Systematic  Theology,"  Vol.  I. 


A  System  of  Natural  Theism  13 

Beattie-  ''A  Treatise  on  Apologetics,"  Vol.  I. 

Everett:  "Theism  and  the  Christian  Faith." 

Stirling:  "Philosophy  and  Theology." 

Ward:  "Naturalism  and  Agnosticism"  and  "The  Realm 
of  Ends." 

Davidson:   "Theism  as  Grounded  in  Human  Nature." 

Schurm^n:  "Belief  in  God:  Its  Origin,  Nature  and 
Basis." 

Sheldon:    "UnbeHef  in  the  Nineteenth  Century." 

Dykes:  "The  Divine  Worker  in  Creation  and  Provi- 
dence." 

Keyser:  "The  Rational  Test,"  Chapter  I. 

Lindsay:  "Recent  Advances  in  Theistic  Philosophy." 

Balfour:  "Theism  and  Humanism"  (1915). 

Ward  (William  Hayes):  "What  I  Believe  and  Why," 
Chapters  I-XH  (1915)- 

Micou:  "Basic  Ideas  in  Religion,  or,  Apologetic 
Theism"  (1916). 


A  SYSTEM  OF  NATURAL  THEISM 

PART  I 
INTRODUCTORY  DATA 


CHAPTER  I 

I.     DEFINITION  AND  TERMS 

1.  Definition: 

Natural  Theism  is  the  science  which  treats  of  the  exist- 
ence and  character  of  God  in  the  light  of  nature  and 
reason. 

2.  Terms: 

Our  science  is  known  by  various  designations,  namely : 
Natural  Theism,  Rational  Theism,  Natural  Theology, 
and  sometimes  simply  Theism. 

The  term  ''Natural  Theism"  seems  to  the  author  to  be 
preferable  for  several  reasons:  (i)  The  word  "Natural" 
clearly  distinguishes  our  science  from  Revealed  or  Bib- 
lical Theism;  (2)  the  word  "Theism"  is  more  suitable 
than  the  word  "Theology"  for  students  who  do  not  intend 
to  enter  a  theological  seminary;  (3)  the  adjective  "Nat- 
ural" is  preferred  to  the  adjective  "Rational"  because 

15 


16  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

the  latter  might  suggest  or  imply  that  Christian  Theism  is 
not  rational,  whereas  we  believe  the  opposite  to  be  true.^ 
The  word  "Theism"  is  derived  from  the  Greek:  0co9, 
God. 

II.     GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 

1.     The  place  of  reason: 

Reason  has  its  uses  and  its  limitations.  Its  processes 
should  not  be  contemned.  It  is  obviously  a  divinely  im- 
planted power  of  the  human  mind,  and  it  is  rational  to 
assume  that  it  was  intended  to  be  used.  Many  minds 
also  find  pleasure  in  rational  processes,  and  that  would  be 
an  additional  evidence  that  they  are  to  be  employed.  No 
less  true  is  it  that  the  mind  is  so  constituted  that  it  cannot 
accept  anything  that  seems  to  it  to  be  incredible  and 
irrational. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  powers  of  human  reason  should 
not  be  over-estimated.  There  are  many  problems  which 
human  intellection  has  not  yet  solved,  in  spite  of  all  its 
endeavors.  Among  these  problems  are  the  following: 
What  is  matter?  What  is  mind?  How  are  matter  and 
mind  correlated  in  the  human  brain  ?  What  is  life  ?  How 
can  the  mind  cognize  objective  reality?  How  can  the 
will  determine  itself  in  liberty?  Mr.  Edison  declared 
some  time  ago  that,  with  all  his  knowledge  of  the  power 
of  electricity,  he  did  not  yet  know  whether  it  is  a  sub- 
stance or  only  a  force.  Therefore,  reason  should  be  mod- 
est in  pressing  its  claims ;  it  should  "not  think  more  highly 
of  itself  than  it  ought  to  think." 

I.  Even  the  word  "Natural,"  as  used  here,  should  be  distinguished  thus: 
its  opposite  is  not  "unnatural,"  but  "supernatural."  Christian  Theism  de- 
pends mostly  on  the  supernatural  revelation,  while  Natural  Theism  depends 
solely  on  the  light  of  nature  and  reason. 


Introductory  Data  17 

In  dealing  with  theistic  problems  in  this  work  we  shall 
use  human  reason  with  the  foregoing  principles  ever  in 
mind.  We  think  it  will  be  found  that  most  of  the 
methods  of  reasoning  employed  will  lead  to  proper  con- 
clusions ;  at  least,  to  those  that  are  more  tenable  than  the 
opposite  conclusions  would  be.  Yet  we  cannot  presume 
to  think  that  all  our  inductions  and  deductions  will  be 
convincing  to  all  classes  of  minds.  Perhaps  no  purely 
rational  process  can  give  the  human  mind  absolute  assur- 
ance of  the  existence  of  God,  especially  the  mind  that  has 
once  been  caught  in  the  meshes  of  atheism.  That  assur- 
ance doubtless  can  be  obtained  only  through  a  clear-cut 
Christian  experience.  However,  with  all  the  limitations 
of  our  human  faculties,  we  sincerely  believe  that  the 
theistic  position  can  be  shown  to  be  more  reasonable  than 
that  of  any  of  the  anti-theistic  theories. 

2.  Marks  of  God*s  handiwork  i^ 

If  there  is  a  God  who  made  and  sustains  the  universe, 
including  human  beings,  it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that 
we  should  be  able  to  see  marks  of  His  handiwork  in  the 
creation.  He  surely  would  not  leave  Himself  without  a 
witness  therein.  These  evidences  should  appear  in  the 
realms  of  both  matter  and  mind.  Every  human  artisan 
leaves  such  marks  upon  his  handiwork.  Why  not  the 
Divine  Artisan? 

3.  Man's  intuitions  and  mental  processes  reliable :' 

In  this  work  the  intuitions  and  general  laws  of  human 
thinking  will,  for  the  most  part,  be  regarded  as  trust- 
worthy.    If  man's  cognitions  of  objective  reality,  time, 

2.  Cf.     Valentine's   "Natural  Theology,"  pp.   1-3. 

3.  Cf.     Valentine,  iit  supra,  pp.  3,  4. 


18  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

space,  cause  and  effect,  moral  distinctions,  logical  con- 
clusions, etc.,  are  not  in  the  main  reliable,  true  knowledge 
and  science  are  utterly  impossible,  and  we  might  as  well 
stop  before  we  begin  our  investigations.  However,  in 
many  places  in  this  work,  especially  in  dealing  with 
Idealism,  Positivism  and  Kant's  Phenomenalism,  we  shall 
endeavor  to  show  the  rational  grounds  of  our  faith  in 
the  general  intuitions  and  experiences  of  the  human  mind. 

4.  Theism  a  science : 

Theism  is  a  true  science,  and  for  these  reasons:  It 
deals  with  observed  and  empirical  facts,  makes  proper 
inductions  from  them,  and  arranges  them  in  systematic 
order,  just  as  is  done  in  any  other  branch  of  science. 
Besides,  the  data  it  treats  of  are  just  as  patent,  just  as 
outstanding,  and  just  as  potent  in  their  influence  as  are 
the  data  of  any  other  worthy  domain  of  investigation. 

True,  at  times  a  priori  methods  must  be  used  and  philo- 
sophical principles  appealed  to,  but  this  is  true  of  all  the 
sciences,  however  empirical;  for  no  scientific  mind  can 
avoid  raising  philosophical  questions. 

5.  History  and  development  of  our  science: 

While  there  has  always  been  reHgion  among  men,  cen- 
turies passed  before  any  attempt  was  made  to  formulate 
a  science  of  religion.  The  greatest  of  the  Greek  and 
Roman  philosophers — Socrates,  Plato,  Aristotle,  Cicero, 
Seneca — made  efforts  along  this  line,  in  connection  with 
their  treatment  of  other  philosophic  problems.  However, 
it  is  only  in  modern  times  that  Natural  Theism  has  been 
so  developed  that  it  can  rightfully  take  its  place  among 
the  sciences  that  are  worthy  of  the  name.    The  same  may 


Introductory  Data  19 

be  said  of  practically  all  the  sciences,  whether  physical, 
mental,  moral  or  theistic. 

6.     Some  vital  relations  of  Theism: 

(i)     To  Christian  theology: 

This  relation  is  that  of  a  part  to  the  whole;  that  is, 
Christian  theology  includes  all  the  light  derived  from 
nature  and  reason,  and  adds  to  it  the  clearer  light  of  the 
divine  revelation  in  the  Bible.  According  to  the  Holy 
Scriptures  themselves,  the  God  who  revealed  His  will 
in  this  special  way  also  ''created  the  heavens  and  the 
earth"  (Gen.  i:i),  and  rules  over  the  universe,  and 
reveals  His  glory  therein  (Psalm  19:  i).  Christ,  who 
came  to  redeem  mankind,  proved  Himself  master  of  the 
natural  realm  as  well  as  of  the  spiritual.  Therefore,  it 
is  correct  to  say  that  Christian  Theology  includes  all  the 
data  of  Natural  Theism. 

No  doubt  all  scientific  theists  in  Bible  lands  are  more 
or  less  influenced  by  the  Christian  revelation,  whether 
they  are  distinctly  conscious  of  it  or  not.  As  Christianity 
is  one  of  the  outstanding  facts  of  the  world,  it  cannot  be 
ignored  in  any  system  of  Theism  that  professes  to  be 
scientific.  It  is  a  patent  fact  that  the  greatest  and  most 
satisfactory  systems  of  Natural  Theism  are  those  that 
have  been  wrought  out  by  men  who  accept  the  Bible  as  a 
divine  revelation. 

(2)     To  religion: 

Without  the  doctrine  of  God — a  God  who  is  a  personal 
Being — there  can  be  no  religion  deserving  of  the  title. 
The  very  idea  of  religion  involves  communion  with  the 
supernatural.    Men  have  attempted  to  establish  a  religion 


20  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

on  the  basis  of  an  impersonal  power  in  the  universe 
(Pantheism),  or  on  the  worship  of  Humanity  (Positiv- 
ism), but  such  forms  of  religion  are  extremely  vague,  and 
possess  little,  if  any,  practical  value,  as  will  be  proved 
in  subsequent  theses.  "The  doctrine  of  God  is  the  first 
doctrine  of  religion." 

(3)  To  morality: 

The  theistic  view  of  the  cosmos  furnishes  the  only  ade- 
quate ground,  sanction  and  inspiration  of  true  morality. 
The  denial  of  God's  existence  logically  results  in  the 
negation  of  moral  distinctions ;  for  if  there  is  no  personal 
God  back  of  the  universe,  why  should  one  thing  be  right 
and  another  wrong?*  This  subject  will  be  elaborated 
in  the  chapter  on  the  Moral  Argument  for  the  divine 
existence. 

(4)  To  the  State- 
Since  religion  and  morality  are  necessary  to  the  wel- 
fare and  perpetuity  of  the  State,  Theism  lies  at  the  very 
foundation  of  civic  well-being.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
a  government  whose  subjects  were  all  atheists  could  sub- 
sist for  any  considerable  time.  At  least,  no  country  has 
ever  ventured  to  try  the  experiment.  A  professed  atheist 
cannot  even  take  an  oath  in  a  civil  court.  Therefore,  for 
the  sake  of  the  State  the  young  people  of  our  schools  and 
colleges  should  be  well  grounded  in  the  reasons  for  the 
theistic  view  of  the  world. 

(5)  To  science  and  philosophy: 

Theism  furnishes  the  foundation  for  true  science  and 
philosophy;  for  it  places  back  of  all  observed  data  and 

4.  Goldwin  Smith:  "The  denial  of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  a  future 
state   is,  in  a  word,  the  dethronement  of  conscience." 


Introductory  Data  21 

phenomena  an  ordering  Mind,  thus  positing  a  real  basis 
for  system  in  science  and  for  ultimate  unity  in  philosophy. 
Without  an  ordering  Intelligence  back  of  all  things  as  the 
Creator  and  Governor,  the  universe  would  have  no  order 
and  system,  and  so  would  not  be  intelligible,  and  could 
not,  therefore,  be  an  object  of  investigation  by  the  human 
mind.  Intelligibleness  in  the  cosmos  connotes  Intelligence 
as  the  cause  of  the  cosmos. 

III.     THE  CONCEPTION  OF  GOD 

1.  Its  content: 

There  are  variable  conceptions  of  God  among  the  peo- 
ple of  the  earth.  They  range  from  the  crude,  hazy  and 
imperfect  ideas  of  pagan  people  to  the  clear  and  correct 
view  that  God  is  the  Supreme,  Absolute  and  Infinite 
Personality  who  is  the  First  Cause. 

2.  Its  genesis: 

(i)  A  number  of  erroneous  views  regarding  the  rise 
of  the  idea  of  God  have  been  advocated  from  time  to 
time.     Let  us  first  examine  these : 

a.  Some  persons  hold  that  the  idea  of  God  arose  from 
superstitious  dread  of  the  awful  and  mysterious  in  nature. 
This  is  not  an  adequate  view,  for,  if  it  were  true,  then, 
when  superstitious  fear  is  removed  by  greater  knowledge, 
the  idea  of  God  would  fade  away;  but,  instead  of  that 
being  the  result,  the  conception  of  God  becomes  clearer 
and  belief  in  Him  more  persistent  as  men  advance  in 
knowledge  of  the  universe  and  its  wonders.  It  would  be 
gratuitous  and  childish  to  hold  that  the  belief  of  the  many 
educated  theists  of  today  is  primarily  due  to  the  supersti- 
tious fears  of  their  primeval  ancestors. 


22  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

b.  Some  unbelievers  maintain  that  the  crafty  inven- 
tions of  priests  and  kings  account  for  the  origin  of  the 
idea  of  God.  This  is  an  antiquated  opinion.  No  well- 
informed  person  would  hold  it  now-a-days.  If  men  have 
no  natural  faculty  for  religion,  how  could  designing  men 
ever  obtain  so  potent  an  influence  over  almost  the  entire 
human  family?  If  there  is  no  God,  how  could  the  idea 
of  the  divine  Being  arise  in  the  minds  even  of  impostors  ? 
Besides,  the  many  intelligent  people  today  who  believe  in 
God  could  not  be  deluded  in  that  way. 

c.  Others  hold  that  ancestral  reverence  gave  rise  to 
the  idea  of  God.  But  it  has  been  found  that  many  nations 
who  do  not  worship  their  forefathers,  and  never  did 
worship  them,  have  positive  conceptions  of  a  divine 
Being.    Hence  this  explanation  is  inadequate. 

d.  Traditions  of  a  primitive  revelation  are  regarded 
by  some  as  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God.  This  may  in 
part  explain  why  most  men  believe  in  God,  especially  if 
the  tradition  is  founded  on  fact;  yet  it  is  not  probable 
that  mere  tradition,  in  view  of  its  uncertainty,  would 
have  kept  the  idea  alive  with  so  much  persistency  through 
all  the  ages,  if  there  were  not  an  innate  disposition  to 
believe  in  the  divine  Being. 

e.  According  to  other  speculatists,  mere  intuition  or 
innate  consciousness  adequately  accounts  for  the  genesis 
of  the  God  idea.  This  of  itself  would  not  be  a  sufficient 
explanation,  for  such  an  intuition  or  consciousness  must 
itself  be  accounted  for.  It  could  not  have  come  by 
chance,  nor  could  the  God  idea  have  evolved  without  an 
adequate  genetical  basis  and  source. 

f .  Today  some  theorists  contend  that  the  idea  of  God 
originated  in  purely  rational  processes.    This  view  is  con- 


Introductory  Data  23 

futed  by  the  patent  fact  that  many  primitive  people  who 
believe  in  God  never  could  have  mastered  the  profound 
arguments  of  systematic  Theism.  Moreover,  some  pro- 
found philosophers  have  become  very  obscure  in  their 
conceptions  of  God,  while  others  have  landed  in  agnosti- 
cism and  even  atheism. 

(2)  What,  then,  may  be  regarded  as  the  true  view 
of  the  origin  of  the  idea  of  God?  Only  that  view  which 
affords  an  adequate  explanation  of  all  the  facts  in  the 
case  can  be  regarded  as  scientific: 

a.  Man  was  created  in  the  image  of  God.  Of  course, 
this  is  a  proposition  that  remains  to  be  proved ;  but  sup- 
posing for  the  moment  that  it  is  a  fact,  it  would  ade- 
quately account  for  man's  innate  capacity  for  knowing 
God  and  his  longing  for  communion  with  Him.  If  man 
is  not  like  God  in  some  respects,  he  could  have  no  idea 
of  God,  no  communion  with  Him,  no  vital  relation 
to  Him.  Therefore,  man  must  bear  the  image  of  his 
Maker. 

b.  There  is,  in  addition,  the  view  of  a  primitive  reve- 
lation. While  we  do  not  believe  that  Natural  Theism 
needs  to  insist  on  this  item,  yet,  if  such  a  revelation  was 
made,  it  would  have  so  deepened  the  idea  of  God  in  the 
mind  of  primitive  man  as  to  help  to  account  adequately 
for  the  persistency  and  universality  of  the  idea. 

c.  A  study  of  ethnology  proves  that  man  has  a  natural 
disposition  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  Creator  and  Pre- 
server from  the  character  of  the  cosmos.  This  inference 
is  almost  intuitive,  and  requires  no  profound  logical  proc- 
esses of  thought.  The  only  adequate  explanation  of  this 
universal  phenomenon  is  that  the  capacity  for  the  God 
idea  and  the  disposition  to  cherish  it  have  been  divinely 


24  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

implanted  in  man's  mind.     Surely  the  idea  of  God  never 
could  have  evolved  from  a  no-idea  of  God. 

3.     Its  original  form;^ 

(i)     Wrong  views: 

A  number  of  erroneous  views  of  the  original  form  of 
the  theistic  idea  are  held  by  certain  classes  of  advocates. 
We  shall  merely  mention  them  here,  and  define  them, 
reserving  our  reasons  for  rejecting  them  to  the  discussion 
of  the  true  view  under  (2)  below.  The  erroneous  views 
are  the  following: 

a.  Fetichism: 

The  worship  of  natural  objects,  which  are  regarded  by 
the  votaries  as  possessed  by  spirits.  Animism  (from 
anima,  soul)  is  practically  the  same  form  of  supersti- 
tion. Fetichism  is  from  facticius,  which  means  "made  by 
art,"  ficticious. 

b.  Polytheism : 

The  worship  of  many  gods,  which  are  regarded  as  more 
or  less  above  and  distinct  from  natural  objects.  Poly- 
theism is  from  ttoAv?,  many,  and  ©eos,  god. 

c.  Henotheism: 

The  idea  of  simply  a  national  or  tribal  God,  but  not  the 
one  and  only  God  of  the  whole  universe.  When  a  nation 
believes  that  it  is  presided  over  by  only  one  God,  while 
other  nations  are  ruled  by  other  gods,  that  nation  would 
hold  to  the  henotheistic  religion.  Henotheism  is  from 
cvos,  one,  and  0eo9,  God. 

5.  For  much  of  this  section  we  are  indebted  to  Valentine's  "Natural 
Theology,"  which  is  of  great  value. 


Introductory  Data  25 

(2)     The  true  view: 

We  believe  that  the  original  conception  was  Mono- 
theism (Greek,  fwvo^,  one,  and  0eo9,  God),  the  conception 
of  one  God  and  only  one,  who  presides  over  all  nations 
and  over  the  whole  cosmos.  Our  reasons  for  holding 
this  view,  and  rejecting  the  foregoing  views  under  a,  b 
and  c  are  the  following : 

a.  Psychological  reason: 

It  would  be  easier  for  primitive  man  to  conceive  of 
only  one  God  than  of  many  gods.  The  natural  develop- 
ment of  the  human  mind  is  from  one  to  many,  from  the 
singular  to  the  plural,  from  the  simple  to  the  complex, 
from  the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous.  All  evo- 
lutionists define  the  process  and  development  of  the  cos- 
mos in  these  terms  and  in  this  order.  This  argument 
may  not  appeal  to  some  persons,  because  they  are  apt  to 
think  of  men  as  they  are  today ;  but  let  us  try  to  imagine 
the  primeval  man  as  the  first  idea  of  God  arises  in  his 
mind,  and  we  shall  see  that  his  initial  conception  must 
have  been  of  one  God.  Afterward  the  idea  of  more  than 
one  God  would  dawn  upon  his  untutored  thought. 

b.  Philological  reason: 

In  most  of  the  principal  languages  of  the  world  the 
word  for  God  comes  from  the  same  root.  Many  of  the 
greatest  linguists''  proclaim  this  view.  While  it  may 
seem  to  point  to  nothing  more  than  the  unitary  origin  of 
the  human  family,  yet  the  idea  of  one  God  would  agree 
better  with  the  fact  of  one  root-word  for  God  than  would 
the  idea  of  a  plurality  of  gods. 

6.     Cf.     Valentincp  ut  supra,  p.  x8.  * 


26  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

c.  Historical  reason: 

The  further  back  we  trace  the  histories  of  the  chief 
reHgions,  the  more  nearly  do  they  approach  to  the  doc- 
trine of  pure  monotheism.  This  is  simply  a  question  of 
fact,  not  of  mere  theory  and  speculation.  It  is  true  of 
the  religions  of  Eg}'pt,  Babylonia,  Persia,  India  and 
^  ChinaJ  History  fails  to  record  a  single  example  of  a 
nation  or  tribe  that  has  advanced  by  its  own  efforts  from 
a  state  of  animism  and  polytheism  to  the  monotheistic 
conception.^  On  the  other  hand,  history  tells  us  of 
numerous  cases  of  decline  and  degeneration  in  religion. 
In  this  place  we  appeal  to  the  Bible  only  as  one  of  the 
historical  books  of  the  world,  and  in  it  we  find  first  the 
conception  of  one  God,  who  "created  the  heavens  and 
the  earth,"  whereas  afterward  arose  the  tendency  to 
degenerate  into  idolatry  or  polytheism.  'The  Book  of 
the  Dead"  is  the  oldest  Egyptian  document  yet  found ;  it 
teaches  monotheism,  while  later  Egyptian  theology  has 
its  pantheon.  All  this  affords  strong  proof  that  the 
original  form  of  the  God  idea  was  that  of  monotheism. 

d.  Ethnological  reason: 

As  has  been  already  indicated,  there  has  been  a  general 
tendency  among  the  nations  which  have  been  unenlight- 

7  Valentine,  pp.  19,  20;  Max  Muller,  "Chips  from  a  German  Workshop;" 
Renouf:  "Hibbert  Lectures  on  the  Religion  of  Ancient  Egypt,  pp.  92,  93; 
James  Legge,  "The  Religion  of  China,"  pp.  11,. 16.  ,, 

8.  Vide  Tames  Orr,  "The  Christian  Conception  of  God  and  the  World, 
pp.  75,  409-412  (the  latter  reference  is  very  valuable).  See  also  cogent 
statement  by  Dr.  F.  P.  Ramsay  in  "The  Princeton  Theological  Review  for 
April,  1917,  page  355-  Dr.  Ramsay  says:  "There  is  no  known  instance  of 
monotheism  being  derived  from  Polytheism.  .  .  So  far  as  the  present 
writer  knows,  there  is  not  one  scintilla  of  proof  of  the  existence  of  any 
people  whose  ancestors  were  never  monotheistic;  and  monotheism  is  as  old 
as  any  trustworthy  human  records."  Principal  A.  M.  Fairbairn  (  Mudies 
in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.  12)  and  Max  Muller  C  Is  Fetichism  a 
Primitive  Form  of  Religion?"  p.  105)  make  similar  statements.  (See  Orr, 
nt  supra,  p.  4'59-) 


Introductory  Data  27 

ened  by  Christianity  to  degeneration  in  religion.  The 
progress  has  been  downward  instead  of  upward.  This 
fact  would  point  to  an  original  pure  form  of  religion, 
namely,  monotheism,  while  polytheism  and  fetichism 
would  be  later  decadent  and  corrupted  forms. 


PART  II 

PROOFS  OF  THE  DIVINE  EXISTENCE 

CHAPTER  II 


I.  DEFINITION 

The  General  Argument  is  that  form  of  theistic  proof 
which  is  based  on  the  universal  belief  in  God  and  the 
universal  religious  instinct. 

II.  DIVISIONS 

1.     The  universal  belief  in  God: 

( I )  History  and  ethnology  prove  that  all  nations  have 
a  belief  in  a  Supernatural  Being  or  in  supernatural  beings. 
True,  a  certain  class  of  scientists  once  contended  that 
tribes  had  been  found  in  central  Africa  and  Australia 
who  had  no  conception  of  divine  or  supernatural  beings  ; 
but  later  investigations  have  disproved  their  contention. 
Even  if  such  tribes  had  been  found,  what  would  have 

I.  In  his  excellent  work,  "Natural  Theology,"  Dr.  Milton  Valentine 
calls  the  first  class  of  proofs  "The  Presumptive  Arguments,"  by  which  he 
means  those  arguments  which,  while  they  do  not  afTord  a  clearly  logical 
demonstration,  yet  offer  a  more  or  less  convincing  presumption  that  there  is 
a  God.  However,  after  a  good  deal  of  thought  on  the  subject,  we  are  con- 
vinced that  these  arguments  are  quite  as  convincing  as  are  the  other  argu- 
ments. In  lieu  of  a  better  term,  therefore,  we  use  the  word  "General,  be- 
cause the  proof  deals  with  the  general  or  universal  belief  in  God,  etc.  The 
last  two  divisions  included  by  Valentine  under  the  "Presumptive  Argument" 
belong  more  logically  elsewhere,  and  are  located  in  this  work  in  what  wc 
regard  as  the  proper  places. 

28 


General  Argument  29 

been  their  state  of  civilization?  It  surely  would  have 
been  of  the  lowest  type.  But  human  beliefs,  especially 
those  of  an  exalted  and  morally  potent  character,  should 
not  be  gauged  by  the  most  degraded  forms.  Would  it 
not  be  more  rational  to  form  our  conceptions  of  the  divine 
Being  and  His  existence  from  the  highest  forms  of  civili- 
zation? We  do  not  determine  our  ideas  of  science,  moral- 
ity and  esthetics  from  the  conceptions  held  by  the  lowest, 
crudest  and  basest  tribes.  Why,  then,  our  ideas  of  God? 
Besides,  such  inferior  tribes,  if  actually  found,  would  be 
so  exceptional  as  to  prove  the  rule.  However,  the  best 
results  of  research  thus  far  lead  us  to  conclude  that  there 
are  no  exceptions. 

Objection  may  be  made  on  the  ground  that  in  many  ^ 
tribes  the  conception  of  God  or  of  gods  is  extremely 
crude,  gross  and  grotesque.  Very  true ;  but  still  the  idea 
is  present,  and  in  most  positive  form.  Pagan  nations 
have  crude  ideas  of  other  important  facts  and  reaHties, 
such  as  would  come  under  the  head  of  physical  science, 
civil  government  and  moral  distinctions.  We  must  also 
admit  that  perhaps  our  own  conceptions  of  the  Deity 
fall  far  below  the  wonderful  and  glorious  reality. 

Some  scholars  regard  Buddhism  as  an  exception  to  the  / 
general  belief  in  God  or  gods.  They  maintain  that  it  is 
atheistic.  However,  we  believe  that  deeper  investigation 
proves  Buddhism  to  have  been  originally  and  fundamen- 
tally monotheistic.  Brahm  was  ''pure  intelligence,  sole 
and  self -existent,"  and  Buddha  ''absolute  light  and  per- 
fect wisdom."  These  are  attributes  that  pertain  only  to 
a  personal  God. 

Professed  atheism  in  civilized  lands  is  sometimes  looked 
upon  as  a  disproof  of  the  general  rule.    But  this  reason- 


/ 


30  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

ing  is  not  sound  for  the  following  considerations :  First, 
atheism  is  rare  and  exceptional,  rather  proving  than  dis- 
proving the  general  rule;  second,  atheism  is  the  result  of 
a  kind  of  speculative  thinking  that  usually  disregards  the 
testimony  of  consciousness  and  experience;  third,  athe- 
ists always  posit  some  primal  cause  in  the  place  of  God 
and  predicate  of  it  many  Godlike  qualities. 

(2)  Now  what  is  the  clear  inference  from  the  univer- 
sal belief  in  God  ?  Surely  it  must  connote  that  He  exists. 
If  there  is  no  God,  if  there  is  nothing  in  the  universe  but 
material  substance,  how  could  the  idea  of  God  ever  have 
arisen  at  all  in  the  human  mind  ?  Could  mere  materiality 
ever  have  evolved  the  conception  of  a  divine  Being? 
Water  cannot  rise  higher  than  its  source.  And  why 
should  the  idea  of  God  have  become  so  general,  persistent, 
dominant  and  potent?  If  material  substance  is  the  only 
entity,  and  yet  has  led  almost  the  entire  human  family 
to  believe  that  there  is  a  God,  then  material  substance 
must  be  a  universal  falsifier.  In  that  case  you  could  not 
trust  its  testimony  on  any  subject. 

Let  us  apply  the  scientific  law  of  casuality  to  this  argu- 
ment: every  eflfect  must  have  an  adequate  cause.  If  there 
is  a  God,  and  He  created  the  world,  and  implanted  in 
man's  mind  the  germ  of  the  God  idea,  we  have  an  entirely 
adequate  cause  for  the  grand  eflfect,  namely,  that  practic- 
ally all  men  and  nations  believe  in  the  divine  existence. 
This  view  will  also  account  adequately  for  the  spontaneity 
of  the  idea  in  the  universal  human  mind. 

Let  us  also  apply  the  law  of  evolution  to  this  locus. 
If  there  is  no  God  back  of  the  cosmos,  the  idea  of  God 
never  could  have  arisen  in  the  human  mind;  for  nothing 
can  be  evolved  that  was  not  previously  involved.     The 


General  Argument  31 

idea  of  Deity  could  never  have  evolved  from  a  no-God 
source.  Mere  material  substance  never  could  evolve  by 
only  its  resident  forces  into  any  idea,  much  less  so  great 
an  idea  as  that  of  a  Supreme  and  Absolute  Being.  Water 
does  not  rise  higher  than  its  source.  However,  if  God 
is  back  of  and  in  the  evolutionary  process,  an  adequate 
cause  has  been  assigned  for  the  grand  outcome. 

Should  the  objection  be  raised  that,  if  there  is  a  God, 
He  would  have  bestowed  upon  the  human  family  a  clear 
and  perfect  conception  of  His  being  and  character  from 
the  start,  we  would  reply  that  God  evidently  has  chosen 
the  method  of  development  rather  than  the  method  of 
initial  completeness.  Geology  teaches  that  the  lower 
forms  of  life  appeared  first;  afterwards  the  higher  forms. 
"First  the  corn,  then  the  ear,  then  the  full  corn  in  the 
ear"  seems  to  be  God's  modus  operandi  in  nature.  For 
purposes  of  His  own,  whose  wisdom  we  may  not  ques- 
tion, He  has  ordained  also  that  the  conception  of  Him- 
self shall  be  a  matter  of  development.  The  science  of  the 
day,  which  holds  so  strenuously  to  the  doctrine  of  devel- 
opment, should  interpose  no  objection  to  this  method  of 
the  divine  procedure. 

2.    The  universal  religious  instinct: 

( I )  Men  in  all  the  world  not  only  believe  in  God,  but 
also  engage  in  acts  of  worship  and  devotion.  The  most 
recent  ethnological  researches  prove  that  religious  sen- 
timents exist  in  all  nations  and  tribes.  A  few  years  ago 
the  National  Geographic  Society  sent  out  its  scientific 
representatives  to  study  the  various  ethnic  tribes  of  the 
world.  After  the  most  careful  and  unbiased  investiga- 
tions, all  these  men  testified  that  they  had   found  no 


32  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

people  which  did  not  have  some  form  of  religion,  some 
religious  sentiment.  This  was  the  testimony,  not  of  theo- 
logians, but  of  purely  scientific  investigators,  who  could 
have  had  no  e.r  parte  interest  in  the  results. 

(2)  Not  only  so,  but  the  religious  principle  is  ex- 
tremely potent  in  all  nations,  dominating  individual  and 
community  life.  It  is  not  merely  a  negligible  factor. 
Witness  the  predominant  influence  of  religion  in  India, 
China  and  Japan.  The  same  is  true  of  peoples  who  are 
very  low  in  the  scale  of  civilization,  as,  for  example,  the 
jungle  folk  of  Africa. 

(3)  Everywhere  the  human  heart  has  a  crazing  for 
Qod — "feels  after  Him,  if  perchance  it  may  find  Him" 
(Acts  17:27).  The  Psalmist  puts  this  general  yearning 
in  vivid  phrase:  ''As  the  heart  panteth  after  the  water 
brooks,  so  panteth  my  soul  after  thee,  O  God :  My  soul 
thirsteth  for  God,  for  the  living  God"   (Psalm  42:1,  2). 

(4)  It  will  be  said  that  there  are  exceptions,  at  least, 
in  the  so-called  civilized  countries ;  that  there  are  people 
who  do  not  seem  to  have  any  desire  for  religion  and 
religious  worsliip.  We  reply,  the  apparent  exceptions  do 
not  invalidate  the  rule,  and  that  for  the  following  reasons : 

a.  There  are  men  here  and  there  who  have  obscure 
and  crass  ideas  of  the  good  and  the  beautiful  as  well  as  of 
the  spiritual.  Does  this  prove  that  there  is  not  an  inher- 
ent ethical  and  esthetic  principle  in  human  nature? 

b.  Sin  has  come  into  the  world,  and  has  darkened 
man's  spiritual  insight ;  has,  in  a  measure,  brought  a  feel- 
ing of  constraint  between  God  and  men,  and  in  many 
instances  has  partly  seared  the  human  conscience. 

c.  Even  unbelievers  and  rationalists  often  feel  im- 
pelled to  substitute  some  form  of  religion  and  worship 


General  Argument  33 

for  the   forms   they   seek  to   destroy.     As   conspicuous 
examples,  note  Comte,  Strauss,  Hseckel,  Tyndal,  etc. 

(5)  Now  what  are  the  logical  inferences  from  the 
foregoing  facts? 

a.  It  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  there  must  be  a 
reality  to  complement  and  answer  to  this  universal  crav- 
ing for  communion  with  God.  In  nature's  realm  food  is 
provided  to  satisfy  hunger,  water  for  thirst,  music  for 
the  ear,  light  and  color  for  the  eye.  The  only  comple- 
ment for  the  universal  religious  craving  would  be  a 
personal  God.  Is  it  probable  that  we  have  been  constituted 
to  have  our  bodily  wants  supplied,  while  our  higher  wants, 
those  of  the  soul,  must  go  unsatisfied?  If  such  were  the 
case,  the  cosmos  would  not  be  a  rational  one. 

b.  Again,  apply  the  laws  of  evolution  and  causality 
to  this  locus.  Mere  natural  evolution  from  material  sub- 
stance never  could  have  produced  a  longing  for  God  and 
an  instinct  to  worship  Him.  Every  effect  must  have  an 
adequate  cause.  Whatever  is  evolved  must,  at  some  pre- 
vious time,  have  been  germinally  involved.  If  mere  mate- 
rial substance  is  the  ground  and  cause  of  all  things,  and 
has  simply  by  its  own  resident  forces  evolved  the  theistic 
idea  and  the  yearning  for  God,  we  would  here  have  an 
effect  that  is  greater  than  its  cause ;  which  is  scientifically 
absurd.  Every  cause  must  be  as  great  as,  or  greater 
than,  its  effect. 


CHAPTER  III 

TELEOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT^ 

I.     DEFINITIONS 

1.  Etymology  of  the  term:  reAo?,  end,  and  Xoyos, 
discourse. 

2.  The  TeleologicaP  Argument  is  the  proof  of  the 
divine  existence  which  is  based  on  the  evidence  of  de- 
sign, purpose  and  adaptation  in  the  creation.  It  is  often 
called  the  argument  of  design,  purpose  or  final  cause. 

3.  The  Final  Cause  is  the  end  or  purpose  in  the  mind 
of  the  designer  in  the  planning  and  making  of  a  structure. 
It  is  called  the  Final  Cause  because  its  manifestation 
appears  at  the  end  of  the  process.  In  reality  it  is  the 
primary  cause,  for  it  exists  first  of  all  in  the  mind  of  the 
designer. 

4.  The  Efficient  Cause  is  the  force  or  forces  em- 
ployed by  the  designer  to  bring  about  the  desired  eflfect. 

5.  Adaptation  is  the  selection  and  use  of  the  proper 
means  to  secure  the  desired  end. 

6.  Final  Cause  and  Efficient   Cause  are  thus  re- 

1.  On  this  argument  compare  the  followinar  valuable  works:  Valentine, 
ut  supra,  pp.  74-205  (most  thorough-going) ;  Orr,  "The  Christian  View  of 
God  and  the  World,"  pp.  97-103,  415-418;  Lindsay,  "Recent  Advances  in 
Theistic  Philosophy,"  pp.  170-215;  Fisher,  "The  Grounds  of  Theistic  and 
Christian  Belief,"  pp.  29-55;  Balfour,  "Theism  and  Humanism,"  pp.  42-63 
(rather  unique  in  mode  of  presentation) ;  Micou,  "Basic  Ideas  in  Religion," 
pp.  50-99  (also  consult  index);  Bruce,  "Apologetics,"  pp.  150-153  (clear  and 
succinct);  Ward,  "What  I  Believe  and  Why,"  Chapters  I-XII. 

2.  Sometimes  called  the  Eutaxiological  Argument  when  desipn  in  the 
universe  as  a  whole  is  considered.     From  evrjla,  order,  and  \6yos. 

34 


Teleological  Argument  35 

lated:  The  former  determines  what  forces  or  energies 
shall  constitute  the  latter  and  how  they  shall  be  employed 
throughout  the  process.  Final  Cause  is  dependent  on  the 
Efficient  Causes  that  are  available  for  accomplishing  its 
purpose.  Thus  they  are  mutually  dependent.  Efficient 
Cause  without  Final  Cause  would  bring  only  chaos ;  Final 
Cause  without  Efficient  Cause  would  be  helpless. 

II.     PROOFS  OF  DESIGN  IN  THE  COSMOS^ 

1.    In  organisms: 

The  eye,  the  ear,  the  hand,  foot,  lungs,  heart,  man's 
entire  anatomical  structure;  the  structure  of  animals. 

The  latest  researches  in  physiology  prove  that  the 
human  eye  has  800  complemental  contrivances,*  all  of 
which  are  necessary  to  sight.  Study  its  complicated 
structure,  and  note  what  a  wonderful  piece  of  mechanism 
it  is.  Its  various  parts  are  so  constructed  and  combined 
as  to  bring  about,  so  far  as  we  can  understand,  only  one 
purpose,  namely,  vision.  If  the  mechanism  of  the  eye 
was  ever  designed  for  any  other  purpose  than  sight,  it  has 
never  dawned  on  the  intelligence  of  man.  However,  even 
the  800  organic  particulars  do  not  exhaust  the  number 
in  the  eye,  for  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  substance 
of  this  organ  is  composed  of  atoms,  molecules,  and  per- 
haps of  vortices,  ions  and  electrons,  and  all  these  had 
to  be  brought  together  in  conformity  with  the  plan  and 
purpose  of  eye. 

The  ear  is  scarcely  less  complicated.  But  how  differ- 
ent from  the  eye!  Its  purpose  being  different,  it  has 
been  organized  on  an  entirely  different  model,  and  one 

3.  Many  of  the  examples  are  selected  from  Valentine's  presentation. 

4.  Kinsley,  "Was  Christ  Divine?"  p.  13. 


36  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

O 
that  points  just  as  inevitably  to  a  definite  purpose.    The 
very  fact  that  it  is  so  different  from  the  eye,  because  its 
purpose  is  so  different,  accentuates  the  proof  of  specific 
design  for  auditory  ends. 

Every  part  of  the  human  hand  connotes  a  definite  end 
in  view.  If  the  human  hand  were  Hke  that  of  the  mon- 
key, man,  with  all  his  intelligence,  could  make  little  or  no 
progress  in  mechanics,  and  that  would  make  progress 
and  civilization  almost  impossible.  None  of  the  arts  and 
sciences  could  be  developed. 

The  human  foot  was  evidently  designed  for  the  specific 
end  of  enabling  man  to  walk,  and  walk  uprightly.  What 
a  beneficent  arrangement  that  was!  Just  one  point: 
There  is  a  ligament  running  crosswise  of  the  instep  which 
holds  the  parallel  cords  in  their  place  in  the  graceful  and 
necessary  curve  on  the  upper  part  of  the  foot.  This  fact 
is  so  patent  and  convincing  a  proof  of  confederate  and 
specific  purpose  that  it  cannot  be  gainsaid. 

But  note  man's  entire  anatomical  structure.  All  these 
various  organs  are  combined  into  a  unified  plan.  Res- 
spiration,  circulation  and  digestion  all  join  to  produce  a 
specific  result,  just  as  if  they  had  been  put  together  by 
marvelous  foresight.  Note  this,  too :  the  retina  is  only  in 
the  eye;  the  tympanum  only  in  the  ear;  the  olfactory 
nerves  only  in  the  nose;  the  palate  only  at  the  upper  end 
of  the  throat;  all  these  are  placed  just  where  they  should 
be  for  their  several  highly  specialized  purposes. 

In  the  animal  world  the  bird  is  organized  on  a  highly 
specialized  scheme  for  flying ;  the  fish  for  swimming ;  the 
serpent  for  crawling;  the  quadruped  for  walking.  Here 
is  not  only  evidence  of  design,  but  also  evidence  of  end- 
less diversity  of  design. 


Teleological  Argument  37 

2.  In  animal  instinct : 

Design  is  seen  in  the  marvelous  instinct  of  the  bees  in 
making  their  combs  on  the  precise  mathematical  model 
best  adapted  for  their  purpose,  combining  lightness, 
strength  and  proper  dimensions.  No  less  marvelous  is 
the  instinct  of  ants,  wasps,  spiders  and  many  other  in- 
sects. Who  taught  the  wasps  and  hornets  to  make  their 
papier  machef  Callow  birds  in  the  nest  have  only  one 
way  to  be  fed :  almost  immediately  after  they  come  from 
the  shell,  their  instinct  impels  them  to  open  their  mouths 
for  their  food.  Each  species  of  animal  instinctively  takes 
its  infantile  food  in  its  own  way,  and  here  again  nature 
shows  endless  variety.     "Each  after  its  kind." 

3.  In  chemistry  and  physics: 

In  this  realm  there  is  patent  proof  of  design.  The 
combinations  of  atoms  and  molecules  in  various  ways 
always  bring  about  a  highly  specialized  result.  Oxygen 
and  nitrogen  are  combined  in  precisely  the  right  ratio  to 
.  form  the  volatile  atmosphere  which  we  breathe  to  sustain 
life,  being  fitted  especially  to  the  human  organism.  A 
different  combination  of  these  elements  would  be  abso- 
lutely fatal  to  animal  life  of  any  kind.  Thus  chemistry 
dovetails  into  biology.  Hydrogen  and  oxygen  in  specific 
ratio  form  water,  which  again  is  admirably  adapted  to 
human  and  animal  need. 

Respecting  water  there  is  a  specific  fact  that  is  worthy 
of  attention.  Cold  almost  invariably  contracts  substances. 
As  water  cools,  it  follows  this  general  law  to  a  certain 
degree  of  temperature ;  then  just  at  the  right  point — the 
"strategic"  moment,  we  had  almost  said — it  begins  to 
expand  by  virtue  of  its   crystalizing  propensity,   forms 


38  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

ice,  becomes  lighter  than  the  water,  and  remains  on  the 
upper  surface.  If  it  continued  to  contract  and  grow 
heavier,  the  ice  would  sink  to  the  bottom  of  all  our  rivers, 
ponds  and  lakes;  soon  they  would  be  converted  into  a 
solid  mass  of  ice  during  the  winter,  destroying  all  animal 
life  in  the  water,  and  melting  very  little  during  the  sum- 
mer. Neither  would  the  warmth  of  summer  ever  suc- 
ceed in  thawing  the  frost  out  of  the  ground.  What  a 
beneficent  contrivance  of  nature  do  we  see  here! 

Fire  for  warmth  is  another  beneficent  arrangement.  It 
also  produces  carbon  dioxide  and  aqueous  vapor,  which 
are  then  absorbed  by  the  trees  and  grasses  as  their  food. 
As  fire  is  the  result  of  the  combination  of  the  oxygen 
of  the  air  and  the  carbon  of  combustible  substances,  why 
does  not  a  little  blaze  set  the  entire  atmosphere  into  con- 
flagration? Because  nature  has  herself  placed  an  em- 
bargo on  such  a  result.  As  Dr.  Milton  Valentine  says: 
"Everything  appears  to  be  ordered  so  as  to  run  in  chan- 
nels of  economic  utility." 

4.  In  biology: 

The  growth,  divisions  and  combinations  of  cells  are 
so  specific  in  bringing  about  the  various  forms  of  life 
and  organisms  that  no  one  can  fail  to  see  here  abundant 
proof  of  intentionality. 

5.  In  psychology: 

The  human  mind  usually  acts  with  conscious  and  defi- 
nite purpose.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  the  human  mind 
is  part  of  the  cosmos,  and  is  fitted  into  it  in  a  most  vital 
way.  The  very  fact  that  it  is  a  purposive  mind  implies 
the  idea  of  purpose  in  the  cosmos. 


Teleological  Argument  39 

6.     In  the  universe  as  a  whole: 

Its  wise  arrangement,  its  unity  of  plan,  its  mathemat- 
ical precision  of  movement,  and  its  adaptation  in  innu- 
merable ways  to  human  need — all  these  point  indubitably 
to  final  cause  in  its  origin  and  structure.  Many  persons 
who  are  not  deeply  impressed  with  the  argument  of  design, 
when  applied  to  individual  structures  in  nature,  are  con- 
vinced of  the  validity  of  the  design  argument  when  applied 
to  the  entire  cosmos,^ 

III.    DESIGN     CONNOTES     AN     INTELLIGENT 
DESIGNER 

1.  Intelligence  is  the  most  natural  and  spontaneous 
explanation  of  order,  purpose  and  adaptation.  There- 
fore, to  seek  another  cause  for  these  effects  in  the  cos- 
mos, as  Hume  and  Mill  did,  is  to  disregard  the  innate 
feelings  and  conceptions  of  the  human  mind.  Besides, 
why  should  men  try  to  find  some  obscure  and  indefinite 
cause  when  one  may  be  seen  lying  clearly  on  the  surface  ? 

2.  The  only  cause  of  design  that  we  know  of  is 
mind.  We  certainly  can  attribute  purpose  and  finaHty 
to  no  other  known  source.  Therefore,  either  mind  is  the 
cause  of  the  wonderful  confederation  seen  in  the  uni- 
verse, or  else  we  know  nothing  of  its  causation.  Our 
choice  must  lie  between  Theism  and  Agnosticism. 

3.  What  is  the  only  alternative  of  an  intelligent 
First  Cause?     It  is  chance.     We  must  choose  between 

5.  However,  we  cannot  agree  to  such  methods  of  reasoning.  Suppose 
you  were  to  pass  through  a  great  factory  or  mill,  constructed  for  the  spe- 
cific purpose  of  turning  out  a  certain  product,  would  you  say  that  the  struc- 
ture as  whole  gives  proof  of  design,  but  the  smaller  mechanisms  do  not? 
You  surely  would  not  reason  in  so  lame  a  way.  Every  individual  part  of 
the  structure  is  a  work  of  design.  If  it  were  not,  the  factory  would  never 
turn  its  specific  product.      So   with  the  universe. 


40  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

God  and  chance.  But  chance  is  utterly  inadequate  for  the 
following  reasons: 

(i)  It  is  unthinkable  that  blind  chance  could  ever 
produce  anything  but  chaos.  But  the  universe  is  a  cos- 
mos, not  a  chaos.  Let  us  think  for  a  moment.  Could 
an  orderly  world  ever  have  evolved  out  of  chaos  without 
an  ordering  Intelligence?  The  outstanding  principle  of 
the  cosmos  is  law.  Scientific  men  today  are  constantly 
ringing  the  changes  on  "the  reign  of  law."  If  the  world 
was  produced  by  chance,  then  chance  produced  the  very 
antithesis  of  itself !  That  certainly  would  be  a  marvelous 
exploit.  It  would  be  a  greater  miracle  than  the  creation 
of  the  universe  by  an  all-wise  and  all-powerful  God. 

(2)  In  this  connection  let  us  note  the  mathematical 
law  of  probability  in  permutations  and  geometrical  pro- 
gression : 

On  ten  bells  3,628,800  changes  can  be  rung.  How 
much  probability  would  there  be  of  these  ten  bells  ever 
playing  the  tune,  **My  country,  'tis  of  thee,"  by  pure 
chance?  Everyone  knows  this  never  could  occur.  Yet 
a  trained  mind  could  so  manipulate  the  ten  bells  as  to  play 
many  tunes.  Thus  design  and  order  always  imply  intel- 
ligence— mind. 

The  figure  2,  multiplied  in  geometrical  progression, 
requires,  in  the  fifth  order,  19,729  figures  to  express  it. 
Again,  this  indicates  the  degrees  of  improbability  for 
mere  chance  to  accompHsh  any  specific  purpose. 

The  26  letters  of  the  English  alphabet  are  capable  of 
so  many  different  combinations  that  they  would  require 
27  figures  to  express  them.  How  much  probability  would 
there  be  that  these  letters  would  ever  fall  together  into 
a  book  by  pure  fortuity  ?    Yet,  human  intelligence,  work- 


Teleological  Argument  41 

ing  with  design,  may  combine  them  in  such  order  as  to 
form  vast  libraries. 

Take  loo  dice  blocks,  numbered  from  one  to  lOO,  in 
your  hand,  and  fling  them  promiscuously  on  the  floor. 
How  often  would  you  have  to  repeat  the  performance  to 
cause  them  to  fall  in  a  straight  row  and  in  numerical 
order?  However,  by  using  thought  and  purpose  you  can 
easily  lay  them  down  in  that  way. 

As  has  been  said,  the  human  eye  has  800  complemental 
particulars,  each  of  which  is  essential  to  sight.  But  this 
falls  far  short  of  the  reality,  for  the  eye  is  composed  of  an 
inconceivable  number  of  atoms,  molecules  and  living  cells, 
to  say  nothing  of  vortices,  ions,  and  electrons.  There 
certainly  would  not  be  much  chance  for  chance  in  this 
case.  It  should  also  be  remembered  that  the  eye  is  set 
in  the  midst  of  a  congeries  of  many  other  organs,  just  as 
wonderful  as  itself,  to  which  it  is  fitted  and  which  are 
adapted  to  it.  Divine  intelligence  back  of  this  wonder- 
fully purposeful  arrangement  is  the  only  adequate 
explanation. 

4.  The  human  mind,  with  all  its  rational,  self-deter- 
mining and  purposive  powers,  is  a  part  of  the  cosmos,  and 
is  organically  related  to  it.  But  the  mental  could  not 
evolve  from  the  non-mental,  the  purposive  from  the  non- 
purposive,  nor  freedom  from  bald  necessity.  It  is  rational 
to  believe  that  the  Power  that  produced  the  human  mind 
would  be  at  least  as  purposive  as  its  product. 

5.  All  science  is  based  on  the  principle  that  the  cos- 
mos is  intelligible  to  the  human  mind.  Otherwise  no 
kind  of  science  would  be  possible ;  no  order  would  be  dis- 
cernible; no  classification  of  data  could  be  made.  As  the 
cosmos  is  capable  of  being  apprehended  by  intelligence, 


42  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

it  must  be  the  product  of  intelligence.  This  is  practically 
the  argument  of  Plato's  doctrine  of  "Ideas"  discernible 
in  the  cosmos. 

6.  The  science  of  mathematics  furnishes  cogent  proof 
that  an  intelligent  Being  designed  and  constructed  the 
universe.  By  abstract  processes  the  human  mind  can 
solve  mathematical  problems,  and  arrive  at  absolutely 
correct  results.  Now,  when  these  principles  are  applied 
to  the  universe,  as  in  mathematical  astronomy,  it  is  found 
that  there  is  an  exact  correspondence  between  the  prin- 
ciples and  the  empirical  data.  The  universe  is  constructed 
according  to  a  mathematical  plan.  Again  this  fact  con- 
notes intelligence — a  mathematical  Mind — as  the  cause 
of  the  universe. 

7.  As  a  scientific  hypothesis.  Theism  is  an  adequate 
explanation  of  the  cosmos  and  its  phenomena,  with  all 
its  marks  of  intentionality.  No  other  hypothesis  is  ade- 
quate. According  to  scientific  procedure,  we  ought  to 
adopt  the  hypothesis  that  furnishes  an  adequate  explana- 
tion of  all  the  data. 

8.  To  rivet  the  conclusion,  the  evidences  of  design  in 
the  universe  prove  that  intelligence  and  will  must  be 
its  cause;  but  intelligence  and  will  are  the  attributes  of 
personality;  therefore,  the  cause  of  the  universe  must 
be  a  Person — God. 

IV.     OBJECTIONS     TO     TELEOLOGY     STATED 
AND  CONFUTED 

I.  Objection:  Nature  and  art  are  very  different  in 
their  operations;  therefore,  design  in  the  former  may 
come  from  some  other  source  than  intelligence  and  per- 
sonality.   This  is  the  objection  of  Hume  and  Mill. 


Teleological  Argument  43 

Reply :  Observe  that  this  argument  is  based  on  a  mere 
"may  be."  Without  impugning  the  motives  of  the  object- 
ors, it  creates  the  impression  that  it  is  a  makeshift  to  avoid 
a  reasonable  conclusion.  At  all  events,  it  seeks  for  an 
obscure  and  unknown  cause  rather  than  to  accept  the 
obvious  and  natural  one.  The  human  mind  intuitively 
attributes  design  to  intelligence  and  intelligence  to  per- 
sonality. Therefore,  the  above  objection  runs  counter 
to  the  normal  processes  of  human  thinking. 

2.  Objection:  In  nature  the  moving  force  is  imma- 
nent (that  is,  within  the  structure)  ;  in  art  it  is  external. 
This  is  the  chief  argument  of  Pantheism. 

Reply:  While  it  is  true  that  in  nature  the  moving 
principle  is  within  the  structure,  yet  there  must  be  some- 
thing back  of  the  immanent  force  to  start  and  direct  it 
along  adaptive  lines,  or  the  result  would  be  chaos  instead 
of  law  and  order.  Blind  force  would  surely  be  inade- 
quate to  produce  orderly  results,  whether  brought  about 
immanently  or  transcendentally.  "Unconscious  intelli- 
gence" is  a  contradiction  of  terms.  There  can  be  no 
intelligence  which  does  not  work  in  the  light  of  its  own 
consciousness.  Besides,  many  works  of  art,  like  watches 
and  other  humanly  contrived  mechanisms,  operate  im- 
manently; yet  no  one  ever  thinks  that  they  made  them- 
selves or  were  put  together  by  chance.  How  much  less 
the  wonderful  mechanisms  of  nature?  The  very  fact 
that  the  forces  in  nature's  operations  are  immanent  is 
all  the  more  convincing  proof  of  the  wonderful  intelli- 
gence and  power  of  nature's  Contriver. 

3.  Objection:  Mere  evolution,  with  its  laws  of 
natural  selection  and  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  is  a  suffi- 
cient explanation  of  the  cosmos,  including  man.    This  is 


44  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

the  argument  of  Materialism  and  Naturalistic  Evolu- 
tion. 

Reply:  Evolution,  if  scientifically  proved  to  be  true, 
would  demand  a  Supreme  Intelligence  back  of  the  won- 
derful process  to  initiate  and  direct  it;  for  nothing  can 
be  evolved  that  was  not  previously  involved;  and  surely 
mere  chance  could  not  establish  a  regular  order  and 
modus  operandi.  Mere  evolution  explains  nothing  ulti- 
mate. It  is  not  a  power  and  intelligence  in  itself;  it  is 
merely  a  mode  of  operation,  a  law  of  development.  The 
fundamental  question  is,  What  is  the  cause  of  the  evo- 
lutionary process?  What  or  who  formulated  the  laws 
of  evolution?  Materialism  is  always  superficial,  because 
it  stops  before  it  reaches  the  Primal  Cause  of  all  the  laws 
of  orderly  development.  Can  a  law  devise,  administer 
and  execute  itself?  Such  great  evolutionists  as  A.  R. 
Wallace,  Richard  Owen,  St.  George  Mivart,  Asa  Gray, 
Richard  Dana  and  John  Fiske  maintained  that  Theism 
is  the  necessary  postulate  of  evolution. 

4.  Objection:  ''Adaptation  is  the  necessary  law  of 
existence/' 

Reply:  This  again  is  a  superficial  mode  of  reason- 
ing, for  you  might  ask  why  it  is  so,  even  if  it  were  the 
truth.  But  it  is  not  true,  for  chaos  might  just  as  well 
exist  as  order,  if  there  is  no  ordering  Intelligence  back 
of  the  world.  The  higher  the  organism  the  more  diffi- 
cult to  produce  and  preserve.  Any  one  can  see  that 
disorder  would  be  much  easier  to  produce  than  order. 
A  well-known  principle  is  that  intelligence  is  always 
required  to  "bring  order  out  of  chaos."  Again,  the  cru- 
cial question  is.  Why  should  blind  chance  want  to  pro- 
duce a  world  at  all,  whether  a  chaos  or  a  cosmos?    On 


Teleological  Argument  45 

the  other  hand,  if  there  is  a  God,  we  can  easily  see  why 
He  should  create  the  universe.  True  science  always 
seeks  for  the  explanation  that  is  adequate. 

5.  Objection:  There  are  some  things  in  nature  that 
do  not  have  any  apparent  purpose,  and  others  that  do 
not  seem  to  be  wisely  contrived.  Do  not  these  facts 
invahdate  Teleology? 

Reply:  Admitting  the  above  proposition  to  be  true, 
we  may  well  lay  the  emphasis  on  the  words  "apparent" 
and  "seem.''  Our  inability  to  see  design,  or  the  wisdom 
of  design,  in  any  object  does  not  disprove  design,  but 
simply  proves  our  inability  to  perceive  it.  There  are 
few  things,  however,  in  which  we  cannot  see  some  wise 
purpose,  even  if  it  be  only  for  man's  moral  discipline. 
A  perfect  world,  one  in  which  there  were  no  trials  and 
mysteries,  certainly  would  not  be  well  adapted  to  bring 
out  the  sturdy  and  heroic  human  virtues.  There  may 
be  people  to  whom  this  argument  makes  no  appeal,  but 
they  prove  by  that  very  token  that  their  moral  standards 
are  not  of  a  high  order ;  that  they  would  prefer  an  exist- 
ence of  mere  automatic  pleasure  (Epicureanism)  to  one 
that  develops  moral  character.  Again,  the  general  rule 
is  that  nature  reveals  design ;  we  should  not  make  the 
exceptions  the  rule.  Still  again,  many  things  that  once 
were  supposed  to  be  useless  have  in  recent  years  been 
proven  to  have  great  utility.  This  would  indicate  that 
further  progress  in  science  may  prove  that  all  things 
have  their  use,  and  it  is  part  of  God's  design  that  men's 
minds  shall  be  developed  by  their  efforts  to  discover  all 
His  great  and  wise  purposes.  Moreover,  it  has  been 
good  for  man  both  mentally  and  morally  to  trust  the 
wisdom  and  good  will  of  the  Power  that  is  back  of  the 


46  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

Universe.  No  doubt,  too,  the  advent  of  sin  introduced 
some  confusion  into  the  realm  of  nature  just  as  it  has 
brought  discord  into  the  human  sphere.  Pessimism — 
the  philosophy  of  the  daunted  and  discouraged — may  see 
only  the  apparent  defects  in  the  cosmos;  rational  optim- 
ism sees  the  evils,  but  "trusts  in  God  and  does  its  best." 

6.  Objection:  There  are  areas  in  the  world  where 
chance  seems  to  rule.  We  speak  of  accidents,  good  luck, 
bad  luck,  chance,  fortuity.  These  words  connote  reality, 
not  mere  fancy  or  delusion.  A  hundred  dice  blocks  thrown 
down  haphazard  would  never  fall  in  a  straight  row  and 
in  consecutive  order.  Rocks  hurled  from  the  crater  of 
a  volcano  fall  in  great  confusion  upon  the  surrounding 
country. 

Reply:  There  is  just  enough  of  a  realm  of  chance 
in  the  world  to  prove  how  utterly  inadequate  it  would 
be  to  account  for  the  innumerable  evidences  of  design. 
The  instances  of  chance  simply  accentuate  the  instances 
of  order  and  purpose.  In  reality,  however,  there  is  no 
chance  in  the  world;  all  is  controlled  by  law;  only  in 
some  cases  the  law  does  not  come  sufficiently  within  the 
range  of  human  intelligence  to  enable  us  to  see  the 
evidences  of  its  operation  and  the  purpose  of  its  De- 
signer. Every  dice  block  cast  upon  the  floor  falls  into 
its  place  by  the  operation  of  inevitable  laws,  such  as 
force,  momentum,  gravity,  hardness,  friction,  etc.  So 
with  every  rock  hurled  from  a  volcano. 

Summation  of  the  argument: 

Teleology  is  evident  in  the  cosmos;  design  connotes 
intelligence  and  will;  intelligence  and  will  connote  per- 
sonality; therefore  the  primal  cause  of  the  cosmos,  with 


Teleological  Argument  47 

its  order  and  design,  must  be  a  Person.    This  Person  the 
Theist  calls  God. 

V.    TELEOLOGY  PROVES  GOD  TO  BE  ALL- 
WISE  AND  INFINITE 

1.  There  are  reasoners  who  concede  that  design  con- 
notes intelligence  and  personality,  and  therefore  a  God 
back  of  the  cosmos;  but  they  deny  that  it  proves  Him 
to  be  all-wise  and  infinite.  They  base  their  objections 
on  the  defects  and  imperfections  in  the  natural  and 
human  realms.  They  also  contend  that  the  universe  is 
not  infinite — and  this  we  grant;  therefore  its  Maker 
need  not  be  infinite — which  we  do  not  grant. 

2.  In  refutation  we  offer  the  following  considera- 
tions : 

(i)  The  processes  of  the  cosmos  are  so  intricate,  so 
complicated,  so  inconceivably  numerous,  so  profound  and 
mysterious,  that  the  human  mind  almost  spontaneously 
feels  that  the  wisdom  which  invented  and  created  all  of 
them,  and  set  them  in  operation,  and  now  upholds  them, 
must  be  infinite. 

(2)  In  contriving  and  making  the  universe,  with  all 
its  complexity  and  extent,  the  possible  contingencies  that 
might  have  arisen  would  demand  an  infinite  intelligence 
to  provide  for  all  of  them,  and  prevent  any  miscarriage 
of  the  vast  and  intricate  plan. 

(3)  The  universe  is  so  vast,  and  therefore  its  ultimate 
purpose  must  so  be  far-reaching,  as  to  require  omniscience 
as  its  most  reasonable  ground.  To  contrive  so  vast  a  plan, 
and  then  to  uphold  all  its  infinitesimal  parts  in  the  great 


48  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

unity  of  the  original  design,   would  require  a  wisdom 
which,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  would  have  to  be  infinite. 

(4)  If  God  is  infinite  in  wisdom,  it  is  reasonable  to  be- 
lieve that  He  must  be  infinite  in  all  His  other  attributes; 
or,  to  put  it  still  more  cogently,  it  would  be  utterly  absurd 
to  suppose  that  God  could  be  infinite  in  one  attribute  and 
finite  in  His  other  attributes  and  the  essence  of  His  being. 
Therefore  the  argument  from  Teleology  proves  that  God 
is  an  Infinite  Being  or  Personality. 


CHAPTER  IV 

COSMOLOGICAL    ARGUMENT^ 

I.  DEFINITIONS 

1.  The  etymology  of  the  term  cosmology:  ko?juo?, 
world,  and  A0709,  discourse.  However,  the  derivation  of 
the  word  does  not  give  a  real  clue  to  the  argument,  and 
therefore  the  definition  given  below  must  be  committed 
and  understood. 

2.  Cosmos  means  a  world  of  order,  and  is  therefore 
the  antithesis  of  chaos. 

3.  The  Cosmological  Argument  is  the  argument  that 
the  cosmos  is  an  efifect  produced  by  a  Primal  Cause, 
which,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  must  be  a  Person. 
Sometimes  it  is  called  the  argument  from  causality,  or 
from  cause  and  effect.^ 

II.  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  CAUSALITY: 

1.     Statement: 

Every  effect  and  event  must  have  an  adequate  cause. 
Some  objection  has  been  raised  to  the  words  "effect"  and 
"cause"  when  thus  connected,  on  the  ground,  as  Valen- 
tine^ says,  that  "then  the  proposition  would  involve  only 

1.  Here  consult  the  authors  in  loco  cited  in  the  first  footnote  for  Chap- 
ter III. 

2.  Also  called  the  ^Etiological  Argument  from  airla,  cause,  and  \6yos- 

3.  "Natural  Theology,"  p.  6i. 

49 


50  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

the  self-evidence  of  verbal  correlatives."     However,  the 
mode  of  reasoning  employed  to  establish  this  objection 
strikes  us  as  vague  and  abstruse.    "Effect"  and  "cause" 
may  be  verbal  correlatives,  but  "event"  and  "cause"  are 
essential  correlatives,  and  therefore  the  logical  process  is 
the  same  whether  the  word  "event"  or  the  word  "effect" 
is  used.    The  simple  statement,  "Every  effect  must  have 
an  adequate  cause,"  at  once  impresses  the  normal  mind 
as  an  axiomatic  truth — one  that  stands  in  its  own  inherent 
right,  and  needs  no  more  proof  than  the  statement  that 
two  plus  two  equal  four,  or  that  a  straight  line  is  the 
shortest  distance  between  two  points.     Indeed,  to  our 
mind  the  word  "effect"  is  better  than  the  word  "event," 
for  the  mind  at  once  grasps  the  simple  idea  of  effect, 
while  it  must  always  make  more  or  less  effort  to  get  the 
full  concept  of  an  event.    The  idea  of  an  effect  is  simple, 
meaning  a  result  of  any  kind,  while  that  of  an  event  is 
complex,  involving  always  the  connotation  that  it  must 
be  something  that  has  had  a  beginning,  something  that 
has  come  into  being  where  there  was  nothing  of  the  kind 
before.     Of  course  both  forms  of  statement  are  true: 
"Every  effect  must  have  an  adequate  cause"  and  "Every 
event  must  have  an  adequate  cause." 
2.     Proofs  of  the  principle: 

(i)  It  is  a  primary  intuition  of  the  human  mind, 
like  an  axiom  in  mathematics.  This,  on  the  face  of  it, 
is  a  strong  reason  for  its  acceptance  without  any  attempt 
at  logical  demonstration.  Very  few  people  would  try 
to  prove  that  2  plus  2  equal  4.  Most  men  would  say  that 
it  is  a  necessary  intuition  in  a  world  constructed  as  the 
present  cosmos  is  and  with  such  a  mental  constitution 
as  human  beings  possess. 


Cosmological  Argument  51 

(2)  It  is  practically  a  universal  concept.  The  only 
persons  who  profess  to  doubt  it  are  those  men  who  be- 
come confused  by  metaphysical  speculations,  and  who, 
therefore,  demand  a  logical  proof  for  propositions  that 
are  known  only  by  the  mind's  natural  intuitions  and  not 
by  logical  processes.  Even  logic  itself  has  no  function 
unless  it  accepts  as  reliable  the  native  human  intuitions. 

(3)  The  science  of  the  day  is  all  based  on  the  funda- 
mental proposition  that  effects  are  really  caused.  When- 
ever an  effect  is  noted  in  the  physical  or  the  psychical 
realm,  the  scientist  of  today  invariably  seeks  for  its  cause, 
and  demands  that  the  cause  be  adequate. 

(4)  To  hold  that  we  only  imagine  a  casual  connec- 
tion, when  there  is  none,  after  all,  is  to  assert  that  man 
is  afflicted  with  mental  impotence;  that  his  mind  is 
elementally  false  in  its  functioning.  Kant's  view  that 
there  is  no  real  "nexus"  between  cause  and  effect  makes 
human  thought  abortive.  Hume  and  Mill,  lost  in  specu- 
lations and  depending  only  on  logical  processes,  taught  that 
there  is  only  a  time  relation,  only  the  relation  of  ante- 
cedent and  consequent,  between  what  we  call  cause  and 
effect;  but  this  is  wrong,  and  for  at  least  two  reasons: 
a.  The  mind  intuitively  concludes  that  there  is  a  real  pro- 
ducing force  in  the  antecedent  that  precedes  the  effect; 
and  why  should  not  the  intuitional  faculty  be  as  reliable 
as  the  logical  faculty?  b.  The  mind  cannot  rest  satis- 
fied without  asking  the  question  why  such  and  such  con- 
sequences invariably  follow  such  and  such  antecedents, 
if  there  is  no  causal  relation  between  them.  Surely  mere 
parallelism  and  coincidence  are  not  adequate  explanations. 
We  stand  firmly  on  the  basis  of  the  universal  intuitions, 
experiences  and  concepts  of  human  thought. 


52  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

IV.     THE  UNIVERSE  AN  EFFECT 

I.  The  universe  is  real,  not  imaginary.  We  have  al- 
ready presented  our  reasons  for  accepting  the  native  in- 
tuitions of  the  human  mind.*  Here  we  will  simply  state 
that  the  speculations  of  Kant  and  other  advocates  of  the 
phenomenalistic  school  are  not  valid.  Their  contention 
is  as  follows :  We  do  not  know  "things  in  themselves" — 
called  noiimena — but  know  only  phenomena.  There- 
fore the  human  mind  may  be  so  constructed  that  it  im- 
poses its  own  ''forms  of  thought"  upon  phenomena,  and 
thus  we  cannot  be  sure  that  its  intuitions  of  outward 
reality  are  true  to  the  facts.  Things  may  not  be  at  all 
what  they  seem.  The  phenomena  apprehended  by  the 
mind  may  not  correspond  at  all  to  the  things  themselves, 
because  the  mind  may  distort  them  by  its  own  constitu- 
tional bent  and  make-up. 

In  reply  we  say,  it  is  true,  we  do  not  know  the  essence 
of  things,  but  only  their  phenomena.  But  why  should  not 
the  phenomena  give  to  the  mind  a  true  report  of  objec- 
tive reality  as  far  as  the  mind  is  able  to  comprehend  it? 
Is  the  world  based  on  false  and  hypocritical  principles? 
There  is  no  evidence  that  such  is  the  case.  Then  why 
should  it  be  assumed  or  even  imagined,  that  the  human 
mind  is  afflicted  with  hallucination,  so  that  it  distorts  ob- 
jective reality,  and  does  not,  so  far  as  it  is  endowed  with 
the  ability,  apprehend  things  in  their  true  aspects  and 
relations?  Should  it  be  said  that  we  are  often  deluded 
by  mirages,  ignes  fatui,  and  other  mere  appearances, 
we  reply  that  we  usually  are  able  sooner  or  later  to  cor- 

4.  The  problem  of  the  nature  and  validity  of  knowledge,  called  Epis- 
temology,  is  one  of  the  outstanding  problems  of  philosophy.  It  is  treated 
searchingly  and  extensively  in  Dr.  Samuel  Harris's  "The  Philosophical 
Basis  of  Theism,"  Chapters  II-VII.  The  reader  is  also  referred  to  Hib- 
ben's  clear  exposition  in  his  "The  Problems  of  Philosophy,"  Chapter  VI. 


Cosmological  Argument  53 

rect  such  delusions  by  discovering  the  reality  in  the  case. 
Besides,  if  there  were  no  objective  reality,  there  would 
not  even  be  a  mirage.  Somewhere  in  the  vicinity  there 
must  be  the  real  landscape  that  is  imaged  on  the  rari- 
fied  air.  If  you  move  toward  the  mirage,  it  will  pres- 
ently disappear,  and  you  will  know  that  it  was  only  a 
reflection,  and  hence  an  optical  illusion;  but  if  you  see 
a  real  landscape  and  approach  it,  you  will  find  it  there. 
Thus  human  experience  is  able  to  distinguish  between  an 
illusion  and  a  reality.  If  all  the  world  were  an  illusion, 
no  such  distinction  could  be  made. 

Nothing  is  clearer,  either,  than  that  the  human  mind 
readily  distinguishes  between  a  mere  coincidence  and  a 
real  case  of  cause  and  effect.  For  instance,  if  two  persons, 
without  any  previous  understanding,  should  happen  to 
meet  at  the  intersection  of  two  roads,  we  would  say  at  once 
that  it  was  simply  a  coincidence.  However,  if  they  should 
previously  arrange  by  telephone  to  meet  at  that  particular 
place,  we  would  say  the  result  was  due  to  a  real  and  ade- 
quate cause.  What  absurdity  of  reasoning  it  would  be 
to  attribute  all  antecedents  and  consequents  to  mere  coin- 
cidence or  fortuity ! 

Again,  it  is  quite  gratuitous  to  assume  that  the  human 
mind  is  so  constructed  as  to  be  mal-apropos  to  the  cosmos 
in  which  it  is  placed.  Being  here,  and  being  highly  en- 
dowed with  certain  distinguishing  qualities,  it  is  much 
more  reasonable  to  believe  that  it  has  been  made  to  fit 
truly  into  the  environment  in  which  it  has  been  placed. 
If  it  is  not;  if  it  is  deluded  in  all  its  intuitions,  or  if  it 
sees  everything  in  distorted  form,  then  the  world,  includ- 
ing man,  is  a  hodgepodge,  not  a  cosmos.  Then,  too,  we 
might  as  well  abandon  all  efforts  at  arriving  at  scientific 


54  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

and  philosophical  truth.  In  that  case,  too,  the  con- 
clusions of  skepticism  and  agnosticism  would  be  just  as 
unreliable.  Let  us  cease  to  think  altogether,  if  all  our 
thinking  is  a  delusion  and  a  snare. 

The  philosophy  of  Idealism  goes  further  than  that  of 
mere  phenomenalism  (Kant  and  Comte),  but  we  shall 
deal  with  it  under  its  proper  head  in  Part  III  of  this  work. 

2.  Being  real,  the  universe  is  finite,  because  it  is  made 
up,  as  to  its  physical  constitution,  of  finite  parts,  called 
atoms,  aions  or  electrons ;  and  no  number  of  finite  parts 
added  together  could  ever  reach  infinity.  The  same  prop- 
osition is  true  of  the  mental  world ;  no  addition  of  finite 
minds  could  ever  aggregate  an  infinite  mind.  We  think 
this  statement  self-evident.  Yet  the  objection  has  been 
raised  that  an  infinite  number  of  parts  added  together 
would  sum  up  infinity.  But  that  is  an  unthinkable  assump- 
tion, for  you  never  could  arrive  at  an  infinite  number  of 
parts.  The  infinite  belongs  to  a  different  category  from 
the  finite.  It  is  not  something  that  is  either  physical  or 
partible.  Moreover,  if  you  even  could  add  together  an  in- 
finite number  of  minds,  you  would  simply  have  that  many 
different  minds,  not  an  infinite  unitary  mind.  Therefore 
we  maintain  that  the  only  tenable  position  is  that  the  uni- 
verse, however  vast,  is  finite. 

3.  Being  finite,  the  universe  must  be  dependent. 
All  its  parts  are  found  to  be  dependent;  therefore  as  a 
whole  it  must  be  dependent. 

4.  Being  finite  and  dependent,  the  universe  must 
have  had  a  beginning ;  for  if  it  were  eternal,  it  could  not 
be  finite  and  dependent.  How  could  it  be  infinite  in  one 
way,  that  of  eternity,  and  finite  in  other  respects?  Then, 
if  it  were  eternal,  it  would  be  self -existent,  for  it  never 


Cosmological  Argument  55 

would  have  been  brought  into  being ;  but  we  have  already 
proved  from  its  finity  that  it  must  be  dependent  as  a  whole 
and  in  all  its  parts. 

5.  If  the  universe  is  finite  and  dependent  and  had  a 
beginning,  its  inception  must  have  been  an  effect  and  an 
event  that  demand  an  adequate  cause  outside  of  itself. 
An  effect  cannot  be  its  own  cause.  The  universe,  there- 
fore, could  not  be  its  own  cause.  This  leads  us  logically 
to  our  next  proposition. 

V.    THE  CAUSE  OF  THE  UNIVERSE 

1.  The  Creator: 

If  the  universe  is  finite  and  dependent  or  contingent  and 
had  a  beginning,  it  must  have  been  created.  If  there 
ever  was  a  time  when  it  was  not,  there  is  no  thinkable 
way  of  its  having  been  brought  into  being  save  by  an  act 
of  creation.    But  creation  demands  a  Creator. 

2.  The  Creator  the  First  Cause : 

If  the  Creator  of  the  universe  was  not  the  First  Cause, 
He  must  have  been  created  by  another  Creator;  but  we 
know  nothing  of  one  or  more  such  intermediary  beings. 
At  all  events,  our  thought  must  go  back  finally  to  the 
Primal  Creator,  for  thought  cannot  rest  in  the  idea  of 
an  infinite  series  of  causes  suspended  on  nothing.  Such 
a  conception  spells  nihilism  of  thought. 

3.  The  First  Cause  eternal  and  uncaused : 
There  is  something  now — that  is,  something  really  ex- 
ists at  the  present  time.    All  the  universe,  including  our- 
selves, is  evidence  of  that  fact.     No  normal  mind  will 
deny  so  self-evident  a  proposition.     Now,  if  there  ever 


56  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

was  a  time  when  there  was  nothing,  nothing  could  have 
ever  been.  Therefore  something  must  have  always  ex- 
isted. From  this  it  follows  that  the  ultimate  or  primal 
cause  must  be  eternal  and  self -existent,  the  uncaused 
Cause  of  all  other  existences. 

4.     The  First  Cause  a  Person: 

(i)  The  creation  of  the  universe  must  have  been  a 
free,  voluntary  act,  not  a  coerced  one.  It  is  unreason- 
able to  believe  that  the  eternal,  self-existent,  independent 
First  Cause  should  have  been  compelled  by  anything  in 
Himself  to  create  a  world;  and  of  course  there  was  noth- 
ing outside  of  Himself  yet  in  existence  to  coerce  Him. 
Therefore  we  maintain  that  the  creation  of  the  universe 
must  have  been  a  free  act  of  the  Creator;  but  freedom 
can  be  predicated  only  of  a  person,  never  of  a  thing;  there- 
fore the  First  Cause  (or  the  Creator)  must  be  a  Person. 

(2)  The  universe  is  a  cosmos,  evincing  order  and  de- 
sign in  its  constitution ;  but  order  and  design  connote  in- 
telligence and  freedom,  and  intelligence  and  freedom  con- 
note personality.  Therefore  the  cosmos  demands  a  Per- 
son as  its  only  adequate  Cause. 

(3)  Human  beings  are  part  of  the  cosmos,  and  they 
are  persons.  The  only  adequate  cause  for  such  an  effect 
is  a  First  Cause  who  is  a  Person.  How  could  personal- 
ities ever  have  evolved  from  an  impersonal  source?  Re- 
member we  are  seeking  for  the  scientific  principle  of  an 
adequate  cause  for  all  events  and  effects. 

(4)  Human  personalities — a  very  important  part  of 
the  universe — have  self -consciousness,  freedom,  morality, 
and  spirituality.  The  only  adequate  cause  that  could 
have  produced  these  personal  qualities  must  be  a  personal 


Cosmological  Argument  57 

Creator.  Mere  materialistic  evolution  would  have  been 
utterly  inadequate  to  produce  these  great  and  unique  re- 
sults. Can  the  scientific  mind  of  the  day  rest  satisfied  in 
assigning  anything  but  an  adequate  cause  for  all  the  phen- 
omena of  the  cosmos?  Let  us  remember  that  human  per- 
sonalities are  phenomena  of  the  highest  order.  High 
results  demand  a  high  cause — one  that  is  adequate.  To 
assign  a  cause  that  is  insufficient  is  contrary  to  the  scien- 
tific methods  and  temper  of  the  day. 

5.     The  First  Cause  infinite: 

(i)  If  the  Creator  were  not  infinite,  there  would  be 
something  greater  than  He — that  is,  infinity — and  He 
would  not,  after  all,  be  the  First  Cause,  self-existent  and 
eternal. 

(2)  H  the  Creator  were  not  infinite  in  power,  He 
would  sometime  become  exhausted  in  sustaining  so  vast 
a  universe. 

(3)  If  He  were  not  infinite  in  wisdom,  a  contingency 
might  sometime  arise  for  which  He  was  not  prepared, 
and  that  would  hurl  Himself  and  the  universe  to  ruin. 
His  wisdom  must  be  equal  to  every  possible  emergency. 
His  knowledge  must  be  perfect  so  that  He  can  never  be 
surprised  and  disconcerted. 

(4)  If  He  were  not  infinite  in  love,  justice,  and  self- 
control.  He  would  sometime  do  wrong,  and  that  would 
bring  about  His  own  destruction  and  that  of  His  universe. 

(5)  The  number  of  possible  contingencies  in  so  vast 
a  universe  would  demand  that  its  Maker  and  Preserver 
be  infinite  in  all  His  attributes.  The  principle  of  caus- 
ality requires  an  infinite  personal  Being  back  of  all  the 
data  and  phenomena  of  the  universe. 


58  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

VI.    AN  OBJECTION  STATED  AND  REFUTED 

1.  Objection: 

It  is  just  as  difficult  to  account  for  God  as  for  the  mate- 
rial universe.  Therefore  why  not  accept  the  hypothesis 
that  the  universe  itself  is  eternal,  self-existent  and 
uncaused  ? 

2.  Refutation : 

Something  now  exists ;  therefore  something  must  have 
always  existed.  If  there  ever  was  a  time  when  nothing 
existed,  nothing  could  have  ever  come  into  existence.  Ex 
fiihilo  nihil  fit.  Now,  is  it  not  more  reasonable  to  believe 
that  the  primal  entity  was  an  ordering  Mind  than  that  it 
was  mere  blind  force?  Place  God  back  of  the  universe, 
and  you  have  an  adequate  cause  and  explanation  of  the 
universe  and  all  its  varied  phenomena.  Deny  God's  exist- 
ence, and  you  have  no  adequate  explanation  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  single  atom,  to  say  nothing  of  all  the  various 
forms  of  life,  intelligence,  morality  and  spiritual  belief 
and  experience.  You  are  plunged  into  intellectual,  moral 
and  spiritual  agnosticism.  Your  science  and  philosophy 
break  to  pieces  at  their  very  fountain  head.  You  have  a 
universe  without  an  adequate  cause. 

Therefore  the  Cosmological  Argument,  based  on  the 
sound  scientific  and  philosophic  principle  of  causality, 
demands  a  personal  God  back  of  the  cosmos  as  the  only 
adequate  cause  of  its  being  and  diversified  phenomena; 
therefore  it  is  the  only  scientific  hypothesis. 


CHAPTER  V 

ONTOLOGICAL  ARGUMENT^ 

I.  DEFINITION 

1.  Etymology  of  the  term: 

Qv,  ovTo^,  being,  and  Aoyo?,  discourse.  The  etymology, 
however,  does  not  in  itself  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  precise 
form  of  the  argument  in  Theism.  See  definition  follow- 
ing: 

2.  Meaning  o£  the  term  as  used  in  Theism: 

The  Ontological  Argument  is  the  argument  that  is  based 
on  the  idea  possessed  by  the  human  mind  of  a  perfect 
and  absolute  Being. 

II.  HISTORICAL  SKETCH 

1.  The  germs  of  the  argument  are  found  in  Plato, 
who  taught  that  our  minds,  in  examining  the  cosmos, 
discover  the  evidence  of  ideas.  If  they  were  not  there, 
our  minds  would  not  find  them.  Hence,  he  reasoned, 
there  must  be  a  Mind  back  of  the  cosmos  whose  ideas 
are  reflected  in  its  constitution  and  order. 

2.  The  argument  was  first  elaborated  and  put  into 
syllogistic  form  by  Anselm  (1093-1109  A.  D.),  who  was 
its  first  real  proponent  and  defender.    The  Anselmic  form 

I.  See  footnote  i,  Chapter  III,  and  consult  the  several  authors  in  loco, 
especially  Valentine,  Orr  and  Micou. 

59 


60  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

of  the  argument  is  given  with  sHght  modification  under 
III  below. 

3.  It  was  further  developed  and  modified  by  Des- 
cartes, Butler,  Cousin,  Leibnitz,  and  Sir  William 
Hamilton. 

4.  In  the  most  recent  times  it  has  been  acutely  advo- 
cated in  revised  form  by  Dorner,  Valentine,  Orr,  Fisher, 
Harris,  Lindsay  and  Micou. 

III.  STATEMENT  OF  THE  ARGUMENT 

1.  The  mind  possesses  the  idea  of  the  perfect  and  ab- 
solute Being; 

2.  Existence  is  a  necessary  attribute  of  such  a  Being, 
or  He  would  not  be  perfect  and  absolute ; 

3.  Therefore  such  a  Being  must  exist. 

IV.  CRITICISM  OF  THE  ARGUMENT 

The  first  and  second  statements  are  true  as  separate 
statements ;  but  they  are  not  related  to  each  other  as  the 
major  and  minor  premises  of  a  syllogism,  because  the 
existence  of  a  being  is  not  necessarily  included  in  the 
idea  of  a  being.  The  mere  idea  of  a  thing  does  not  neces- 
sitate or  connote  its  existence.  You  may  imagine  a  Cen- 
taur, but  you  know  that  such  a  creature  has  no  existence ; 
it  is  purely  a  creature  of  the  fancy.  True,  the  idea  of  a 
perfect  and  absolute  Being  is  a  unique  idea,  as  we  shall 
show  later;  yet  even  then  we  must  admit  that  the  above 
threefold  statement  is  not  a  true  syllogism,  and  hence 
does  not  carry  conviction  to  most  minds.  The  very  fact 
that  few  persons  follow  the  reasoning  and  feel  its  force 
proves  that  it  is  at  least  obscure;  that  there  is  a  dark 
place  somewhere  in  the  argument.  Compare  it  with  a 
true  logical  syllogism,  and  note  the  diflference : 


Ontological  Argument  61 

1.  All  men  are  mortal; 

2.  John  Jones  is  a  man ; 

3.  Therefore  John  Jones  is  mortal. 

Here  we  see  that  the  man  mentioned  in  the  minor  prem- 
ise belongs  to  the  class  named  in  the  major  premise.  For 
that  reason  the  conclusion  is  inevitable.  However,  the 
same  relation  does  not  subsist  between  the  major  and 
minor  premises  in  the  Ontological  Argument. 

V.  VALUE  OF  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  ARGU- 
MENT 

When  properly  stated,  the  argument  has  real  value, 
even  if  it  does  not  have  convincing  force.  To  some 
classes  of  minds  it  makes  a  very  distinct  appeal,  while  to 
a  few  it  is  regarded  as  the  crowning  proof  of  the  divine 
existence.    Let  us  note  how  far  its  validity  extends. 

I.  The  idea  of  a  perfect,  absolute  Being  is,  after  some 
thought,  found  to  be  a  necessary  idea  of  the  human 
mind.  It  is  not  a  pure  intuition,  but  follows  necessarily 
from  certain  postulates  of  human  thinking  and  experi- 
ence, such  as  the  following :  having  the  idea  of  the  rela- 
tive, which  all  of  us  have,  we  cannot  help  thinking  of  the 
absolute;  so  the  idea  of  the  dependent  implies  the  idea 
of  the  independent ;  the  derived  the  idea  of  the  underived ; 
all  effects  and  events  the  idea  of  an  original  uncaused 
Cause.  We  know  that  the  relative,  dependent  and  de- 
rived exist,  for  we  see  them  all  about  us,  and  realize  that 
we  belong  to  the  same  category.  But  the  moment  you 
think  of  the  contingent  matters,  that  moment  you  get 
an  inevitable  conception  of  the  ultimate  uncontingent 
ground  and  basis  of  them  all. 

Now,  note :  If  the  perfect  and  absolute  Being  does  not 


62  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

exist,  our  necessary  ideas  are  false,  and  our  minds  have 
been  so  constructed  as  to  delude  us.  On  the  other  hand, 
if  the  perfect  and  absolute  Being  really  exists,  our  neces- 
sary ideas  have  a  true  basis,  and  the  mind,  when  it  func- 
tions fundamentally,  may  be  trusted.  Herein  lies  the 
singular  force  of  this  argument — that  the  idea  of  the  per- 
fect Being  is  a  necessary  idea  of  the  human  mind,  whereas 
the  idea  of  an  imaginary  being,  or  even  a  finite  being, 
is  not  a  necessary  one. 

2.  Let  us  now  put  the  Ontological  Argument  in  its 
proper  syllogistic  form: 

Major  Premise :  The  human  mind  possesses  the  neces- 
sary idea  of  a  perfect  and  absolute  Being. 

Minor  Premise:  Existence  is  a  necessary  attribute  of 
such  a  Being. 

Conclusion:  Ergo,  such  a  Being  must  exist,  or  our 
necessary  ideas  are  null  and  void. 

You  will  observe  that  the  legitimacy  of  the  syllogism 
rests  on  the  contingency  of  the  or  in  the  conclusion.  On 
the  ground  that  the  intuitions  and  normal  inferences  of 
the  human  mind  are  valid  and  trustworthy,  the  method  of 
reasoning  is  convincing.  None  but  the  phenomenalists 
will  question  it;  and  they,  judged  by  their  own  theories 
of  knowledge,  cannot  trust  the  vaHdity  of  their  own  ques- 
tioning. 

3.  The  Ontological  Argument  may  be  combined  with 
the  Cosmological  with  singular  force  as  follows: 

We  have  the  idea  of  the  perfect  and  absolute  Being; 
and  it  comes  to  us,  not  as  a  freak  of  the  imagination,  but 
either  as  an  intuition  or  a  necessary  inference.  If  there 
is  no  such  Being,  whence  came  the  idea  of  Him  to  the 
human  mind?    How  could  it  ever  have  arisen  in  human 


Ontological  Argument  63 

thought  ?  Nothing  can  rise  higher  than  its  source ;  noth- 
ing can  be  evolved  that  was  not  previously  involved. 
Therefore  the  only  adequate  explanation  of  our  necessary 
idea  of  a  perfect  Being  is  the  existence  of  that  Being  as 
the  source  and  cause  of  the  idea. 


CHAPTER  VI 

MORAL   ARGUMENT^ 

I.  DEFINITION 

The  Moral  Argument  is  the  proof  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence which  is  based  on  the  moral  constitution  of  man 
and  the  moral  order  of  the  world. 

II.  RELATION  TO  COSMOLOGY 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  Moral  Argument  might 
be  regarded  as  a  division  of  the  Cosmological  proof.  The 
latter  seeks  to  find  the  adequate  cause  for  the  cosmos, 
of  which  moral  facts  and  phenomena  are  an  integral  part. 
Thus  it  might  be  thought  that,  in  seeking  for  the  adequate 
cause  of  morality,  we  are  dealing  purely  and  simply  with 
the  Cosmological  Argument.  However,  there  are  four 
reasons  why  we  believe  the  Moral  Argument  is  suffi- 
ciently distinctive  to  deserve  a  place  as  a  major  division 
in  our  theistic  system,  co-ordinate  with  the  other  out- 
standing proofs.    They  are  the  following : 

1.  Cosmology  deals  more  largely  with  the  cosmos  as 
a  physical  system,  and  touches  only  incidentally  on 
moral  phenomena. 

2.  The  cardinal  thought  in  the  Cosmological  Argu- 
ment is  the  view  of  the  universe  as  contingent,  finite 

I.  See  footnote  i,  Chapter  III,  and  compare  the  several  authors  in  loco. 
On  this  thesis  Valentine,  Balfour  and  Micou  are  especially  cogent. 

64 


Moral  Argument  65 

and  dependent,  and  therefore  as  demanding  a  personal, 
self -existent  and  eternal  Cause  to  bring  it  into  being  and 
to  sustain  it  in  all  its  parts  and  relations.  The  moral 
order  of  the  world  would  not,  therefore,  belong  element- 
ally to  this  conception. 

3.  The  ethical  phenomenon  is  so  unique  in  its  very 
idea,  involving  conscience,  freedom  and  moral  distinc- 
tions, that  it  may  well  claim  a  place  that  is  all  its  own 
among  the  theistic  evidences. 

4.  Morality  is  so  large,  important  and  vital  a  fact 
in  the  world  of  humanity,  and  is  so  decisive  for  human 
welfare,  that  it  should  not  be  assigned  merely  a  minor 
place  in  a  system  of  Theism.  In  making  evaluations, 
moral  data  are  of  more  importance  than  all  the  physical 
facts  of  the  universe.  The  best  and  noblest  thinking 
would  say  that  the  physical  has  been  made  for  the  sake  of 
the  moral  and  spiritual,  not  the  reverse.  The  summum 
bonum  is  ethical  being  and  achievement,  not  merely  pleas- 
ure and  utility,  whether  physical  or  psychical.  This  being 
true,  surely  the  argument  for  the  divine  existence  derived 
from  the  moral  data  of  the  world  deserves  a  major  posi- 
tion; indeed,  its  importance  would  not  permit  it  to  be 
relegated  to  an  inconspicuous  or  subordinate  place.  Even 
our  highest  conception  of  God  must  be  that  He  is  an 
ethical  Being.  Note  the  Trisagion  of  the  Bible:  "Holy, 
holy,  holy  art  thou.  Lord  God  Almighty." 

ni.     STATEMENT  OF  THE  ARGUMENT 
1.     Man's  Moral  nature: 

( I )  That  man  has  a  moral  constitution  scarcely  needs 
argument.  He  has  a  conscience  faculty  that  discerns 
moral  distinctions,  creates  a  moral  imperative  within  him, 


66  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

and  gives  him  a  sense  of  responsibility  to  the  law  over 
him  and  the  moral  Personality  back  of  the  law.  True  joy 
comes  to  him  only  from  right  being  and  conduct ;  never 
from  wrong.  Moreover,  the  ethical  phenomenon  is  prac- 
tically universal.  There  are  no  nations  on  the  earth  which 
do  not  have  some  sense  of  right  and  wrong.  This  fact  is 
writ  large  on  the  human  constitution  everywhere. 

(2)  Among  ethicists  there  are  differences  of  opinion 
as  to  the  origin  and  nature  of  conscience,  some  holding 
that  it  is  a  distinct  power  of  the  human  soul,  innate  and 
divinely  implanted ;  others  maintain  that  it  is  an  acquired 
power  of  functioning,  the  result  of  accumulated  expe- 
riences. However,  this  diversity  of  view  does  not  invah- 
date  the  fact  of  conscience,  for,  whatever  may  be  its 
genesis,  it  persists  everywhere  in  recognizing  moral  dis- 
tinctions, and  is  perhaps  the  most  dominating  factor  in 
human  life,  especially  in  moulding  the  true  character  and 
securing  the  real  advancement  of  the  human  race. 

(3)  The  fact  of  diversity  of  moral  judgments  among 
men  does  not  nullify  conscience  or  moral  distinctions. 
That  there  is  such  variety  of  moral  judgment  must  be 
admitted.  Some  tribes  have  practices  that  they  regard 
as  right,  but  that  other  nations  condemn  as  entirely 
unethical.  Even  different  individuals  in  civilized  lands 
often  subscribe  to  different  moral  codes,  some  condemn- 
ing what  others  approve.  However,  the  fundamental  or 
primary  fact  of  moral  distinctions  still  persists.  The  dif- 
ferences are  only  in  the  sphere  of  secondary  moral  judg- 
ments, not  in  the  elemental  realm  of  morality.  There  are 
no  nations  which  utterly  wipe  out  the  difference  between 
right  and  wrong.  Even  the  pagan  mother  who  sacrifices 
her  babe  to  appease  the  gods  does  this  because  she  thinks 


Moral  Argument  67 

it  is  right.  As  soon  as  her  moral  judgment  is  corrected 
by  Christian  teaching,  she  ceases  her  heathen  practice, 
and  rejoices  in  the  higher  Hght  that  has  broken  into  her 
benighted  mind.  This  proves  that,  however  moral  judg- 
ments may  be  obscured,  the  primary  fact  of  moral  distinc- 
tions and  a  cognizing  moral  faculty  still  remain  intact. 
It  should  also  be  remembered  that  many  tribes  have  very 
erroneous  ideas  of  scientific  facts.  This  does  not  prove 
that  the  human  mind  does  not  have  a  real  scientific  fac- 
ulty, nor  that  there  is  no  true  basis  for  science  in  the 
cosmos.  Indeed,  it  cannot  be  denied  that  some  tribes 
which  have  exceedingly  crude  idea  of  physical  science, 
yet  possess  surprisingly  high  moral  standards.  It  is  said 
that  the  virtue  of  the  Zulu  women  puts  to  shame  the  low 
standards  of  sexual  virtue  that  frequently  obtain  in 
so-called  civiHzed  communities.^ 

(4)  That  moral  judgments  are  capable  of  improve- 
ment does  not  destroy  the  moral  faculty  in  man.  All 
man's  faculties  are  imperfectly  developed  in  the  immature 
state,  and  must  be  cultivated.  Nobody  holds  that,  on  this 
account,  man  has  no  intellectual  powers. 

(5)  Sometimes  it  is  objected  that  conscience,  after  all, 
is  not  an  infallible  guide  even  in  its  own  sphere,  that  of 
morality,  which  proves,  the  opponent  asserts,  that  con- 
science is  not  an  innate  power  of  the  human  mind.  But 
the  argument  is  not  valid.  No  human  faculty  is  infallible 
even  in  its  distinct  sphere.  Sense  perception  is  not  infal- 
lible in  cognizing  the  objective  world;  the  logical  faculty 
is  not  infallible  in  pursuing  the  praxis  of  ratiocination; 
the  scientific  faculty  is  liable  to  err ;  the  memory  is  imper- 
fect; so  with  all  the  psychical  powers.     Yet  no  one,  be- 

2.    Valentine,  "Theoretical  Ethics,"  p.  44. 


68  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

cause  of  this  general  fallibility,  denies  the  reality  of  man's 
mental  make-up  and  of  its  several  functioning  powers. 

(6)  That  a  distinct  moral  faculty  is  native  to  the 
human  mind  is  evident  from  the  unique  character  of  its 
perceptions  and  feelings.  Moral  phenomena  are  sui 
generis.  Ethics  deals  with  the  distinct  sphere  of  the  right 
and  the  wrong,  which  is  different  from  the  sphere  of  the 
physical,  the  purely  pleasurable  and  utihtarian,  the  logical, 
the  scientific,  the  esthetic.  The  question,  'Ts  it  right?" 
is  the  problem  of  ethics,  and  differs  in  kind,  and  not 
merely  in  degree  or  quality,  from  all  other  questions. 
Now,  conscience  is  the  specialized  faculty  for  discerning 
this  peculiar  body  of  facts,  namely,  the  ethical  phenomena, 
the  right  and  the  wrong.  Its  objects  of  discernment  are 
different  in  kind  from  those  of  sense  perception,  mathe- 
matical demonstration,  logical  practice,  etc.  The  ethical 
emotions  are  also  distinct  from  those  that  are  stirred  by 
any  other  psychical  cognitions,  being  the  feelings  of 
''ought,"  duty,  moral  approval,  moral  aversion,  guilt  and 
remorse.  When  you  say,  "I  feel  that  such  a  course  is 
right,"  you  delimit  that  feeHng  from  every  other  feeling 
of  which  you  are  capable.  All  these  facts  prove  conclu- 
sively that  man  has  a  moral  constitution  and  a  specific 
moral  faculty  or  functioning  power. 

(7)  The  outstanding  and  paramount  character  of 
moral  phenomena  help  to  prove  the  reality  of  man's  moral 
nature.  All  true  progress  and  civilization  depend  upon 
the  recognition  of  moral  distinctions  and  the  practice  of 
moral  principles.  Society  itself  could  not  cohere  without 
such  recognition  and  practice.  Human  government  is 
based  largely  on  the  fact  that  man  has  an  innate  power  of 


Moral  Argument  69 

distinguishing  between  right  and  wrong.     Otherwise  all 
penal  sanctions  would  be  vain  and  foolish. 

(8)  It  is  not  likely  that  man  would  have  been  framed 
in  a  cosmos  where  moral  phenomena  are  so  universal, 
dominant  and  vitally  important  without  being  endued  with 
a  specialized  faculty  for  apprehending  them.  In  other 
ways  he  is  wonderfully  fitted  into  the  cosmical  order;  so 
it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  he  is  adapted  to  the  moral 
order,  and  it  is  unreasonable  to  think  that  he  is  not. 

(9)  At  this  place  we  cannot  enter  the  discussion  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  freedom  of  the  will ;  we  must  be  con- 
tent to  say  that  universal  consciousness  attests  that  the 
human  will  has  the  power  of  choice;  that  man  is  not 
merely  an  automaton.  This  being  true,  the  fact  of  free- 
dom of  choice  connotes  that  man  must  be  a  moral  being, 
with  the  power  to  elect  either  right  or  wrong.  Therefore, 
he  must  have  a  faculty  to  discern  the  difference  and 
antagonism  between  them. 

2.     The  moral  order  of  the  world : 

(i)  No  matter  how  we  explain  it,  there  is  a  power 
in  the  universe  ''that  makes  for  righteousness."  It  may 
not  always  appear  on  the  surface,  but  pro  founder  study 
of  nature  in  its  relation  to  human  life  and  history  always 
discloses  the  truth.  We  see  virtue  rewarded,  and  applaud 
it ;  crime  punished,  and  sanction  it.  History  has  a  way  of 
vindicating  the  right  even  though  sometimes  tardily.  No 
bad  man  is  ever  honored  long  by  succeeding  generations, 
whereas  the  men  who  have  wrought  for  right  principles 
are  held  in  grateful  esteem.  "The  memory  of  the  right- 
eous is  blessed;  but  the  name  of  the  wicked  shall  rot" 
(Prov.  10:7). 


70  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

(2)  Society  and  government  are  based  on  a  moral 
order;  otherwise,  they  could  not  exist. 

(3)  There  are  also  natural  consequences  of  right  and 
wrong  conduct,  thus  proving  a  moral  order — at  least,  that 
the  natural  realm  has  been  fitted  to  sustain  and  advance 
the  ethical  law.  The  debauchee  sooner  or  later  suffers 
the  consequences  of  his  immoral  life,  and  he  and  others 
recognize  his  sufferings  as  condign  retribution.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  physically  virtuous  man  is  free  from  those 
sufferings  which  are  intuitively  regarded  as  penal.  If  he 
must  suffer  pain,  it  is  generally  looked  upon  as  a  natural 
consequence  or  a  disciplinary  measure,  and  not  as  a  puni- 
tive affliction.  And  when  sufferings  are  visited  upon  the 
innocent,  men  usually  feel  that  it  is  a  temporary  wrong 
for  which  ample  compensation  will  be  made  in  the  future 
life,  when  equity  and  justice  shall  prevail;  when  there 
shall  be  ''new  heavens  and  a  new  earth,  wherein  dwelleth 
righteousness"  (2  Pet.  3:  13). 

(4)  The  world  (and  this  includes  both  the  natural 
and  the  human  realms)  is  so  constituted  as  to  give  man 
constant  opportunity  to  choose  between  right  and  wrong. 
For  example,  here  are  two  paths  which  a  man  may  pur- 
sue— the  one  may  lead  to  the  house  of  sin,  the  other  to 
the  house  of  worship.  The  man  has  the  power  of  option 
between  the  two.  What  stronger  proof  could  there  be 
that  the  natural  realm  is  itself  so  constituted  as  to  furnish 
an  arena  for  moral  action  and  achievement? 

3.  A  moral  economy  demands  a  personal  Creator 
and  Governor: 

(i)  The  moral  could  never  have  evolved  from  the 
non-moral  merely  by  means  of  natural  or  resident  forces. 
If  the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  true  at  all,  it  postulates 


Moral  Argument  71 

a  moral  Being  at  the  beginning  of  the  process  who  in- 
volved seminally  all  the  facts  and  principles  that  were 
subsequently  evolved. 

(2)  Moral  qualities  can  be  predicated  only  of  persons. 
You  cannot  correctly  assign  moral  attributes  to  a  thing  or 
an  animal.  Rational  personality  alone  can  constitute 
moral  agency.  Hence  the  ultimate  ground  of  all  moral 
data  must  be  a  Person — God. 

(3)  Man's  feeling  of  responsibility  connotes  a  per- 
sonal Being  to  whom  he  is  amenable.  Man  cannot  have 
a  sense  of  responsibility  merely  to  an  abstract  law,  if 
there  is  no  lawgiver  and  executor  back  of  it.  Think  of 
the  absurdity  of  a  man  saying,  "I  feel  that  I  must  some 
day  give  an  account  to  the  laws  of  nature!"  Much 
more  rational  and  profound  is  the  teaching  of  the  great- 
est ethical  book  in  the  world:  "So  then  every  one  of 
us  shall  give  account  of  himself  unto  God"  (Rom. 
14:12). 

(4)  The  injustice  and  inequality  now  so  apparent  in 
the  world  demand  an  all-wise  and  righteous  Being  who 
will  sometime  right  every  wrong  and  usher  in  the  ulti- 
mate triumph  and  reign  of  truth  and  justice.  Without 
such  a  belief  men  must  conclude  that  they  live  in  a  world 
of  insoluble  riddles,  without  any  hope  that  they  shall  ever 
be  deciphered.  Such  pessimism  and  hopelessness  do  not 
agree  with  the  almost  universal  feeling  of  a  golden  age 
to  come.  Moreover,  it  would  not  agree  with  the  patent 
fact  that  the  world  is  a  cosmos,  that  it  has  a  moral  order, 
and  that  man,  its  chief  denizen,  is  an  ethical  being. 

(5)  A  profound  philosopher  like  Kant,  who  could 
not  appreciate  the  force  of  the  other  theistic  arguments, 
was  convinced  of  the  divine  existence  through  the  Moral 


72  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

Argument.  The  gist  of  his  teaching  was  this :  Man's  con- 
science feels  the  moral  imperative  within  it  and  over  it, 
and  this  so  powerfully  that  it  cannot  be  evaded;  but  a 
moral  imperative  connotes  an  objective  moral  law ;  an 
objective  moral  law  can  be  accounted  for  only  by  a  real 
moral  Personality  who  is  its  ground,  source,  author  and 
administrant.  To  the  man  who  has  not  stultified  his  con- 
science by  wrong  thinking  or  wrong  doing,  or  both,  the 
argument  of  the  great  critical  philosopher  surely  must  be 
convincing. 

(6)  Theism  affords  an  adequate  explanation  of  the 
moral  phenomena  of  the  world.  In  positing  an  infinite 
and  perfect  moral  Personality  back  of  the  universe  as  its 
Creator  and  Ruler,  it  certainly  assigns  a  sufficient  cause 
for  all  moral  data  and  developments.  No  other  concep- 
tion is  adequate.  Surely  Materialism,  Pantheism  and 
Agnosticism  are  not  adequate.  Therefore,  Theism  is  the 
most  scientific  hypothesis. 

(7)  In  order  to  be  as  thorough-going  as  possible  in 
our  argument,  we  must  here  take  note  of  an  objection 
that  the  skeptic  is  likely  to  raise :  There  is  wrong  in  the 
world  as  well  as  right,  immorality  as  well  as  morality. 
Must  not  wrong,  therefore,  have  an  eternal  basis  in  fact? 
How  could  it  ever  have  evolved  if  it  is  not  eternal  in 
seminal  form? 

Reply:  Right  and  wrong  are  not  entities,  but  quali- 
ties. And  they  are  qualities  of  certain  kinds  of  entities, 
namely,  rational  personalities.  Now  right  is  a  positive 
quality;  therefore,  as  soon  as  there  is  a  rational  person,, 
he  must  be  a  moral  being,  if  there  is  to  be  a  moral  econ- 
omy; and  we  have  already  proved  that  the  world  is  such 
an   economy.     However,  wrong,  being  only  a  negative 


Moral  Argument  73 

quality,  that  is,  the  negation  of  the  right,  it  is  not  a 
necessary  quaHty  of  a  personal  being.  In  a  moral  uni- 
verse the  wrong  is  only  an  eternal  possibility,  and  is 
contingent  on  the  choice  of  a  free  being.  A  being  who 
is  not  free  would  not  be  an  ethical  being ;  he  would  be  a 
machine  or  automaton.  As  a  free  being,  it  is  possible 
for  him  to  do  wrong,  but  not  necessary,  for  were  it  nec- 
essary, he  would  not  be  a  free  being.  Thus  we  see  that 
wrong  is  not  necessarily  existent  from  eternity,  but  is 
only  a  possibility  contingent  on  free  choice — a  possibility 
which  God  never  desired  should  become  an  actuality,  but 
which  He  could  not  prevent  by  force  and  yet  leave  man 
a  moral  agent.  Thus  we  say  that  wrong  is  not  an  eter- 
nal actuality,  but  only  an  eternal  possibility.  In  this  prin- 
ciple lies  the  uniqueness  of  ethical  facts ;  they  are  depend- 
ent on  the  initiating  power  of  free  will ;  otherwise  there 
could  be  no  morality. 

Let  us  illustrate.  In  a  certain  class-room  there  is  per- 
fect order.  Does  not  that  very  fact,  however,  connote 
the  possibility  of  disorder.  But  disorder  is  something 
that  ought  not  to  be  made  actual ;  it  ought  to  remain  only 
a  possibility.  Again,  suppose  a  student  stands  at  the 
blackboard  solving  a  problem  in  mathematics.  There  is 
a  true  way  of  solving  it;  but  that  fact  connotes  the  pos- 
sibility of  error.  However,  he  should  avoid  bringing  the 
error  into  actuality.  Just  so  in  the  moral  sphere — except 
that  a  moral  error  is  a  great  deal  more  serious  than 
merely  an  intellectual  error. 

So  we  say  that  the  right,  the  moral,  being  a  positive 
quality  or  attribute,  must  be  an  eternal  fact  dwelling  in 
a  moral  personality,  or  it  never  could  have  brought  forth 
a  moral  cosmos  with  moral  beings ;  but  the  wrong  or  the 


74  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

immoral  was  only  an  eternal  possibility,  which  should 
never  have  been  converted  into  actuality. 

Should  the  objection  be  made  that  the  eternal  moral 
Personality — God — might  have  prevented  the  commission 
of  the  wrong,  we  reply :  He  could  have  done  so  only  by 
destroying  the  freedom  of  the  moral  agents  He  had  cre- 
ated, or  by  refraining  from  creating  moral  agents  at  all. 
Since  man  is  in  the  world,  and  is  a  moral  agent,  we  know 
that  God  created  moral  agents.  In  His  wisdom  He 
evidently  knew  that  it  was  better  to  create  moral  beings 
than  mere  happy  automata  or  mere  material  mechanisms. 
Since  moral  excellence  is  the  noblest  kind  of  excellence, 
the  true  ethicist  cannot  help  approving  God's  choice  and 
adventure.  The  man  who  says  that  God  should  not  have 
made  moral  agents,  but  only  automatically  happy  beings, 
proves  by  that  very  token  that  he  has  extremely  crass 
moral  ideals.  He  is  a  man  who  will  "bear  watching."  He 
is  an  opportunist  and  an  epicurean. 

4.     Moral  influence  of  Theism: 

(i)  Truth  promotes  human  welfare;  error  blights  it. 
li  Theism  is  found  to  be  useful  in  the  highest  sense  of  the 
term,  as  it  is,  that  fact  is  a  cogent  argument  in  its  favor. 

(2)  Belief  in  a  God  to  whom  men  realize  that  they 
are  responsible  and  who  takes  pleasure  in  right  doing  and 
feels  displeasure  in  wrong  doing,  must  act  as  a  stimulant 
to  virtue  and  a  deterrent  to  vice.  History  and  experience 
prove  that  the  clearer  and  stronger  the  belief  in  a  personal 
God  has  been,  the  more  salutary  have  been  the  results. 

(3)  While  atheism  or  agnosticism  may  construct  some 
sort  of  an  ethical  system,  it  is  most  conspicuous  for  its 
failure,  as,  for  example,  Herbert  Spencer's  ''Data  of 
Ethics,"  where  the  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  are  resolved 


Moral  Argument  75 

into  mere  utility  and  pleasure.  Any  system  that  thus 
interprets  the  ethical  principles  of  the  world  cannot  help 
lowering  the  standard  of  ethical  practice,  if  generally 
accepted. 

(4)  As  a  matter  of  fact,  atheism  leads  to  laxity  of 
morals  with  individuals  and  communities.  The  atheists 
of  a  neighborhood  are  never  its  moral  glory  and  inspira- 
tion ;  they  never  help  to  bring  about  truly  moral  reforms, 
but  are  more  apt  to  oppose  them.  The  terrors  of  the 
French  revolution  might  be  taken  as  an  example.  Anarch- 
ists, nihilists,  and  other  "dangerous  classes"  are  almost 
invariably  atheistic.^  On  the  other  hand,  the  men  who 
have  really  turned  the  currents  of  history  and  civilization 
upward  have  almost  to  a  man  been  earnest  and  whole- 
hearted theists.  As  a  rule,  they  have  appealed  to  God 
to  aid  them  in  their  unselfish  moral  endeavors. 

(5)  If  theists  have  ever  been  guilty  of  crimes,  it  was 
because  they  held  gross  and  unethical  conceptions  of  God. 
The  history  of  the  world  furnishes  scarcely  an  exception 
to  the  rule  that  men  who  have  earnestly  believed  in  the 
divine  Being  as  the  good  and  holy  God  to  whom  they  were 
responsible  have  been  men  of  upright  and  benevolent 
character.  One  might  cite  Moses,  Samuel,  Paul,  and,  in 
a  still  higher  degree,  Christ  Himself,  who  beHeved  in 
God  and  sought  to  do  His  will. 

3.  Goldwin  Smith:  "The  denial  of  the  existence  of  God  and  of  a  future 
state  is,  in  a  word,  the  dethronement  of  conscience."  Although  this  state- 
ment is  cited  in  a  footnote  in  Chapter  I,  it  is  quoted  here  again  on  account 
of  its  relevancy. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ESTHETICAL  ARGUMENT 

I.  DEFINITION 

The  Esthetical  Argument^  is  the  argument  for  the 
divine  existence  which  is  based  on  the  presence  of  beauty 
and  subHmity  in  the  universe. 

II.  THE  FACT  OF  BEAUTY 

1.     In  nature: 

There  are  beauty  and  sublimity  in  the  natural  realm. 
Let  it  be  freely  admitted  that  there  is  much  in  nature  that 
is  ugly  and  repulsive;  much  that  is  dreary  and  monoto- 
nous ;  much  that  can  be  called  neither  attractive  nor  repel- 
lent. Yet,  on  the  other  hand,  many  parts  of  the  natural 
realm  are  truly  and  even  exquisitely  lovely :  the  green  of 
field,  meadow  and  foliage;  the  variegated  flowers;  the 
undulating  landscapes;  the  rivers  and  lakes  sparkling  in 
the  sunshine;  the  glorious  sunsets;  the  exquisite  tinting 
of  the  plumage  of  many  birds,  especially  of  tanagers, 
humming  birds  and  birds  of  Paradise;  mountain  scenery; 
the  glory  of  the  hills  and  valleys.  All  nature  might  have 
been  made  humdrum,  but  for  some  reason  much  of  it  has 
been  arrayed  in  beauty  and  grandeur,  and  these  attributes 

I.  An  eloquent  chapter  on  the  argument  from  the  beautiful  is  found  in 
Micou's  ''Basic  Ideas  in  Religion."  A.  J.  Balfour  has  also  employed  this 
proof  with  lingular  force  and  delicacy  of  style  in  his  "Theism  and  Human- 
ism." 

76 


Esthetical  Argument  77 

are  adapted  to  stir  a  responding  chord  in  the  mind  of 
man,  causing  him  interest  and  dehght. 

2.     In  the  human  physique : 

No  people  appreciated  the  beauty  of  the  human  face 
and  form  more  than  did  the  Greeks,  as  their  many  works 
of  art  testify.  The  Venus  de  Milo  is  said  to  be  the  most 
truthful  and  beautiful  replica  of  the  female  form.  The 
Apollo  Belvedere  is  the  classic  representation  of  mascu- 
line beauty.  It  may  be  freely  admitted  that  there  are 
many  people  who  are  far  from  attractive,  while  others 
are  repulsive;  yet  there  is  much  physical  attractiveness 
among  men,  women  and  children.  We  may  well  ask  why 
there  is  physical  human  beauty  at  all.  Such  beauty  also 
strikes  a  responsive  chord  in  the  mind  of  man. 

3.     In  human  art : 

( 1 )  The  productions  of  human  skill  in  drawing,  paint- 
ing and  sculpturing  all  bear  witness  to  the  fact  there 
is  a  large  element  of  the  esthetic  in  the  world.  Man 
might  have  been  so  constituted  as  to  drag  out  a  monoto- 
nous existence  without  such  a  means  of  delight  and 
exhilaration. 

(2)  Literature  also  betokens  an  element  of  beauty  in 
the  world.  True,  much  writing  is  prosaic  enough,  and 
"of  the  making  of  books  there  is  no  end."  However, 
there  are  such  things  as  literary  art,  the  beauty  of  style, 
the  smoothness  of  diction,  the  exquisite  turning  of 
phrases,  the  delight  of  pure  simplicity  and  limpidness,  the 
rhyme  and  rhythtn  of  poetry.  Such  appreciation  is  writ 
large  on  the  human  soul.    We  may  well  ask  why. 

(3)  In  no  human  efforts  is  the  fact  of  beauty  more 
clearly  evinced  than  in  music.    Listen  to  the  sweet  and 


78  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

simple  melody ;  to  the  soul-stirring  oratorio ;  to  the  sweep- 
ing orchestra.  Man  might  have  been  made  without  this 
capacity.    Why  was  music  put  into  his  soul?^ 

III.  MAN'S  ESTHETIC  FACULTY 

To  correspond  with,  and  respond  to,  all  the  beauty  in 
the  world,  man  has  an  esthetic  capacity.  His  eye  sees 
the  marvelous  colors  on  the  evening  sky,  or  the  profound 
depths  of  the  starlit  dome  at  night,  and  there  is  some- 
thing in  his  soul  that  appreciates.  His  eye  alone  could 
not  feel  such  a  thrill  and  uplift.  He  feels  that  it  is  a 
spiritual  emotion.  The  same  is  true  of  his  delight  in  all 
forms  of  beauty.  While  there  are  persons  who  are  unre- 
sponsive to  the  appeal  of  beauty,  there  are  multitudes 
whose  chief  pleasure  in  life  is  admiration  of  beauty  in  its 
varied  forms  and  phenomena.  The  horse  and  the  dog, 
however  intelligent  in  other  ways,  show  no  appreciation 
of  beauty,  though  they  may  at  times  be  frightened  by  the 
terrible.  Stand  with  your  well-trained  family  horse  on 
a  hilltop,  and  try  to  interest  him  in  the  glory  of  the  sun- 
set ;  you  will  find  that,  if  he  notes  it  at  all,  he  has  no  means 
of  showing  his  appreciation.  He  has  not  been  endued 
with  the  esthetic  faculty. 

IV.  THE  RATIONAL  INFERENCE 
1.     Evidence  of  design: 

Since  so  much  beauty  and  grandeur  mark  the  universe, 
and  since  man  has  a  natural  esthetic  taste  to  match  them, 
the  rational  conclusion  is  that  the  cosmical  beauty  and 
man's  taste  must  have  been  designed  to  complement  each 

«.     We  also  speak  of  moral  beauty  by  which  we  mean  true  moral  excel- 
lence and  symmetry.     However,   it  is  perhaps  only  a  figure  of  speech. 


Esthetical  Argument  79 

other.  If  this  is  not  true,  the  universe  has  not  been  con- 
structed on  rational  principles.  Then  how  can  it  be  a 
cosmos  instead  of  a  chaos?  And  how  can  it  be  intelligible 
to  reason?  However,  if  there  was  intentionality  in  fitting 
together  the  beauty  of  the  cosmos  and  man's  esthetic  fac- 
ulty, intentionality  connotes  intelligence  and  will,  which 
in  turn  connote  personality.  Therefore,  the  designer 
must  be  a  Person — God. 

^-      2.     Evidence  o£  beneficent  design: 

The  universe  might  have  been  made  a  dreary  waste, 
and  man  might  have  been  created  without  esthetic  appre- 
ciation. But  how  dull  and  monotonous  would  have  been 
his  existence !  For  what  other  reason,  then,  could  beauty 
have  been  added  to  the  cosmos  than  for  man's  delight? 
For  what  other  reason  could  his  taste  for  the  beautiful 
have  been  given  him?  But  such  a  purpose  connotes, 
not  only  a  personal  Designer,  but  also  a  beneficent  one. 
Hence  reason  drives  us  back  to  God  as  the  intelligent 
cause  of  the  esthetic  element  in  the  world  and  the  esthetic 
taste  in  man. 

/         3.     Evidence  of  divine  love  of  the  beautiful: 

There  is  much  beauty  in  the  world  that  is  never  seen 
by  man.  "Full  many  a  flower  is  born  to  blush  unseen," 
etc.  In  most  out-of-the-way  locaHties  there  is  most  ex- 
quisite beauty,  and  doubtless  has  been  for  centuries,  for 
the  moment  man  discovers  it  unexpectedly,  it  is  there  in 
its  completeness,  not  adding  to  its  pristine  beauty  because 
of  his  presence.  How  many  rare  flowers  have  bloomed 
and  perished;  how  many  lovely  shells  and  plants  have 
existed  for  centuries  at  the  bottom  of  the  sea ;  how  many 
consummately  beautiful  birds  have  lived  and  died;  how 


80  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

many  delicately  tinted  sunsets  have  flamed  and  faded — 
all  of  them  before  a  human  eye  could  behold  them  and  a 
human  soul  rejoice  in  them!  Then  why  all  this  unnoted 
beauty?  Ah!  was  it  unnoted?  What  is  its  rationale? 
Was  it  merely  an  age-long  waste  ?  Was  so  much  beauty 
created  without  a  purpose?  Suppose  we  simply  assume 
that  there  is  a  Creator  and  Preserver  who,  like  ourselves, 
loves  the  beautiful  in  all  its  forms,  would  not  that  assump- 
tion offer  a  rational  explanation  of  all  the  phenomenal 
beauty  and  magnificence  there  are  in  the  world?  If  this 
is  not  the  true  explication,  there  is  none  that  is  rational 
and  adequate.  Hence  both  teleology  and  cosmology  in 
the  realm  of  beauty  point  indubitably  to  a  personal 
Creator  and  Sustainer. 

Here  we  must  add  that  many  objects  that  to  human  ken 
at  first  seem  to  be  repellent  are  found,  on  closer  investi- 
gation, to  be  rarely  fascinating.  Look  at  a  toad's  skin 
through  a  microscope,  and  note  that  it  sparkles  with  gems 
of  many  facets.  The  same  is  true  of  a  common  pebble. 
The  skin  of  the  serpent  is  set  with  many  diamonds.  Per- 
haps when  we  come  to  see  nature  "face  to  face,"  we  shall 
find  that  all  her  forms  are  beautiful.  Even  the  atoms 
and  electrons,  and  also  the  universal  ether  itself,  may  be 
made  with  rarely  beautiful  forms  and  colored  with  ex- 
quisite tints.  Who  knows  but  this  may  be  the  meaning  of 
the  New  Testament  Apocalypse,  which  speaks  of  the 
jasper  walls,  gates  of  pearl,  golden  streets,  river  and  tree 
of  life,  and  alabaster  throne  of  the  New  Jerusalem? 
However  that  may  be,  the  rational  explanation  of  the 
unseen  beauty  in  the  world  is  that  God  Himself  sees  and 
appreciates  it.  Add  to  this  the  arguments  in  the  preced- 
ing sections,  namely,  that  God  endowed  man  with  the 


Esthetical  Argument  81 

esthetic  faculty  to  mate  with  the  beauty  in  nature,  and  you 
have  ample  reason  for  believing  in  a  beneficent  and  beauty- 
loving  Ordainer;  and  reason,  too,  that  is  founded,  not 
merely  on  sentiment,  but  also  on  scientific  processes  of 
thought. 

4.     Purpose  of  the  repulsive: 

( 1 )  The  skeptic  is  apt  to  raise  the  objection  that  there 
is  much  in  the  world  that  is  disagreeable.  Hence,  pass- 
ing by  all  the  beautiful  and  sublime  in  the  world,  he  sees 
only  the  offensive,  becomes  pessimistic,  and  either  denies 
that  there  is  a  God,  or  questions  His  goodness  and  love. 
It  may  be  frankly  admitted  that  the  presence  of  the 
offensive  in  the  world,  and  that  in  large  amounts,  is  in 
many  respects  a  mystery ;  and  perhaps  no  explanation  can 
be  given  that  will  satisfy  all  minds.  Yet  so  many  amelio- 
rating explanations  of  the  difficulty  may  be  given  that 
there  is  no  sufficient  reason  to  become  atheistic  or  pessi- 
mistic over  the  problem. 

(2)  The  commonplace  accentuates  the  interesting, 
and  the  repellent  brings  out  more  sharply  the  beautiful. 
Whatever  might  be  the  case  in  a  perfect  world,  tenanted 
by  perfect  people,  we  know  that  in  the  world  as  it  is  we 
have  a  keener  appreciation  of  the  beautiful  because  of  the 
presence  of  its  opposite.  After  riding  on  the  train  for 
hours  over  the  dreary,  monotonous  plains  of  the  West, 
how  you  exclaim  with  delight  when  you  suddenly  come 
upon  an  irrigated  area  gleaming  in  rich  and  variegated 
hues  in  the  sun !  Formed  as  we  are,  therefore,  we  appre- 
ciate beauty  all  the  more  by  way  of  contrast. 

(3)  After  all,  as  has  been  said  (section  3  above),  all 
things  may  be  beautiful  in  their  essence,  even  the  univer- 


82  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

sal  ether,  the  electrons  and  the  atoms.     It  may  be  that 
it  is  only  the  temporary   functioning  and  condition  of 
some  parts  of  nature  that  are  offensive  in  our  present 
limited  status. 
1/  (4)     There  is  very  likely  a  moral  purpose  in  the  dis- 

agreeable and  difficult.  Object  as  we  will  to  the  present 
order  of  the  world,  we  know  that  many  of  the  finest,  and 
especially  the  sturdiest  and  most  heroic,  virtues  are  pos- 
sible only  in  a  world  of  struggle.  Certainly  if  all  nature 
were  beautiful,  pleasant  and  prolific  in  itself,  there  would 
be  no  chance  to  develop  the  noble  virtues  of  diligence, 
bravery,  patience,  initiative  and  enterprise.  Morally  all 
men  would  be  weak  and  supine.  Now,  if  true  moral 
excellence  is  the  highest  quality  in  the  world,  men  ought 
not  to  find  fault  with  the  very  regime  that  gives  oppor- 
tunity for  its  achievement.  Therefore  it  would  seem  that 
the  Creator,  being  a  moral  Being  Himself  and  desiring 
His  world  to  be  a  moral  economy,  was  profoundly  wise 
in  making  the  cosmos  just  as  it  is — with  enough  of  the 
good  and  beautiful  to  stimulate  man,  and  prevent  his 
being  daunted  and  overcome,  and  yet  enough  of  the  hard 
and  unbeautiful  to  test  and  discipline  his  moral  powers. 
Will  the  skeptic  tell  us  what  kind  of  regime  could  have 
accomplished  this  exalted  purpose  so  effectively  as  the 
present  one? 

(5)  On  theistic  grounds  there  is  a  sure  hope  that 
sometime  the  problem  of  the  commonplace  and  repellent 
will,  Hke  all  the  other  puzzling  problems  of  our  mundane 
existence,  be  solved;  for  if  there  is  a  God  who  is  good 
and  beneficent,  He  will  not  forever  leave  the  questions  of 
the  soul  remain  unanswered.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Atheist  and  Materialist  have  no  such  prospect ;  according 


Esthetical  Argument  83 

to  their  theory,  all  men  will  sooner  or  later  die  and  sink 
into  eternal  oblivion.  Here  the  words  of  a  great  Book 
are  assuring :  "Now  we  see  in  a  glass  darkly ;  but  then 
face  to  face:  now  we  know  in  part;  but  then  we  shall 
know  even  also  as  we  are  known"  (i  Cor.  13:12). 

5.     Purpose  o£  the  sublime: 

A  few  words  should  be  added  on  this  thesis.  Nature 
is  sometimes  grandly  beautiful ;  she  stirs  within  us  feel- 
ings of  reverence,  worship  and  awe.  The  Alpine  heights, 
the  deep  canons,  the  majestic  sweep  of  the  storm,  the 
glory  of  the  starlit  heavens  at  night — all  beget  within  us 
these  noble  emotions.  Now  what  is  the  obvious  purpose 
of  the  sublime  in  nature  ?  Is  not  to  stir  in  man's  soul  the 
emotions  that  have  been  mentioned  ?  Can  any  other  pur- 
pose be  named?  At  all  events,  that  purpose  is  accom- 
plished, and  man  is  made  better  and  happier  thereby.  If 
such  is  the  purpose  of  the  sublime  in  the  universe,  there 
must  have  been  a  personal  Creator  who  held  the  purpose 
in  mind  and  carried  it  out  in  the  structure  of  the  world. 
Who  knows  but  that  the  Psalmist  assigned  the  highest 
possible  reason  for  sublimity  and  majesty  in  the  universe 
when  he  exclaimed:  'The  heavens  declare  the  glory  of 
God,  and  the  firmament  showeth  His  handiwork"  (Ps. 
19 :  i)  ?  Yes ;  if  the  universe  is  constructed  on  a  rational 
plan  at  all,  and  is  not  a  mere  idle  and  purposeless  mech- 
anism, the  argument  for  the  divine  existence  from  the 
sublime  and  the  beautiful  is  vindicated.  The  alternatives 
of  a  rational  universe  or  an  irrational  one  are  set  before 
every  thinker,  and  he  must  make  his  choice. 


PART  III 
ANTI-THEISTIC  THEORIES^ 

CHAPTER  VIII 

ATHEISM    AND    MATERIALISM 

I.     DEFINITIONS 

1.  0£  Atheism: 

Atheism  is  the  teaching  that  there  is  no  God.  It  is  mere 
negation,  and  therefore  is  no  science  or  philosophy. 

2.  Of  Materialism: 

Materialism  is  the  teaching  that  the  only  entity  is 
material  substance. 

3.  Distinction  between  Atheism  and  Materialism: 

Materialism  is  simply  the  positive  pole  of  Atheism ;  in 
addition  to  the  mere  negation  of  the  divine  existence, 
Materiahsm  asserts  positively  that  the  only  entity  is  mate- 
rial substance,  which  is  the  source,  basis  and  explanation 
of  all  things.  It  is  pure  materialistic  monism.  All 
materialists  are  atheists,  and  all  atheists  who  make  any 
positive  assertions  dre  materialists;  hence  in  confuting 
the  errors  of  the  one  class  we  confute  those  of  the 
other. 

I.  The  classical  work  on  all  these  defective  world-views  is  Flint's  "Anti- 
Theistic  Theories." 

84 


Atheism  and  Materialism  85 

11.    ERRORS  OF  MATERIALISM^ 

1.  It  is  superficial: 

It  stops  with  material  substance,  whereas  thought  can 
readily  go  back  further— to  a  Supreme  Personal  God, 
who  is  the  intelligent  Creator  and  Preserver.  But  fur- 
ther back  than  Theism  goes  thought  cannot  travel  without 
being  lost  in  an  unending  series  resting  on  nothing.  The 
ultima  thule  of  human  thinking  is  the  self-existent,  per- 
sonal Being  we  call  God. 

2.  It  is  based  on  chance: 

If  there  is  nothing  but  material  substance ;  if  there  is 
no  creative  and  superintending  Intelligence  back  of  the 
universe,  it  must  be  a  mere  happen-so,  a  mere  fortuitous 
concourse  of  things  and  events.  But  the  world  is  a  cos- 
mos, not  a  chaos.  How  could  chance  ever  produce  a 
world  whose  most  dominating  principle  is  that  of  order 
and  law?  That  would  be  tantamount  to  bringing  some- 
thing out  of  nothing.  It  would  make  the  effect  greater 
than  the  cause.^ 

3.  It  is  opposed  to  the  most  universal  belief  o£ 
mankind : 

All  nations  are  theistic.  There  is  not  a  nation  or  tribe 
that  is  atheistic.  If  there  is  no  God,  nothing  but  material 
substance,  how  does  it  occur  that  almost  all  men  believe 
in  God?  Could  mere  material  substance,  by  means  of 
mere  resident  forces,  ever  produce  or  evolve  even  the 

3.  Consult  the  following:  Sheldon  "Unbelief  in  the  Nineteenth  Cen- 
tury," pp.  42-77;  Orr,  "The  Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World,  pp.  142- 
,To^'402.  403;  Fisher',  "The  Grounds  of  Theistic  and  Christian  Belief  "pp 
68-72T  Christlieb,  "Modern  Doubt  and  Christian  Belief.  pp.  i45-x6x, 
Micou.  "Basic  Ideas  in  Religion,"  pp.  207-229,  and  other  references;  Harrw, 
"The  Philosophic  Basis  of  Theism,"  pp.  428-554  (profound). 

3.     Vide  Micou,  ut  supra,  pp.  2i3f. 


86  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

idea  of  God  ?  How  much  less  so  universal  and  dominant 
an  idea,  so  persistent  a  conviction!  If  material  sub- 
stance causes  all  men  to  believe  there  is  a  God  when 
there  is  none,  then  material  substance  must  be  a  uni- 
versal liar. 

4.  Materialism  makes  the  world  eternal: 
The  world  cannot  be  eternal  and  uncreated  for  three 
reasons:  (i)  It  is  finite,  contingent  and  dependent,  be- 
cause all  its  parts  are  so,  as  we  have  shown  in  a  pre- 
vious thesis,  and  therefore  it  cannot  be  self-existent,  abso- 
lute and  eternal.  (2)  It  is  a  developing  universe;  so  de- 
clared to  be  by  the  science  of  the  day ;  therefore  it  must 
have  had  a  beginning,  because  if  it  were  eternal  and  yet 
developing,  it  should  have  reached  its  present  stage  of 
evolution  long  ago,  for  it  had  eternity  in  which  to  unfold 
and  progress.  That  which  develops  must  have  had  a 
beginning;  only  that  which  is  perfect  and  self-existent 
can  be  eternal.  Therefore  in  positing  the  material  world 
as  eternal,  Materialism  is  irrational.  (3)  The  science 
of  the  day  goes  back  to  beginnings,  and  finds  them.  It 
teaches  that  there  was  a  time  when  man,  animals  and  vege- 
tables began  to  be ;  when  the  present  form  of  the  universe 
had  its  genesis.  Reasoning  by  analogy,  we  may  conclude 
that  material  substance  itself  did  not  always  exist,  but 
had  a  beginning  in  time. 

5.  Materialism  is  unscientific  because  inadequate : 
It  offers  no  adequate  explanation  of  the  advent  of  the 
following  phenomena  of  the  universe:  Matter,  force, 
life,  sentiency,  consciousness,  freedom,  morality,  spiritu- 
ality. These  are  the  outstanding  facts,  those  that  are 
crucial  in  working  out  a  philosophy.    A  hypothesis  that 


Atheism  and  Materialism  87 

does  not  afford  an  adequate  solution  of  any  of  the  vital 
problems  raised  by  the  human  mind  is  surely  neither 
scientific  nor  philosophical.  It  fails  precisely  where  it 
ought  to  show  its  strength  and  sufficiency.  Compare  the 
hypothesis  of  Theism,  which  offers  an  adequate  explana- 
tion of  all  the  facts  and  phenomena  of  the  universe,  be- 
cause it  places  a  sufficient  foundation  under  the  whole 
structure. 

6.     Materialism  is  unpsychological : 

It  denies  the  reality  of  mind,  and  attributes  thought 
to  mere  brain  secretion  and  molecular  action.  Feuerbach 
asserts:  "Man  is  what  he  eats."  Says  Cabanis:  "The 
brain  secretes  thought  as  the  liver  secretes  bile."  Here 
is  the  dictum  of  Carl  Vogt :  "As  contraction  is  the  func- 
tion of  muscles,  and  as  the  kidneys  secrete  urine,  so,  and 
in  the  same  way,  does  the  brain  generate  thoughts,  move- 
ments and  feelings." 

Let  us  for  a  moment  scrutinize  the  second  of  these 
statements,  for  all  three  mean  the  same  thing.  The  liver 
secretes  bile.  True  enough ;  but  the  bile  secreted  by  the 
liver  is  material  substance,  just  as  the  liver  itself  is  mate- 
rial substance.  Not  so  with  thought,  which,  while  it 
has  its  connection  with  the  brain,  is  not  material  at  all, 
is  not  even  a  thing,  an  entity,  but  purely  a  psychical  prod- 
uct and  function.  Bile  and  thought  are  so  different  in 
their  very  nature  that  they  belong  to  entirely  different 
categories.  It  is  a  sign  of  crude  and  superficial  think- 
ing to  put  them  into  the  same  class.  Bile  is  a  substance ; 
thought  is  only  a  function  of  a  substance.  Bile  is  inert ; 
thought  is  self-moving.  Bile  is  unconscious;  thought  is 
conscious.     Bile  is  visible,  palpable;  thought  and  mind 


88  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

are  invisible,  impalpable.  They  are  utterly  different.  If 
the  brain  as  mere  material  substance  produces  mind  and 
thought,  then  the  effect  is  greater  than  the  cause,  and  we 
have  another  case  of  something  coming  from  nothing. 
Here  again  the  maxim,  ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,  must  be  applied. 
No ;  mind  and  matter  are  different  quiddities ;  yet  they  are 
vitally  united  in  human  beings  by  an  all-wise  Creator 
for  a  clear,  definite  and  exalted  purpose.  While  by  an 
empirical  mode  of  reasoning  we  cannot  explain  the  won- 
derful connection  between  mind  and  matter,  the  philos- 
ophy of  dualism  has  the  decided  advantage  that  it  assigns 
an  adequate  cause  for  all  the  known  effects. 

7.     Moral  weakness  of  Materialism: 

(i)  It  virtually  destroys  the  validity  of  moral  distinc- 
tions, and  affords  no  true  and  adequate  ground  of  right; 
for  if  there  is  no  moral  Person  back  of  and  in  the  uni- 
verse, what  makes  one  thing  right  and  another  wrong? 
Hence  Materialism,  if  generally  accepted,  would  have  a 
pernicious  effect  on  individuals  and  society. 

(2)  It  affords  no  comfort  and  hope  in  sorrow,  and 
would  therefore  lead  to  ennui  and  pessimism;  which 
would  also  be  harmful  in  their  practical  effects  on  the 
race. 

(3)  It  nullifies  all  expectation  of  personal  and  con- 
scious immortality,  and  hence  affords  no  ray  of  hope  of 
the  ultimate  solution  of  man's  many  perplexing  prob- 
lems; no  hope  that  the  wrongs  of  life  will  ever  be  made 
right.  Such  hopelessness  would  surely  be  morally 
depleting. 

(4)  In  its  very  nature  it  is  crass  and  debasing;  of  the 
earth,  earthy;  tending  to  destroy  the  higher  and  nobler 


Atheism  and  Materialism  89 

aspirations  of  the  soul.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  material- 
istic schools  do  not  uphold  a  high  standard  of  morality, 
but  are  disposed  to  be  hedonists  in  ethics.  "Ye  shall 
know  them  by  their  fruits."  In  a  word,  for  moral  upUft 
and  exhilaration  MateriaHsm  will  bear  no  comparison 
with  Theism. 


CHAPTER  IX 

DEISM 

L     EXPLANATION 

1.  Definition: 

Deism  is  the  view  that  God  created  the  universe,  then 
forsook  it,  and  reHnquished  it  to  the  operation  of  second- 
ary causes. 

2.  Derivation  of  term: 

The  word  Deism  is  derived  from  the  Latin  Dens,  God. 
Its  etymology  does  not  give  a  clue  to  its  peculiar  tech- 
nical meaning  in  scientific  works.     See  next  division. 

3.  Technical  meaning: 

Deism  believes  in  a  personal  God  as  the  Creator  of  the 
universe  with  all  its  laws.  However,  it  holds  that,  after 
creating  the  universe,  God  gave  it  over  to  the  control 
of  those  laws.  Hence  it  denies  the  divine  immanence 
and  providence,  and  is  especially  opposed  to  the  doc- 
trine of  a  special  divine  revelation,  such  as  we  have  in 
the  Bible,  and  contends  that  the  light  of  nature  and  rea- 
son is  sufficient  for  man's  guidance.  It  advocates  the 
so-called  "religion  of  nature,"  that  is,  that  a  study  of 
nature  gives  to  man  all  the  light  he  needs  to  make  him  a 
truly  religious  being. 

90 


Deism  91 

4.  Comparison  with  Theism: 

The  word  Deism  is  derived  from  the  Latin  word  for 
God,  while  Theism  is  derived  from  the  Greek.  So  far, 
therefore,  as  their  etymologies  are  concerned,  Deism  and 
Theism  might  mean  the  same  thing.  However,  in  scien- 
tific and  philosophical  works  these  words  have  come  to 
have  a  technical  significance.  The  two  views  agree  in 
holding  that  God  is  a  personal  Being  and  that  he  created 
the  heavens  and  the  earth ;  they  differ  in  this :  Deism  re- 
jects the  doctrine  of  the  divine  immanence  and  superin- 
tendence, while  Theism  accepts  and  upholds  them. 

5.  Historical  note: 

In  its  technical  sense.  Deism  arose  in  England  in  the 
closing  decades  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and  continued 
to  flourish  throughout  the  eighteenth  century.  Among 
its  chief  proponents  were  Lord  Herbert,  Tindal,  Shafts- 
bury,  Bolingbroke  and  Collins  in  England,  and  Thomas 
Paine  in  America.  While  all  Deists  believed  in  God  as 
the  Creator  and  in  "the  religion  of  nature,"  many  of  them 
were  especially  bitter  in  their  hostility  to  the  Bible. 
Hence  they  were  usually  known  as  "infidels,"  and  some- 
times as  "freethinkers."  In  more  recent  times,  however, 
these  terms  are  applied  to  all  classes  of  persons  who  re- 
ject the  Holy  Scriptures  as  a  special  divine  revelation. 
Near  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  Deism  had  run 
its  course  as  a  movement,  and  developed  into  the  univer- 
sal skepticism  of  Hume  and  Gibbon,  although  here  and 
there  were  practical  Deists  all  along,  and  there  are  some 
today.  There  is  good  historical  evidence  that  English 
Deism  was  carried  into  France  by  Voltaire,  and  thence 
by  him  into  Germany  during  the  time  of  Frederick  the 


92  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

Great.     In  France  it  became  atheistic  and  materialistic, 
and  in  Germany  it  developed  into  Rationalism.^ 

11.     ERRORS 

1.  It  is  unreasonable  to  believe  that  God  would  create 
the  world,  especially  one  containing  sentient  and  rational 
beings,  and  then  sever  His  connection  with  it.  If  His 
creatures  should  fall  into  error  and  trouble,  it  is  rational 
to  believe  that  He  would  come  to  their  rescue,  and  even 
give  to  them  a  special  revelation  of  a  way  of  escape.  No 
true  human  father  would  forsake  his  children  as  the  De- 
ists assert  that  God  has  forsaken  His  creation.  It  is  far 
more  reasonable  to  believe  what  we  read  in  the  greatest 
theistic  book  in  the  world :  "If  ye  then,  being  evil,  know 
how  to  give  good  gifts  unto  your  children,  how  much 
more  shall  your  Father  who  is  in  heaven  give  good  things 
to  them  that  ask  Him"  (Matt.  7:11)? 

2.  Men  would  soon  lose  their  interest  in  and  respect 
for  a  God  who  had  so  little  solicitude  for  them  as  to  leave 
them  alone  in  their  struggles  and  temptations.  An  ab- 
sentee God  would  soon  be  forgotten. 

3.  Hence,  as  a  matter  of  fact.  Deism  has  proved  a 
failure  morally  and  spiritually,  for  it  has  done  little,  if 
anything,  to  uplift  humanity.  It  has  evinced  little  power 
even  to  keep  many  of  its  advocates  in  the  paths  of  com- 
mon virtue,  as  is  obvious  from  an  account  of  their  prin- 
ciples and  lives.^ 

4.  Historically  it  has  always  shown  a  tendency  to 
degenerate  into  Atheism,  Pantheism  and  Agnosticism. 
This  tendency  is  perfectly  natural,  for  men  cannot  long 

I.     Cf.      John    Urquhart,    "The   Inspiration    and    Accuracy    of   the    Holy 
Scriptures,"  pp.   142-144. 
3.     Cf.     Home,  "Introduction,"  Vol.  i,  pp.  22-26. 


Deism  93 

rest  in  the  conception  of  a  merely  transcendent  Being 
who  shows  no  interest  in  their  welfare.  Hence  they  are 
apt  ultimately  to  conclude  that  they  would  rather  believe 
in  no  personal  God  at  all  than  in  a  God  Hke  that. 

5.  Philosophically  Deism  is  wrongly  based;  for  the 
universe,  being  finite  and  contingent  (as  we  have  already 
proved),  cannot  be  independent;  cannot  in  the  very 
nature  of  the  case  uphold  itself;  therefore  God,  who 
created  it,  must  continue  to  sustain  it. 

6.  Scientifically  considered,  the  cosmos  is  not  an  en- 
tity that  has  within  itself  the  power  of  sustentation.  It 
is  made  up  of  finite  particles  ;  therefore  as  a  whole  it  must 
be  finite ;  its  parts  are  each  and  all  dependent ;  therefore 
it  must  as  a  whole  be  dependent.  The  scientific 
doctrine  of  the  radiation  of  energy  points  to  the  fact 
that  in  and  of  itself  the  universe  would  finally  waste  away. 
Therefore  it  must  be  continuously  dependent  upon  a 
Being  who  is  infinite  in  all  His  attributes  and  resources, 
and  who  must,  therefore,  sustain  an  interested,  intelligent 
and  vital  relation  to  it. 

Thus  Deism  as  a  world-view  is  not  based  on  scientific, 
philosophical  and  rational  principles.^ 

3.     An  incisive  critique  on  Deism  is  found  in  Christlicb,  "Modern  Doubt 
and   Christian  Belief,"  pp.    190-209. 


CHAPTER  X 

PANTHEISM^ 

I.     EXPLANATIONS 

1.  Etymology  of  term: 

Pantheism  is  derived  from  the  Greek :  nav,  all,  and  06o?, 
God. 

2.  Definition: 

Pantheism  is  the  philosophy  that  identifies  God  and  the 
world:  the  world  is  God  and  God  is  the  world;  God  is 
the  All  and  the  All  is  God.  It  especially  negates  the  trans- 
cendence and  personality  of  God,  and  insists  on  the  doc- 
trine that  He  is  only  immanent. 

3.  Classes  o£  Pantheists: 

Some  so-called  Pantheists  can  scarcely  be  distinguished 
from  the  Materialists,  save  that  they  speak  of  an  in- 
tangible, indwelling  principle  or  spirit  which  acts  very 
like  an  intelligent  something.  Other  Pantheists  veer 
toward  Idealism,  practically  denying  that  material  sub- 
stance is  a  real  quiddity,  but  is,  rather,  an  illusion  of  the 
mind.  The  Pantheism  of  Spinoza,  which  is  perhaps  the 
most  conspicuous  type,  is  purely  monistic,  teaching  that 

I.  On  Pantheism  consult  the  following:  Christlieb,  "Modern  Doubt," 
etc.,  pp.  161-190;  Micou,  "Basic  Ideas  in  Religion,"  178-187,  and  many 
other  references;  Orr,  "The  Christian  View,"  etc.,  pp.  49-59,  84,  368,  402; 
Fisher,  "The  Groundi,"  etc.,  pp.  63-67,  138,  398. 

94 


Pantheism  95 

there  is  only  one  substance,  which  has  two  attributes, 
thought  and  extension,  the  former  displaying  the  phe- 
nomena of  mind,  the  latter  those  of  matter. 

11.     ITS  FUNDAMENTAL  DEFECTS 

1.  It  is  too  vague  and  abstruse  to  be  of  practical 
value  as  a  world-view  or  philosophy.  Who  can  obtain  a 
clear  conception  of  a  theory  that  calls  the  universe  God 
and  God  the  universe?  The  universe  is  not  a  personal 
entity.  Then  how  can  it  be  called  God?  Thus  it  will  be 
seen  that  in  trying  to  get  a  conception  of  the  theory, 
thought  simply  vapors  off  into  mistiness.  Then  take  the 
idea  of  the  divine  immanence  on  which  Pantheism  ever 
insists;  how  can  God  be  the  universe  and  at  the  same 
time  immanent  in  it?  If  He  is  immanent.  He  must  be 
something  different  from  the  universe.  A  thing  cannot 
be  immanent  in  itself,  because  it  is  itself.  Hence  Panthe- 
ism uses  terms  without  meaning.  Consider,  again,  Spi- 
noza's fundamental  idea,  that  of  one  substance  with  its 
two  attributes;  what  a  hazy  idea  presents  itself  to  the 
mind  when  you  speak  of  a  substance  that  has  two  such 
attributes  as  thought  and  extension?  How  can  an  at- 
tribute like  thought  give  rise  to  an  entity  like  mind? 
Is  it  not  clearer  and  more  rational  to  believe  that  mind 
is  the  basis  of  thought  than  the  reverse?  Can  there  be 
an  attribute  before  there  is  an  entity?  The  same  argu- 
ment holds  with  regard  to  extension.  A  substance  whose 
chief  attribute  is  extension  surely  could  not  give  reality 
to  all  the  various  forms  of  the  material  world.  A  world- 
view  that  is  so  indeterminate  is  not  likely  to  be  true.  Com- 
pare with  it  the  clearly  defined  conceptions  of  Theism. 

2.  Pantheism  forces  matter  and  mind  into  one  sub- 


96  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

stance.  It  is  unscientific  thus  to  manipulate  two  different 
quiddities,  especially  without  giving  a  fundamentally 
reasoned  basis  for  such  treatment.  That  matter  and 
mind  are  different  entities  may  be  seen  from  their  phe- 
nomena. You  cannot  convert  terms  of  materiality  into 
terms  of  mentality.  Matter  has  no  consciousness;  mind 
has.  Matter  is  not  sentient;  mind  is.  Matter  does  not 
think  and  reason ;  mind  does.  Matter  is  inert ;  mind  is 
self-moving,  self-determining.  Matter  has  no  person- 
aUty,  never  says  "I";  mind  has  egoity,  and  says  'T\ 
Matter  has  no  conscience,  no  morality ;  mind  has.  Matter 
has  no  spiritual  consciousness  and  quality ;  mind  is  spirit- 
ually active  and  conscious.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that 
matter  and  mind  do  not  belong  to  the  same  category. 
They  are  marvellously  joined  and  related,  but  they  are 
different  in  quality  and  essence.  Hence  to  force  them 
into  one  substance,  as  Pantheism  tries  to  do,  is  unscientific 
and  irrational.  The  old  aphorism,  'What  is  matter? 
Never  mind;  what  is  mind?  No  matter,"  even  though 
meant  to  be  facetious,  expresses  a  fundamental  and  un- 
alterable truth. 

3.  Somewhat  wedded  to  the  merely  phenomenalistic 
view  of  the  world,  Pantheism  professedly  denies  the 
category  of  cause  and  effect,  and  yet  is  constantly  com- 
pelled to  use  terms  that  mean  the  same  thing.  Thus  it 
is  fundamentally  inconsistent  in  this  respect. 

4.  It  does  not  solve  the  ultimate  problem  of  being 
(Ontology),  but  leaves  it  as  great  a  mystery  as  ever.  For 
example,  what  is  the  ultimate  "Substance"  of  Spinoza, 
which  has  the  two  remarkable  attributes  of  thought  and 
extension?  Is  it  mental  stuff  or  material  stuff,  or  is  it 
merely  a  "thingless  thing"  ?    These  are  serious  questions, 


Pantheism  97 

and  are  not  meant  to  be  humorous  or  sarcastic.  Thus 
Pantheism  does  not  solve  the  ultimate  problem  of  On- 
tology, and  in  this  respect  has  no  advantage  over  Theism, 
while  it  fails,  as  Theism  does  not,  to  afford  an  adequate 
explanation  of  the  varied  phenomena  in  the  material  and 
psychical  realms. 

5.  It  assumes  that  there  is  thought  in  the  cosmos,  in- 
telligence, design;  and  yet  it  negates  three  essential 
elements  o£  thought,  namely,  self-consciousness,  feel- 
ing and  will.  In  this  respect  it  proves  itself  an  irra- 
tional and  insufficient  world-view. 

6.  In  trying  to  explain  the  evidences  of  thought  in  the 
universe,  it  reasons  from  the  attributes  it  finds  in  the 
human  personality,  and  yet  denies  personality  to  the 
ultimate  Thinker,  who  has  at  least  unfolded  the  cosmos 
in  an  intelligent  way.  Here  again  it  punctures  its  own 
philosophy. 

7.  It  mistakes  the  very  nature  of  absolute  person- 
ality by  contending  that  personality  implies  limitation. 
This  is  a  profound  problem,  but  deep  thinking  leads  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  only  kind  of  entity  that  can  be 
infinite  is  spiritual  personality.  The  spiritual,  or,  in 
other  words,  the  psychical,  cannot  be  put  into  the  cate- 
gories of  material  substance,  which  has  spatial  exten- 
sion and  limitation,  and  therefore  must  be  finite  and  de- 
pendent ;  for  whatever  mind  is  as  an  entity  or  essence,  its 
attribute  of  thought  has  no  spatial  limitation,  but  can 
project  itself,  by  means  of  the  imagination,  even  beyond 
the  boundaries  of  the  physical  universe.  Therefore  we 
are  not  irrational  in  predicating  infinity  to  the  Absolute 
Spiritual  Person,  who  must,  by  the  very  exigencies  of 
thought  itself,  transcend  the  limits  of  the  finite  universe. 


98  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

8.  Here  is  a  serious  indictment  against  the  moral 
character  of  Pantheism;  it  rejects  the  well-known  fact 
of  human  freedom.  It  lands  in  pure  determinism,  and 
most  pantheists  not  only  do  not  deny  this  allegation,  but 
rather  argue  strenuously  against  the  freedom  of  the  will, 
maintaining  that  the  cosmos  has  developed  as  it  has  simply 
by  inherent  principles,  and  could  have  developed  in  no 
other  way.  Everything  is  just  as  it  had  to  be.  Some  of 
the  favorite  phrases  of  this  system  of  speculation  are, 
"a  predetermined  will,"  ''a  necessitated  will."  But  such 
a  will  is  no  will  at  all,^  but  a  contradiction  of  terms,  as 
if  one  were  to  speak  of  ''coerced  freedom."  Now,  a  sys- 
tem that  negates  divine  and  human  freedom  destroys  mo- 
rality by  that  very  token.  Then  how  shall  we  account  for 
the  universal  fact  of  morality  in  the  human  realm,  of 
conscience,  of  the  sense  of  freedom?  Could  pure  deter- 
minism ever  by  its  own  forces  alone  evolve  into  the 
consciousness  of  a  will  in  liberty?  Here  again  Pan- 
theism is  "weighed  in  the  balance  and  found  wanting." 

9.  By  denying  personality  to  God,  Pantheism  elimi- 
nates true  religion;  for  man,  being  a  person,  can  have 
real  communion  only  with  a  personal  God.  Any  other 
kind  of  communion  than  that  which  is  personal  is  scarcely 
worthy  of  the  name,  and  cannot  rationally  be  called 
religious  communion. 

10.  Although  Pantheists  may  claim  a  kind  of  mysti- 
cal relation  to  the  impersonal  All,  and  therefore  may 
profess  a  feeling  of  comfort  and  inspiration  in  their 
system;  yet  their  claim  is  not  rationally  based.  How 
can  the  impersonal  universe  speak  any  words  of  com- 

s.  On  the  freedom  of  the  will,  cf.  Micou,  ut  supra,  pp.  332-359.  who  it 
profound. 


Pantheism  99 

fort  to  the  soul  ?  It  does  not  know  the  soul's  aspirations 
and  sorrows ;  therefore  it  cannot  help  and  comfort.  Men 
may  sometimes  get  a  kind  of  fanciful  consolation  from 
nature;  but  this  comes  only  because  by  an  effort  of  the 
imagination  they  put  something  into  nature  that  their 
reason  tells  them  is  not  there,  if  there  is  no  personal  God 
in  and  back  of  the  natural  world. 

11.  Pantheism  denies  the  doctrine  of  personal,  con- 
scious immortality.  According  to  this  system,  the  in- 
dividual is  simply  re-absorbed  into  the  impersonal  and 
unconscious  All.  In  this  doctrine  it  corresponds  with 
Hinduism,  which  was  pantheistic  centuries  before  mod- 
ern Pantheism  came  into  vogue.  Whatever  else  may 
be  said  of  this  system,  there  surely  are  no  comfort  and  in- 
spiration in  the  doctrine  of  re-absorption.  In  this  regard 
Pantheism  is  decidedly  weak  in  comparison  with  Theism, 
especially  Christian  Theism. 

12.  In  the  last  place,  Pantheism  holds  that  the  uni- 
verse, God,  the  All,  comes  to  consciousness  only  in  the 
personalities  called  men.  This  is  both  unscientific  and 
a  priori  absurd,  for  how  could  the  conscious  ever  evolve 
from  an  unconscious  source?  Here  again  would  be  a 
case  of  something  coming  from  nothing;  of  water  rising 
higher  than  its  source.  We  insist  on  the  fundamental 
truth:  Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit.  Moreover,  a  consciousness 
that  is  broken  up  into  innumerable  fragments,  each  dis- 
tinct from  the  other,  would  be  a  poor  kind  of  conscious- 
ness, and  would  be  destitute  of  the  unitary  principle  that  is 
required  in  a  true  philosophy  of  the  cosmos,  which  has 
written  upon  it  everywhere  unity  of  plan  and  purpose. 

Thus  Pantheism  will  not  stand  the  test  of  the  rational 
process. 


,     CHAPTER  XI 

IDEALISM^ 

I.     DEFINITION  AND  DISTINCTIONS 

1.  Definition: 

Idealism  is  the  view  that  mind  is  the  only  entity ;  hence 
that  the  material  universe  has  no  real  objective  existence, 
but  is  merely  a  subjective  idea  or  illusion. 

2.  Distinctions: 

(i)  It  is  the  antithesis  of  Materialism,  which  says 
the  only  quiddity  is  material  substance.  Some  idealists 
are  pantheistic;  others  are  positive  in  their  belief  in  a 
personal  God.^  Our  reason  for  including  Idealism  in  the 
list  of  Anti-theistic  Theories  is  that  we  believe  true  The- 
ism is  dualistic  and  not  monistic — that  is,  it  holds  that 
there  are  two  kinds  of  entities,  the  material  and  the 
psychical,  or  matter  and  mind,  and  that  they  are  distinct, 
though  vitally  related. 

(2)  In  this  work  the  term  Idealism  is  used  in  the 
philosophical  sense  as  above  defined,  namely,  that  mind 
is  the  only  reaHty.    The  term  is  often  used  in  what  might 

1.  Books  to  consult:  Sheldon,  "Unbelief  in  the  Nineteenth  Century," 
pp.  11-41;  Micou,  ut  supra^  pp.  183-187,  and  other  references  in  index; 
Keyser,  "A  System  of  Christian  Ethics,"  pp.  190,  191;  Lindsay,  "Recent 
Advances,"  etc.,  many  references  in   index. 

2.  One  of  the  best  works  advocating  what "  might  be  called  Theistic 
Idealism  is  Snowden's  "The  World  a  Spiritual  System."  Though  not  con- 
vincing to  the  present  writer,  he  acknowledges  the  cogency  and  beauty  of 
Dr.  Snowden's  presentation. 

100 


Idealism  101 

be  called  the  ethical  sense;  in  which  sense  it  refers  to 
high  ideals  or  standards  of  excellence.  The  student  should 
bear  this  distinction  in  mind. 

II.     THE  ARGUMENTS  OF  IDEALISM 

1.     We  do  not  know  things  in  themselves   {nou- 

mena)  : 

This  is  the  chief  contention  of  the  ideahstic  philosophy. 
It  says  we  cognize  only  phenomena,  not  things  per  se. 
Take,  for  example,  the  sense  of  sight.  We  say  we  see 
a  tree.  However,  we  do  not  perceive  the  substance  of  the 
tree,  if  it  has  substance,  but  only  the  colors  and  form  im- 
pinged upon  the  retina  of  the  eye,  which  in  some  mys- 
terious way  is  borne  by  the  optic  nerve  back  into  the 
brain,  where  it  is  transferred  into  the  consciousness. 
Now,  since  we  perceive  only  phenomena,  we  cannot  prove 
by  the  empirical  process  that  anything  but  phenomena 
really  exist.  The  noumena  which  we  think  must  exist 
may  be  only  a  *'form  of  thought"  projected  by  our  minds. 
True,  there  seems  to  us  to  be  a  real  objective  tree  there, 
but  you  cannot  prove  it,  because  you  perceive  nothing 
but  the  appearance,  the  phenomenon.  Perhaps  ''things 
are  not  what  they  seem." 

In  the  idealistic  system  all  the  other  senses  are  treated 
in  the  same  way.  You  hear  a  sound,  coming,  as  you 
think,  from  a  bell ;  but  really  only  certain  undulations 
strike  your  tympanum,  and  are  thence  carried  by  the  audi- 
tory nerve  to  the  consciousness.  In  reality  you  know 
that  only  such  an  impression  has  been  made  upon  your 
mind.  You  do  not  hear  the  bell  itself.  Therefore  so 
far  as  your  consciousness  goes,  you  cannot  prove  the 
actual  existence  of  the  bell.     Even  if  you  were  to  go 


102  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

near  it,  and  look  at  it,  you  would  perceive  only  its  form 
and  color.  So  if  you  were  to  feel  it,  your  awareness 
would  give  you  only  the  phenomena  of  hardness,  coldness, 
roundness  and  roughness.  The  same  is  true,  according 
to  the  argument  of  this  system,  regarding  the  sensations 
of  taste  and  smell.  It  is  the  philosophy  of  pure  phe- 
nomenalism. Kant  and  Comte  advanced  the  same  argu- 
ments, though  the  former  was  not  an  idealist,  and  the 
latter  was  an  agnostic. 

2.     We  are  subject  to  illusions: 

The  idealistic  system  makes  much  of  illusions.  For 
instance,  the  mirage  is  an  optical  illusion.  So  far  as  our 
awareness  goes  for  the  time  being,  we  really  think  there 
is  a  landscape  where  it  appears;  but  afterward  we  find 
that  it  was  only  an  optical  illusion,  an  image  on  the  rari- 
fied  air  of  the  plain  or  desert.  So  may  not  all  our  seeing 
be  a  mere  illusion?  What  empirical  proof  have  we 
that  it  is  not? 

Again  we  think  the  sun  rises  and  sets;  that  the  sun, 
moon  and  stars  swing  around  the  earth,  while  our  own 
globe  is  stationary.  It  is  a  clear  illusion  of  our  entire 
sensory  cognition.  Not  only  does  sight  testify  that  the 
earth  is  standing  still,  but  we  also  feel  that  it  is  station- 
ary. Thus  these  two  senses  seem  to  concur  in  their 
testimony  that  the  universe  is  geocentric.  And  yet  the 
physical  facts  are  contrary  to  the  attestations  of  experi- 
ence. It  is  the  earth  that  moves.  So  we  cannot  say  that 
in  every  case  "seeing  is  believing." 

The  sense  of  hearing,  too,  is  often  deceptive.  Some- 
times we  think  we  have  heard  a  sound  when  there  was 
complete  silence,  and  very  often  we  hear  inaccurately. 


Idealism  103 

3.     Our  mental  constitution ; 

Kant  argued  that  the  mind  may  be  so  constituted  as 
to  impose  its  "own  forms  of  thought"  upon  external 
objects.  As  we  know  only  phenomena,  we  cannot  be 
sure  what  the  character  of  the  real  objects  is,  for  the  phe- 
nomena given  off  by  objects  must  first  pass  through  a 
mental  process  which  may  greatly  modify  them.  So, 
while  Kant  did  not  deny  objective  reality — he  was  not 
an  Idealist — his  philosophy  taught  that  objects  may  not 
be  at  all  what  they  seem  to  be  in  our  consciousness.  From 
this  position  it  was  not  a  far  step  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  may  be  no  objective  reality,  but  only  subjective  im- 
pressions; and  therefore  mind  may  be  the  only  entity. 

These  are  the  arguments  of  Idealism.  We  must  pro- 
ceed to  examine  them. 

III.     FUNDAMENTAL  ERRORS  OF  IDEALISM 

1.  It  is  too  speculative  and  obscure,  and  is  there- 
fore of  little  practical  value.  While  we  would  not  advo- 
cate mere  Pragmatism  in  philosophy,  ethics  or  religion, 
yet  a  system  that  cannot  be  understood  by  the  vast  major- 
ity of  people,  and  that  is  so  obscure  as  to  require  a  men- 
tal strain  even  on  the  part  of  disciplined  minds  to  grasp 
its  main  position,  is  not  likely  to  be  the  true  view  of  the 
world.  A  true  world-view,  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose, 
would  have  some  real  practical  value,  and  ought  to  be 
intelligible  at  least  to  the  majority  of  the  people. 

2.  This  theory  makes  the  whole  physical  cosmos  a 
chimera.  We  are  not  urging  this  as  a  final  proof,  yet 
it  is  hardly  reasonable  to  suppose  that  so  vast  a  universe 
of  matter  would  exist  only  in  the  imagination ;  would  not 
be  an  actual  world.     It  is  almost  incredible  that  there 


104  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

should  be  so  much  more  seeming  in  the  universe  than 
reality. 

3.  The  idealistic  theory  contradicts  the  universal 
human  consciousness.  With  the  exception  of  a  few 
speculative  philosophers,  who  live  mostly  in  an  academic 
atmosphere,  all  people  believe  in  the  objective  reality 
of  the  physical  world.  In  fact,  most  men  never  think  of 
questioning  its  reality.  Let  a  million  men  look  at  a  tree, 
and  without  exception  they  would  all  declare  that  the 
tree  is  there  and  that  it  exists.  While  we  are  not  offering 
this  argument  as  absolute  empirical  proof,  yet  we  would 
ask  whether  a  philosophical  system  is  likely  to  be  true 
which  is  so  patently  opposed  to  the  general  experience  of 
mankind.  That  certainly  would  make  the  universe  an  ir- 
rational one,  to  say  the  least.  Why  should  the  Power 
back  of  the  universe  inflict  a  general  hallucination  on 
the  consciousness  of  mankind?  A  world-view  ought 
to  square  with  the  outstanding  facts  of  human 
experience. 

4.  No  man,  not  even  the  Idealist  himself,  can  live, 
and  conform  his  conduct  to  the  principles  of  this 
system.  All  men  have  to  frame  their  behavior  on  the 
basis  of  the  reality  of  material  things.  They  cannot 
treat  material  objects  as  if  they  were  non-existent.  A 
man  cannot  pass  through  a  wall  as  if  it  were  not  there. 
People  do  not  go  right  through  trees  and  houses  and 
mountains  as  if  they  were  only  freaks  of  the  fancy.  If 
a  million  people  were  to  pass  single-file  along  a  path  in 
the  center  of  which  there  stood  a  large  tree,  every  one  of 
them  would  go  around  it,  and  treat  it  as  if  it  were  there. 
Then  why  should  the  speculatist  adopt  a  philosophy  that 
cannot  be  practiced  even  by  himself  ?    It  is  hardly  reason- 


Idealism  105 

able  to  think  that  so  impractical  a  hypothesis  would  be 
the  true  one. 

5.  Idealism  confuses  illusions  with  actualities,  and 
makes  the  exceptions  the  rule.  Much  of  its  argument  is 
based  on  the  illusions  to  which  our  senses  are  subject. 
However,  these  illusions  are  the  exceptions,  and  ought 
not  to  be  made  the  rule.  Moreover,  let  us  consider  the 
exceptions.  You  will  find  that  there  are  always  ways 
of  correcting  our  mistakes,  and  tracing  back  to  the  reali- 
ties. There,  for  example,  is  the  mirage:  first,  it  is  a 
reality  as  a  reflection  or  image  on  the  air  in  certain 
meteorological  conditions;  second,  it  could  not  be  there 
as  an  image  if  there  were  not  a  real  landscape  somewhere 
that  produces  it;  third,  if  you  will  move  nearer  the 
mirage,  it  will  presently  disappear,  and  thus  enable  you 
to  correct  your  error;  fourth,  when  you  approach  a  real 
landscape,  it  is  found  to  be  there,  and  is  not  a  mere 
appearance.  Therefore  the  argument  from  the  mirage, 
so  much  used  by  Idealists,  is  valueless. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  apparent  rising  and  setting  of 
the  sun.  Science  has  been  able  to  set  men  right  in 
regard  to  the  facts;  but  they  have  not  thereby  become 
convinced  that  the  sun  and  earth  have  no  actual  exist- 
ence. If  the  sun  and  earth  were  not  real,  how  could  men 
have  ever  corrected  the  optical  illusion?  How  would 
they  know  today  that  the  earth  revolves  around  the 
sun  instead  of  the  sun  revolving  around  the  earth  ?  The 
very  fact  that  an  Idealist  even  speaks  of  an  optical  illu- 
sion connotes  that  he  must  believe  in  an  optical  reality. 

6.  Let  us  look  into  the  problem  still  more  deeply. 
If  the  objective  world  has  no  reality,  how  can  it 
produce  phenomena?    Can  nothing  have  an  appearance 


106  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

of  being  something?  If  there  is  no  tree  out  yonder  in 
the  campus,  how  can  there  be  the  epiphany  of  a  tree? 
This  must  be  a  strange,  chaotic,  irrational  world  if 
there  can  be  phenomena  without  noumena  to  produce 
them.  An  appearance  is  only  an  exhibition  of  quality; 
but  there  must  be  a  something  or  there  could  be  no 
quality. 

7.  If  the  material  world  is  not  real,  why  does  it 
invariably  impinge  upon  man's  consciousness  as  real? 
The  most  rational  explanation  of  the  mutual  adaptation 
of  the  outer  world  to  the  inner  human  consciousness 
is  that  they  were  purposely  made  for  each  other.  There 
is  the  outer  world;  here  corresponding  to  it  is  the  sub- 
jective receptivity;  they  seem  to  match  each  other,  to  be 
designed  for  each  other.  The  eye  is  a  highly  specialized 
organ,  marvellously  contrived,  for  the  very  purpose  of 
seeing  the  external  world  and  enjoying  its  beauty  and 
sublimity.  So  are  all  the  senses  organized,  each  for  its 
own  special  purpose. 

8.  Let  us  analyze  sense-perception  and  its  content 
in  consciousness  still  more  deeply,  taking  sight  for  our 
example.  You  think  you  see  a  tree  out  on  the  campus. 
The  physicist  tells  you  that  in  reality  the  image  of  the 
tree  is  formed  on  the  retina  of  your  eye  by  means  of 
the  light-rays ;  thence  is  conveyed  by  the  optic  nerve  to 
the  proper  brain  center,  where,  in  some  mysterious  way, 
it  is  brought  out  into  the  field  of  consciousness.  Now 
the  Idealist  declares  that  there  is  no  tree,  but  only  an 
illusory  impression  on  the  mind  within.  Then  why 
does  the  tree  appear  to  be  out  on  the  campus?  It 
ought  to  appear  within  the  brain!  According  to  the 
Idealist,   the  mind   plays   us   very  strange  pranks.     If 


Idealism  107 

so,  what  value  can  you  attach  to  the  Idealist's  own  proc- 
esses of  reasoning? 

9.  We  shall  take  a  simple  object,  and  subject  it  to 
as  many  tests  o£  sense-perception  as  possible,  to  see 
what  the  indubitable  conclusion  must  be.  Here  is  a  red, 
ripe,  mellow  apple.  First  I  see  it;  the  sense  of  sight 
says  it  is  an  apple.  Next  I  feel  it,  and  find  it  round 
and  smooth  and  mellow,  and  the  sense  of  touch  declares 
it  is  an  apple.  Then  I  lift  it  to  my  nose,  and  the  sense 
of  smell  concurs  that  it  is  an  apple.  Now  I  thrum  upon 
it  with  my  fingers,  and  it  gives  forth  a  dull,  thudding 
sound,  and  the  sense  of  hearing  agrees  that  it  is  an 
apple.  Lastly  I  eat  it,  and  the  sense  of  taste  asserts  it 
is  an  apple.  Thus  all  my  senses  bear  the  same  testimony. 
Here  the  five  senses  positively  asseverate  and  concur 
that  the  apple  is  a  reality,  not  a  chimera.  If  such  con- 
current testimony  is  not  valid,  man  has  been  constituted 
insane,  not  rational. 

10.  Rejecting  the  plain  testimony  of  consciousness. 
Idealism  opens  the  way  for  the  invalidation  of  all 
knowledge.  This  would  make  science  and  philosophy 
impossible,  and  render  all  thought  processes  nugatory 
and  vain. 

11.  There  is  real  moral  peril  in  the  ideaHstic  scheme. 
From  the  negation  of  the  testimony  of  consciousness 
in  sense-perception,  it  is  only  a  step  to  the  negation  of 
the  testimony  of  conscience,  and  the  next  step  is  the 
negation  of  moral  distinctions.  In  brief.  Idealism  as  a 
philosophy  surrounds  everything  with  an  air  of  unreality, 
and  is  therefore  dreamy  and  impractical,  and  thus  tends 
to  disqualify  its  advocates  for  true  and  earnest  moral 
endeavor. 


CHAPTER  XII 

NATURALISTIC    EVOLUTION^ 

I.     DEFINITIONS 

1.  Of  evolution  in  general: 

In  general,  evolution  is  the  theoi-y  that  the  cosmos  has 
been  evolved  from  crude,  homogeneous  material  to  its 
present  heterogeneous  and  advanced  status  by  means 
of  resident  forces. 

2.  Of  theistic  evolution: 

Theistic  evolution  is  the  view  that  God  created  the 
primordial  material,  and  that  evolution  has  since  been 
His  modus  operandi  in  developing  it  to  its  present  status. 
Natural  Theism  raises  no  objection  to  this  view,  except 
that  it  waits  to  see  whether  it  can  be  scientifically  proven 
or  not.  The  author  of  this  work  does  not  believe  that 
the  scientific  and  rational  proofs  are  sufficient  to  estab- 
lish the  theory  of  theistic  evolution  properly  so  called, 
as  will  be  seen  later. 

3.  Of  atheistic  (naturalistic)  evolution: 

Atheistic  evolution  is  the  theory  that  denies  the  exist- 
ence of  God,  asserts  the  eternity  of  matter  and  force, 

I.  Literature:  Fairhurst,  "Organic  Evolution  Considered;"  Patterson, 
"The  Other  Side  of  Evolution;"  Townsend,  "The  Collapse  of  Evolution;" 
Dennert^  "At  the  Deathbed  of  Darwinism;"  Sheldon,  "Unbelief  in  the  Nine- 
teenth Century,"  pp.  96-134;  Orr,  "The  Christian  View,"  etc.,  pp.  99-101, 
128,  X76-185,  250,  251,  409-412,  415-418;  Micou,  "Basic  Ideas,"  etc.,  pp.  69- 
99,  409-417,  and  many  other  references  (consult  index);  Wright  (Geo.  F.), 
"Origin  and  Antiquity   of  Man." 

108 


Naturalistic  Evolution  109 

and  attributes  the  development  of  the  cosmos  to  purely 
natural  forces. 

11.     ERRORS   OF   NATURALISTIC   EVOLUTION 

1.  All  the  arguments  urged  against  Materialism  in 
a  former  thesis  apply  here.  A  review  of  them  might  be 
profitable. 

2.  Many  noted  scientists  have  rejected  or  do  reject 
naturalistic  evolution,  among  them :  Agassiz,  Dana,  Gray, 
Lord  Kelvin,  Virchow,  Sir  William  Dawson,  J.  W.  Daw- 
son, Du  Bois  Raymond,  Janet,  John  Fiske,  and  George 
Frederick  Wright. 

3.  Mere  evolution  cannot  account  for  the  origin  of 
matter,  force  and  motion.  Should  the  argument  be 
made  that  you  have  to  assume  these  things  in  order  to 
have  a  cosmos  at  all,  we  reply  that  you  must  also  assume 
intelligence  as  necessarily  as  you  must  assume  mat- 
ter, force  and  motion ;  for  the  cosmos  displays  evidences 
of  law,  order  and  design  as  outstanding  facts.  Law, 
order  and  design  connote  intelligence,  and  intelligence 
demands  a  Person — therefore  God.  To  endue  matter 
with  the  intelligence  necessary  to  produce  and  evolve  the 
cosmos  is  the  height  of  absurdity,  for  we  know  that  mat- 
ter is  not  personal. 

4.  Naturalistic  evolution  cannot  account  for  the  ori- 
gin o£  life.  If,  as  most  scientists  today  hold,  the  earth 
was  once  a  molten  or  incandescent  globe,  no  life — at  least, 
no  life  as  we  know  it  today — could  have  existed  upon 
it.  In  a  blast  furnace  you  see  streams  of  molten  ore 
flowing  from  immense  melting  pots.  How  many  living 
germs  would  you  say  the  fiery  Hquid  contains?  You 
know  there  could  be  none.     So  when  the  earth  cooled 


110  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

off,  it  could  have  contained  no  vital  germs.  There  is  today 
no  scientific  evidence  of  life  from  mere  chemical  action 
or  from  spontaneous  generation.  The  law  of  biogenesis 
— that  is,  of  life  only  from  antecedent  life — is  the  only 
biological  law  known  to  science.  Then  whence  came 
life?  Atheistic  evolution  has  no  reply  to  offer.  Theism 
offers  the  only  adequate  solution. 

5.  Nor  can  naturalistic  evolution  give  a  rational  basis 
for  the  following  outstanding  and  dominating  facts  in 
the  present  status  of  the  cosmos :  Sentiency,  conscious- 
ness, freedom,  morality  and  spirituality.  Think  of  it 
for  a  moment.  If  there  is  nothing  but  material  sub- 
stance and  blind  force  in  the  world,  could  sentiency 
have  evolved  from  purely  non-sentient  substance? 
Could  the  conscious  have  evolved  from  the  non- 
conscious,  the  moral  from  the  non-moral,  the  free  from 
the  necessitated,  the  spiritual  from  the  non-spiritual, 
the  idea  of  a  personal  God  from  mere  material  atoms, 
molecules  and  electrical  forces?  That  would  be  a  case 
of  getting  something  from  nothing.  Again  we  insist  on 
the  basal  truth :  Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit.  The  difficulty  with 
evolution  is,  it  fails  at  all  the  strategic  and  crucial  points, 
the  very  places  where  it  is  most  needed  and  where  it 
should  speak  most  plainly.  Anybody,  even  a  child,  can 
see  that  an  oak  evolves  from  an  acorn;  but  we  need 
just  one  instance  showing  that  mind  has  evolved  from 
material  substance,  or  protoplasm  from  dead  matter. 

6.  While  there  is  considerable  evidence  in  the  geolog- 
ical ages  of  progress  from  lower  to  higher  forms  of  life, 
there  is  also  clear  evidence  of  immense,  unbridged  gaps 
among  many  types,  and  there  is  no  definite  proof  in  either 
the  past  or  the  present  of   the   transmutation   of   one 


Naturalistic  Evolution  111 

species  into  another  by  an  evolutionary  process.  Rather, 
persistency  of  type  seems  to  be  the  dominating  law. 
Think  of  this  for  a  moment:  If  evolution  were  the  all- 
controlling  law,  the  law  that  is  to  account  for  every- 
thing in  the  world,  would  it  not  be  seen  at  work  today 
in  all  its  glory  and  force,  developing  matter  into  life, 
transmuting  species  into  higher  forms,  and  evolving  mon- 
keys into  men?  Instead  of  showing  its  power  today, 
however,  it  seems  to  have  become  iooperative,  and  we  see 
another  law,  that  of  the  persistency  of  type,  in  the  sad- 
dle. We  should  like  to  ask  why  evolution  resigned  its 
position. 

7.  Again,  evolution  has  left  too  many  missing  links. 
Everywhere  there  are  great,  deep  and  wide  gulfs  that 
have  not  been  bridged.  If  evolution  is  the  oligarch  of 
the  cosmos,  and  if  these  missing  links  ever  existed,  they 
should  be  at  least  fairly  abundant  in  the  fossil  and  other 
remains  of  the  earth.  There  are  many  other  such  re- 
mains. Why  do  the  missing  links  alone  decline  to  appear  ? 
To  say  that  they  will  doubtless  yet  be  discovered  is  to 
admit  that  evolution  is  still  an  unproved  hypothesis. 

Note  the  gulf  between  man  and  the  simian  tribes. 
If  man  was  evolved  by  a  slow  and  gradual  process  from 
the  monkey  or  chimpanzee,  there  must  have  been  myriads 
of  intermediate  creatures  once  living  upon  the  earth. 
Why  has  not  one  indisputable  specimen  been  found? 
Should  it  be  said  that  calcareous  conditions  are  the  only 
ones  favorable  to  the  preservation  of  fossils,  and  that 
at  the  time  of  the  advent  of  the  higher  animal  forms 
such  conditions  did  not  prevail,  we  reply :  But  the  re- 
mains of  many  kinds  of  animals  of  comparatively  recent 
times  have  been  found,  some  of  them  of  immense  size. 


112  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

Why,  then,  should  not  at  least  a  few  of  the  "missing 
links"  appear?  The  only  explanation  that  seems  to  be 
reasonable  is  that  they  do  not  exist  and  never  have 
existed. 

8.  Since  historic  times  began,  there  is  no  evidence  of 
progress  in  nature  by  its  simple,  native  forces.  All 
natural  objects  simply  reproduce  their  kind,  thrive  for  a 
while,  then  perish,  in  a  ceaseless  round.  Only  where 
man  touches  nature  is  there  progress ;  and  even  then,  as 
soon  as  he  removes  his  guiding  hand,  the  cultured  types 
revert  invariably  to  their  original  wild  and  inferior 
forms.  Man  is  the  only  being  who  makes  progress, 
and  this  he  does  solely  by  the  force  of  mind.  Yet  even 
the  progress  of  the  human  family  has  been  anything 
but  steady,  as  will  appear  in  the  next  section. 

9.  Evolution  has  not  been  proved  by  the  history  of 
the  human  family ;  rather,  it  has  been  disproved.  Many 
of  the  best  and  noblest  representatives  of  the  race  ap- 
peared too  soon  for  the  theory:  for  example,  Abraham, 
Moses,  Christ ;  among  the  heathen,  Socrates,  Plato,  Aris- 
totle, Phidias,  Homer,  Sophocles,  Cicero,  Seneca,  Marcus 
Aurelius,  and  many  more.  All  these  should  have  accom- 
modatingly waited  till  our  present  day  of  progress  and 
civilization,  or,  better  still,  till  some  golden  time  in  the 
future.  Most  of  the  nations  had  a  high  degree  of  civili- 
zation long  before  historic  times  began,  as  is  evidenced 
by  their  archeological  remains.  The  code  of  Hammu- 
rabi, formulated  in  the  time  of  Abraham,  disproves  the 
theory  of  evolution.  The  law  of  Moses  broke  in  cen- 
turies too  soon  for  the  comfort  of  our  theorists.  The 
further  back  you  trace  most  of  the  ethnic  religions,  the 
purer  they  become  both  in  principle  and  form.     On  the 


Naturalistic  Evolution  113 

other  hand,  the  law  of  degeneration  rather  than  of  evo- 
lution marks  the  history  of  many  of  the  nations.  How 
many  great  nations  have  arisen,  flourished  for  a  time, 
and  perished!  Today,  after  all  the  millenniums  of  so- 
called  evolutionary  progress,  there  are  many  tribes  which 
are  as  low  in  the  scale  of  civilization  as  any  historic 
primitive  people  can  be  proved  to  have  been.  That  fact 
gives  the  theory  of  evolution  a  serious,  if  not  a  fatal, 
blow.  Moreover,  the  evolutionists  have  been  challenged 
again  and  again  to  cite  a  single  example  of  a  nation  that 
has  arisen  out  of  fetichism  to  monotheism  by  its  own 
native  forces — that  is,  without  help  from  nations  already 
highly  civilized.^  All  these  facts  disprove  the  much- 
vaunted  theory  of  evolution. 

10.  On  a  priori  principles  this  hypothesis  cannot 
be  adequate.  After  all,  evolution  is  only  a  law,  only  a 
modus  operandi.  Therefore,  it  is  not  a  power,  not  an 
executor.  No  law  can  enforce  itself.  There  must  be  a 
law -giver  and  an  administrant,  or  no  law  could  ever  have 
originated,  or,  if  originated,  could  have  become  operative. 
It  is  idle  to  speak  of  ''the  reign  of  law"  without  positing 
a  law-maker  and  executor.  An  impersonal  law  that  can 
administer  and  execute  itself  is  an  absurdity. 

Thus,  naturalistic  evolution  has  been  proved  inade- 
quate, and  therefore  unscientific  and  unphilosophic.  It 
is  contradictory  to  its  own  fundamental  and  basal  prin- 
ciple, namely,  that  nothing  can  be  evolved  that  has  not 
been  previously  involved  by  forces  that  are  adequate. 

2.  Principal  Fairbairn  says:  "They  assume  a  theory  of  development 
which  has  not  a  single  historical  instance  to  verify  it.  Examples  are 
wanted  of  people  who  have  grown,  without  foreign  influence,  from  Atheism 
into  Fetichism,  and  from  it  through  the  intermediate  stages  into  Mono- 
theism; and  until  such  examples  be  given,  hypotheses  claiming  to  be 
'Natural  Histories  of  Religion'  must  be  judged  as  hypotheses  still." — 
"Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,"  p.   12. 


114  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

III.    THE  TRUE  VIEW 

We  regard  the  following  as  a  statement  of  the  only 
view  that  is  adequate  to  the  whole  situation,  and  there- 
fore the  view  of  Scientific  Theism:  God  is  the  Creator, 
Preserver  and  Evolver.  First,  He  created  the  primor- 
dial material.  Without  losing  His  transcendence,  He 
became  immanent  in  His  creation,  developing  it  through 
secondary  causes  for  doubtless  long  eras ;  at  certain  cru- 
cial steps,  as  was  necessary,  He  added  new  creations  and 
injected  new  forces;  such  epochs  were  the  introduction 
of  life,  sentiency  and  man.  This  world-view  should  be 
called  creation  and  evolution,  with  as  marked  an  em- 
phasis on  the  former  as  on  the  latter. 

So  far  as  regards  the  supernatural  revelations  made 
in  the  history  of  redemption,  as  recorded  in  the  Old  and 
New  testaments,  that  thesis  belongs  to  Christian  Theism, 
not  to  the  department  of  Natural  Theism.^ 

3.  The  author  desires  to  say  that  he  does  not  oppose  what  is 
known  as  theistic  evolution  in  the  interest  of  Natural  Theism.  If 
evolution  should  finally  be  proven  by  science  to  be  true,  it  would 
demand  a  personal  God  both  to  initiate  and  direct  the  marvellous 
upward  movement.  To  say  that  mere  materiality  and  chance  could  do 
this,  would  be  to  believe  in  a  miracle  so  great  as  to  be  preposterous. 
The  only  question,  therefore,  is  this:  Has  the  theory  of  evolution 
been  scientifically  established,  or  has  it  not?  As  stated  in  the  text, 
the  author's  honest  conviction  is  that,  in  the  present  state  of  scien- 
tific investigation  and  induction,  the  most  reasonable  view  is  expressed 
by  using  two  terms,  instead  of  only  one,  to  account  for  the  cosmos- 
creation  and  evolution. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

AGNOSTICISM,   POSITIVISM    AND    MONISM 
I 

AGNOSTICISM^ 

I.  DEFINITION 

Agnosticism  is  the  hypothesis  that  we  do  not  and  can- 
not know  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not. 

The  word  is  derived  from  a,  not,  and  yvwo-nKos, 
knowing. 

II.  ERRORS 

1.  It  is  contrary  to  the  universal  beliefs,  intuitions 
and  religious  instincts  of  mankind.  If  we  cannot 
know  whether  there  is  a  God  or  not,  why  is  the  belief  in 
God  so  persistent,  dominating  and  widespread?  Agnos- 
ticism has  no  answer  to  this  pregnant  question. 

2.  It  is  opposed  to  Christian  experience  wherever 
it  has  been  honestly  and  earnestly  tried. 

3.  Agnosticism  is  never  true  to  its  name — that  is, 
never  truly  agnostical:  it  is  always  assertive  and  dog- 
matic in  setting  forth  its  claims,  instead  of  being  modest 
and  humble,  as  its  self-chosen  name  would  imply.  To  be 
true  to  its  principles  and  name,  it  ought  not  even  to 
assert  categorically  that  it  does  not  know  whether  there 

I.  See  an  excellent  discussion  in  Sheldon^  "Unbelief  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century,"  pp.  96-134;  Orr,  ut  supra,  is  also  profound,  pp.  47-51.  80-86, 
367.  373. 

115 


116  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

is  a  God  or  not,  for  how  can  it  be  sure  it  does  not  know  ? 
Thus  it  is  driven  around  and  around  in  a  circle.  How- 
ever, to  be  entirely  fair  with  it,  so  far  as  regards  Theism, 
it  simply  asserts  that  we  do  not  at  present  have  sufficient 
evidence  to  prove  or  disprove  the  existence  of  God  as 
the  power  that  created  and  controls  the  universe. 

4.  In  its  Spencerian  form,  it  is  quite  assertive  on 
this  point :  it  calls  the  power  back  of  and  in  the  universe 
the  Inscrutable  Power,  and  then  immediately  proceeds 
to  predicate  of  it  many  attributes  that  can  belong  only 
to  the  God  of  Theism.  This  procedure  is  inconsistent 
with  the  fundamental  position  of  Agnosticism.  If  it 
knows  that  the  Inscrutable  Power  is  possessed  of  so 
many  personal  attributes,  how  can  it  call  itself  by  its  self- 
chosen  name?  And  why  can  it  not  know  just  a  little 
more — that  the  Power  that  possesses  those  personal 
attributes  is  and  must  be  a  Person? 

5.  It  is  narrow  and  one-sided  in  thinking  that  what 
cannot  be  proved  by  purely  logical  processes  and  physical 
demonstration  cannot  be  proved  at  all.  Many  things 
are  known  by  direct  intuition  and  experience.  Nobody 
but  a  misty  speculatist  tries  to  prove  mathematical  axioms 
by  a  discursive  process,  nor  the  categories  of  time,  space 
and  causality.  These  are  known  only  by  direct  intui- 
tion. In  the  end,  the  only  positive  and  satisfying  proof 
of  anything  is  experience. 

6.  Agnosticism  gives  up  the  theistic  problem  too 
soon.  More  penetrating  and  patient  thought  and  re- 
search would  lead  the  thinker  to  the  conclusion,  taking 
all  the  facts  into  honest  consideration,  that  the  only  ade- 
quate explanation  of  the  cosmos  is  that  of  Theism. 
Agnosticism  is  a  mark  of  the  collapse  of  thought. 


Agnosticism,  Positivism  and  Monism  117 

7.     Like  the  other  anti-theistic  theories,  Agnosticism 
affords    no    comfort,    hope    and    moral    inspiration. 

"Knownothingism"  is,  by  its  very  nature,  mentally  and 
morally  depleting. 


II 

POSITIVISM^ 

I.     DEFINITIONS 

1.  As  a  philosophy: 

As  an  attempt  at  a  philosophy.  Positivism  is  the  theory 
that  all  we  can  know  is  phenomena,  and  hence  we  know 
nothing  of  noumena — that  is,  the  essence  of  things.  It 
professes  to  deal  only  with  the  things  which  are  known; 
hence  its  name  Positivism.  In  regard  to  God,  the  soul 
and  the  substance  of  matter,  it  is  agnostic. 

2.  As  a  religion: 

As  a  religion  it  deifies  and  worships  "Humanity,"  and 
has  a  considerable  cultus  of  forms  and  ceremonies  largely 
borrowed  from  the  Roman  Catholic  Church.  (The 
founder  of  this  system  both  in  philosophy  and  religion 
was  Auguste  Comte.) 

II.     ERRORS 

1.     Philosophical: 

It  goes  too  far  in  negating  all  knozvledge  of  noumena. 
for  we  do  know  that  they  must  exist,  or  there  would  ];i' 

2.  Literature:  Wordsworth,  "The  One  Religion,"  pp.  307-309;  Balfour, 
"Religion  of  Humanity;"  Sheldon,  ut  supra,  pp.  78-95;  Lindsay,  as  ai;uve, 
see  index;  Muir,  "Modern  Substitutes  for  Christianity,     pp.  93-123. 


118  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

no  basis  for  the  phenomena  which  we  observe.  We  also 
feel  rationally  assured  that  the  noumena  must  correspond 
with  the  phenomena,  or  the  latter  would  not  be  what  they 
are;  they  might  as  well  be  something  else.  If  this  is  not 
true,  the  universal  experiences  and  intuitions  of  mankind 
are  worthless,  and  the  world  is  not  a  rational  and  con- 
sistent system. 

Under  the  theses  of  Cosmology  and  Idealism  we  have 
already  dwelt  sufficiently  on  these  points.  However,  in 
the  interest  of  thoroughness,  these  distinctions  should 
be  made:  The  phenomenalism  of  Kant  held  that  we  do 
not  know  what  the  true  character  of  the  noumena  are, 
but  it  did  not  deny  their  reality.  Idealism  denies  the 
reality  of  the  noumena,  and  says  they  are  merely  ''forms 
of  thought."  Positivism  simply  gives  up  the  whole  ques- 
tion, and  says  we  know  nothing  about  the  essence  of 
things,  and  it  is  vain  to  try  to  know. 

2.     Religious: 

As  a  religion.  Positivism  is  irrational  and  valueless, 
because  "Humanity"  is  simply  a  collective  abstraction, 
and  therefore  no  real  religious  communion  with  it  is  pos- 
sible. Could  ''Humanity"  answer  one's  prayers?  Re- 
member, the  "Humanity"  of  this  religion  is  not  the  really 
existent  souls  of  the  dead,  but  only  the  memory  and  influ- 
ence of  their  deeds  as  recorded  in  history.  Such  post- 
mortem influence  has  its  inspirational  value,  for  "their 
works  do  follow  them"  (Rev.  14:13),  and  "he,  being 
dead,  yet  speaketh"  (Heb.  11 :  4)  ;  but  it  is  not  something 
which  men  can  consistently  worship,  or  with  which  they 
can  have  personal  communion.  The  religion  of  this  cult 
does  not  naturally  grow  out  of  its  philosophy,  but  is  a 
mechanical    attachment.      The    religion    was    an    after- 


Agnosticism,  Positivism  and  Monism  119 

thought  with  Comte,   who  realized  that  human  nature 
craves  and  needs  religion. 


Ill 

MONISM 

I.  DEFINITION 

Monism  is  the  theory  that  there  is  only  one  substance. 
The  word  is  derived  from  /xovo?,  one. 

II.  EXPLANATIONS 

1.  The  several  classes: 

(i)  Materialism  is  monistic;  it  asserts  that  the  only 
entity  is  material  substance.  Ernest  Hackel  is  a  matp- 
riaUstic  monist. 

(2)  Idealism  is  monistic,  asserting  that  mind  is  the 
only  entity.  Berkeley  was  an  idealistic  monist;  so  is 
Snowden  today. 

(3)  Spinoza's  Pantheism  was  monistic,  for  he  re- 
duced everything  to  one  substance,  to  which  he  assigned 
the  two  attributes  of  thought  and  extension. 

2.  The  antithesis  o£  Monism: 

Its  opposite  is  Dualism,  which  is  the  theistic  concep- 
tion ;  that  is,  it  believes  in  the  reality  of  two  substances, 
mind  and  matter,  which,  while  never  confused  or  consub- 
stantiated,  are  nevertheless  vitally  connected  in  the 
unitary  plan  of  the  cosmos. 

Dualism  holds  firmly  to  the  distinction  between  God 
and  the  cosmos,  and  believes  in  the  reality  of  both. 
While  it  holds  that  they  are  distinct,  and  are  never  iden- 


120  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

tified  as  in  Pantheism,  it  maintains  that  God  is  not  only 
transcendent,  but  also  immanent. 

Let  us  now  state  precisely  the  view  of  Natural  Theism 
as  developed  in  this  work:  Before  the  creation  of  the 
universe  there  was  monism,  for  God  was  the  only  being, 
the  only  entity;  since  the  creation  of  the  universe  there 
is  dualism,  for  God  created  material  substance  ex  nihilo, 
and  gave  it  real  being,  but  never  mingled  it  with  His 
own  essence.  He  also  created  mental  substance  in  mak- 
ing the  human  mind,  but  this  substance  is  similar  to  His 
own  essence ;  that  is,  it  is  psychical  essence,  not  material ; 
but  it  is  not  the  same  essence  as  the  divine.  As  the 
Greeks  put  it,  God's  essence  and  man's  psuche  are  homoi- 
ousios,  not  homoousios — similar,  but  not  the  same. 

III.     ERROR  OF  MONISM 

It  is  not  necessary  to  expatiate  on  this  thesis.  We 
have  already  shown  that  it  cannot  be  maintained  in  any 
of  its  forms— Materialism,  Idealism,  or  Pantheism.  Its 
fundamental  error  is  that  it  attempts  the  rationally  im- 
possible—the reduction  of  two  such  different  categories 
as  matter  and  mind  into  one  substance.  Matter  may  be 
thought  of,  and  is  organically  related  to  mind  in  man's 
being,  but  it  can  never  be  converted  into  mind ;  nor  can 
mind  ever  be  reduced  to  material  substance. 

The  great  argument  for  Theism  is  that,  by  positing  the 
Divine  Mind  first  as  the  eternal  and  self-existent  essence, 
we  assign  an  adequate  cause  for  the  cosmos  itself  and  all 
cosmical  phenomena  and  processes.  It  is  much  more 
rational  to  believe  that  mind  produced  matter  than  that 
matter  brought  forth  mind.  The  cause  must  always  be 
greater  than  the  effect.     To  our  way  of  thinking,  this 


Agnosticism,  Positivism  and  Monism  121 

is  not  only  the  most  rational  explanation  of  the  universe, 
but  the  only  rational  one. 

We  think  this  is  as  far  as  reason  can  go  in  pursuing 
the  theistic  argument.  It  may  not  convince  the  intellect 
of  every  thinker.  Then  conscience  constrains  us  to  add 
that  the  final  and  absolute  certitude  can  be  gained  only 
by  the  experience  of  God  in  the  soul. 


PART  IV 

THE   DIVINE   ATTRIBUTES   AND   RELATIONS 

CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   DIVINE   ATTRIBUTES 

I.  DEFINITION 

A  divine  attribute  is  a  quality  or  perfection  that  belongs 
inherently  to  the  being  of  God.  It  is  not  an  entity  or 
quiddity,  but  a  characteristic  or  condition  of  being,  as  we 
say  virtue  is  an  attribute  of  man. 

II.  RATIONALE 

There  are  two  ways  by  which  Natural  Theism  deter- 
mines the  divine  attributes :  First,  from  their  manifesta- 
tions in  the  cosmos,  including  nature  and  man;  second, 
from  the  processes  of  reason.  However,  in  treating  the 
subject  these  two  methods  are  combined.  In  Christian 
Theism  the  divine  attributes  can  be  more  fully  treated, 
because  that  branch  of  scientific  theology  works  in  the 
light  of  God's  special  revelation  of  Himself  to  man.  For 
example,  the  love  of  God  is  most  clearly  and  impressively 
displayed  in  the  plan  of  redemption,  but  mere  human 
reason,  without  revelation,  can  say  little  or  nothing  rela- 
tive to  that  locus.  What  do  nature  and  reason  tell  us 
about  God's  perfections? 

122 


The  Divine  Attributes  123 

III.     CLASSES  OF  ATTRIBUTES 

1.  Self-existence: 

By  this  attribute  is  meant  that  God  has  the  ground  and 
basis  of  His  being  in  Himself  alone.  While  this  may  be 
a  difficult  conception  to  some  minds,  yet  reason  teaches 
that  the  ultimate  Being  must  be  possessed  inherently  of 
this  quality.  As  has  been  shown  in  former  theses,  some- 
thing exists  now — a  self-evident  proposition;  therefore 
something  must  have  always  existed;  for  if  there  had 
ever  been  a  time  when  there  was  nothing,  nothing  could 
have  ever  been.  Now,  it  is  obvious  that  what  has  always 
existed  could  not  have  been  produced  by  something  else 
and  could  not  be  dependent  for  its  existence  on  some- 
thing other  than  itself ;  therefore,  the  source  and  ground 
of  its  being  must  be  within  itself.  However,  we  have 
already  shown  by  all  the  theistic  arguments  that  the 
only  adequate  cause  of  the  universe  is  a  personal  Being 
whom  we  call  God.  Thus,  reason  demands  self-exist- 
ence as  a  necessary  divine  attribute. 

2.  Eternity : 

By  this  attribute  we  mean  that  God  has  always  been 
and  always  will  be.  The  rational  basis  for  this  attribute 
is  the  same  as  that  which  proves  self-existence.  There 
must  have  always  been  something,  or  nothing  could  have 
ever  come  into  being.  But  the  cosmos  demands  a  per- 
sonal Being  as  its  Primal  Cause :  therefore,  God  must  be 
an  eternal  Being. 

3.  Personality : 

(i)  Definition:  By  personality  we  mean  that  God  is 
a  Being  who  can  say  "1."    He  is  the  eternal  and  absolute 


124  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

Ego  who  knows,  thinks  and  wills.  He  is  the  eternally 
self-conscious  Being. 

(2)  Argumentation:  The  Teleological  Argument 
proves  God  to  be  Personal,  because  the  design  which  is 
so  palpable  in  the  universe  in  its  entirety  and  in  all  its 
parts  connotes  a  Designer  who  is  intelligent  and  free; 
but  such  a  Being  must  be  a  person.  The  Cosmological 
Argument  verifies  God's  personality,  for  there  are  per- 
sons in  the  cosmos,  namely,  human  beings,  and  the  only 
adequate  ground  for  such  personalities  is  a  Person  who 
brought  them  into  existence ;  the  non-personal  never 
could  have  evolved  the  personal.  The  Moral  and  Esthet- 
ical  arguments  postulate  a  personal  God,  for  morality  can 
be  predicated  only  of  persons  and  the  beautiful  can  be 
truly  appreciated  only  by  persons.  The  Ontological  Ar- 
gument leads  to  the  same  conclusion ;  for  the  perfect  and 
absolute  Being  could  not  be  perfect  and  absolute  without 
personality,  since  personality  is  one  of  the  highest  attri- 
butes conceivable.  Speculative  philosophers  like  Hegel, 
Fichte,  Schelling  and  Von  Hartmann,  who  talk  about 
"Unconscious  Intelligence"  and  "Unconscious  Will,"  are 
using  contradictory  terms.  If  God  is  intelligent  and  free. 
He  must  be  a  Person. 

At  this  point,  in  the  interest  of  thoroughness,  we  must 
notice  the  view,  set  forth  by  a  certain  class  of  speculatists, 
that  God  is  not  personal,  but  superpersonal.  Herbert 
Spencer  seemed  to  hold  this  opinion,  or  something  akin 
to  it,  for  he  says:  It  is  an  "erroneous  assumption  that 
the  choice  is  between  personality  and  something  lower 
than  personality,  whereas  the  choice  is  rather  between 
personality  and  something  higher."  ^     One  cannot  help 

1.     "First  Principles,"  page  109. 


The  Divine  Attributes  125 

wondering  what  kind  of  a  being  that  would  be  which  was 
"something  higher"  than  a  self-conscious,  rational,  free 
and  moral  personality.  If  there  is  such  a  being,  we 
evidently  can  have  no  conception  of  it.  Certainly  the 
''Inscrutable  Power,"  which  Mr.  Spencer  wishes  to  substi- 
tute for  a  personal  God  as  the  ultimate  ground  and  cause 
of  the  universe,  is  not  "something  higher"  than  a  person, 
but,  rather,  something  lower ;  for  Mr.  Spencer  studiously 
avoids  attributing  self-consciousness  to  it.  We  leave  it 
to  common  sense :  Which  is  the  higher  kind  of  being,  one 
that  has,  or  one  that  has  not,  the  attribute  of  self-con- 
sciousness, the  ability  to  say  "I"? 

An  advocate  of  the  view  that  God  is  superpersonal  is 
Dr.  Paul  Carus,  who,  in  a  recent  book,^  says  of  God :  "He 
is  not  personal,  but  superpersonal.  He  is  not  a  great  man, 
he  is  God.  He  is  the  life  of  our  life ;  he  is  the  power  that 
sustains  the  universe ;  he  is  the  law  that  permeates  all ;  he 
is  the  curse  of  sin  and  the  blessing  of  righteousness ;  he  is 
the  unity  of  being;  he  is  love;  he  is  the  possibility  of 
science  and  the  truth  of  knowledge ;  he  is  light ;  he  is  the 
reality  of  existence  in  which  we  live  and  move  and  have 
our  being;  he  is  life  and  the  condition  of  life,  morality. 
To  comprehend  all  in  a  word,  he  is  the  authority  of 
conduct." 

Such  dogmatic  statements,  given  without  argument  or 
proof,  need  little  refutation.  What  is  there  about  them  to 
prove  that  God  is  superpersonal!  They  are  just  as  true  if 
we  conceive  of  God  as  a  personal  being;  indeed,  they 
comport  much  better  with  that  idea.  "He  is  the  curse  of 
sin  and  the  blessing  of  righteousness."  How  can  He  be 
that  without  being  a  self-conscious  and  rational  being? 

2.    "The  Dawn  of  a  New  Religious  Era"  (1916),  page  25. 


126  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

"He  is  love."  Can  a  being  love  without  self-conscious 
personality  ?  "He  is  the  authority  of  conduct."  How  can 
there  be  moral  authority  worthy  of  the  name  without 
rational  personality  ?  Either  this  author's  statements  con- 
note personality  in  God,  which  is  a  clear  conception,  or 
else  they  are  a  lot  of  abstractions  of  which  no  human  mind 
can  form  a  definite  idea.  We  still  maintain  that  reason 
must  and  does  conclude  that  the  highest  and  noblest 
attribute  of  any  being  is  self-conscious,  rational  personal- 
ity, and  any  being  devoid  of  that  quality  ranks  lower  in 
the  scale. 

4.  Spirituality : 

This  means  that  God's  essence  is  spirit  or  mind,  not 
matter.  We  have  already  vindicated  the  doctrine  of 
Dualism.  There  are  two  kinds  of  "stuff"  in  existence: 
mind  and  matter.  They  belong  to  different  categories, 
and  therefore  cannot  be  merged  into  one  substance,  as  is 
done  by  Monism  and  Pantheism.  Matter  is  subject  to 
purely  mechanical  laws,  and  is  inert  and  unfree.  Mind 
has  very  different  qualities;  it  is  self-conscious,  self- 
determining,  moral  and  spiritual.  Therefore,  Dualism  is 
the  only  adequate  philosophy. 

But  mind  is  greater  than  matter ;  a  quiddity  of  a  nobler 
quality;  therefore,  matter  never  could  have  produced  or 
evolved  mind.  The  only  rational  and  adequate  hypothe- 
sis is  that  mind  was  first.  Therefore,  the  ultimate  Cause 
of  the  universe  was  the  eternal,  self-existent,  personal 
Mind. 

5.  Unity : 

By  this  attribute  we  mean  that  God  is  one  God  and  the 
only  one  of  His  kind.    In  scholastic  phrase,  He  is  unus 


The  Divine  Attributes  127 

et  unicus — that  is,  one  and  unique.     He  is  sui  generis, 
in  a  genus  of  His  own,  in  a  class  by  Himself. 

The  oneness  of  God  is  proved  rationally  in  several 
ways.  The  universe  {iinus,  one,  and  vertere,  versum,  to 
turn)  displays  such  wonderful  unity  of  plan  and  opera- 
tion that  the  only  rational  conclusion  is  that  it  is  the 
product  of  one  omniscient  Mind.  It  would  be  idle  to 
suppose  that  it  was  produced  by  two  or  more  minds  when 
its  solidarity  of  plan  is  better  explained  on  the  principle 
of  unity.  Again,  God  is  infinite;  there  can  be  only  one 
Infinite.  God  is  absolute ;  there  can  be  only  one  Absolute. 
God  is  independent;  there  can  be  only  one  Independent 
Being.  God  is  self-existent;  there  can  be  only  one  such  a 
Being. 

6.     Infinity : 

( I )     Definition. 

By  infinity  is  meant  that  God  is  without  boundary  or 
limitation  of  any  kind.  Some  thinkers  add  the  qualify- 
ing phrase :  ''except  those  that  belong  to  the  perfection 
of  His  own  character."  By  this  modification  they  mean, 
for  example,  that  God  cannot  do  wrong,  for,  if  He  could, 
it  would  mean  that  He  is  not  a  perfect  Being.  However, 
difficult  as  the  conception  may  be,  the  author  is  disposed 
to  think  that  God  is  not  limited  in  the  way  indicated; 
it  would  not  be  correct  to  say,  "God  cannot  do  wrong." 
We  would  rather  put  it  thus:  God  is  so  perfect  and 
absolute  in  His  moral  character  that  He  will  not  do 
wrong.  We  would  not  even  put  a  limit  on  the  moral 
freedom  of  God.  However,  in  so  difficult  a  matter  of 
metaphysics  there  is  room  for  honest  difference  of 
opinion. 


128  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

As  to  the  conception  of  spatial  infinity,  no  one  can 
understand  it.  In  reality  we  cannot  conceive  of  infinite 
space,  and  yet  we  cannot  conceive  of  a  line  or  point 
where  space  stops.  Our  minds  are  so  formed  that  we 
always  think  in  the  categories  of  time  and  space,  and 
cannot  think  otherwise.  So  we  cannot  in  our  present 
state  of  knowledge  formulate  a  definite  idea  of  infinity 
and  eternity,  and  should  be  honest  enough  to  admit  our 
ignorance  and  inability.  However,  this  is  no  reason  for 
rejecting  our  necessary  idea  of  the  reality  of  these  things, 
for,  though  we  know  there  are  time  and  space,  no  one 
can  define  them.  What  is  time?  What  is  space?  These 
are  still  two  of  the  unsolved  problems  of  speculative 
philosophy.  All  we  can  say  is  that  the  ideas  of  time 
and  space  are  necessary  ideas,  and  so  are  the  ideas  of 
eternity  and  infinity. 

(2)     Infinite  divine  attributes: 

a.  Omniscience:  God  is  all-wise.  For  the  argument, 
see  Chapter  IV,  Section  5  (3). 

b.  Omnipotence:  God  is  all-powerful.  For  the  argu- 
ment, see  Chapter  IV,  Section  5  (2). 

c.  Omnipresence:  God  is  everywhere  present.  If  He 
were  not  present  everywhere,  something  would  occur  in 
some  part  of  His  universe  that  would  throw  it  out  of 
accord  and  balance,  and  that  would  precipitate  universal 
wreckage,  and  would  perhaps  involve  God's  own  ruin. 
The  personal  presence  of  God  in  every  place  and  in  all 
places  is  beyond  human  comprehension,  and  yet  reason 
requires  this  view  of  His  personal  ubiquity  for  the  preser- 
vation of  Himself  and  His  universe. 


The  Divine  Attributes  129 

7.  Justice : 

This  attribute  signifies  that  God  hates  sin  and  wrong, 
and  will  punish  them  condignly.  The  Moral  Argument 
would  connote  this  fact,  for  if  God  is  a  moral  Being,  the 
attribute  of  perfect  justice  must  pertain  to  Him. 

8.  Goodness :  ; 

This  means  that  God  is  loving,  beneficent,  kind,  desir- 
ing the  highest  well-being  of  all  His  creatures. 

Skeptical  and  pessimistic  philosophers  have  so  often 
called  the  goodness  of  God  in  question,  and  have  argued 
the  subject  so  elaborately,  that,  in  order  to  deal  with  it 
with  any  degree  of  adequacy,  we  must  devote  an  entire 
chapter  to  its  presentation.  The  time  given  to  it  will  not 
be  spent  in  vain,  for  the  mentally  and  morally  depleting 
influence  of  pessimism  is  evident  on  every  hand  today. 


CHAPTER  XV 

THESIS   ON    god's   GOODNESS^ 

I.  WHY  A  SPECIAL  THESIS 

The  goodness  of  God  has  been  so  frequently  assailed 
by  agnostics,  atheists  and  pessimists  that  the  Theist  today 
must  meet  the  difficulties  frankly  and  vindicate  the  divine 
character  with  sound  argument.  Mere  abuse  will  not 
answer  the  objections  of  the  skeptic  or  satisfy  the  honest 
doubts  of  the  inquirer.  An  unbiased  investigation  of  the 
cosmos  as  it  actually  is  will  reveal  the  fact  that  there 
are  real  difficulties.     Let  us  examine  them. 

II.  DIFFICULTIES  FRANKLY  STATED 

1.  Organisms  are  often  imperfect;  many  of  them 
are  apparently  of  a  low  order  and  crudely  contrived; 
they  are  frequently  deficient  in  strength,  even  for  the 
purpose  for  which  they  were  intended;  and  all  of  them 
are  liable  to  derangement,  and  will  finally  wear  out  and 
cease  to  function.  Even  the  eye,  admirable  a  piece  of 
mechanism  as  it  is,  has  often  been  criticized  by  eminent 
anatomists  for  its  apparent  imperfections. 

2.  Organisms  seldom,  if  ever,  seem  to  be  perfectly 
adapted  to  their  environments.  On  account  of  their 
imperfect   functioning,   they  bring  on   many  distressing 

I.  Valentine's  "Natural  Theology,"  (pp.  231-251)  is  especially  fair  and 
judical  on  this  topic,  and  the  author  is  glad  to  acknowledge  his  indebted- 
ness to  that  work.     Consult  also  Orr,  "The  Christian  View,"  etc.,  pp.  186-199. 

130 


Thesis  on  God's  Goodness  131 

diseases,  especially  in  the  human  body.  Animal  organ- 
isms are  not  so  susceptible  to  disease;  yet  even  they 
may  become  ineffective  and  painful  through  accident. 
Thus  nature  sometimes  appears  to  defeat  her  own  pur- 
poses. 

3.  The  earth  in  many  ways  does  not  seem  to  us  to 
be  the  best  possible:  there  are  large  zones  of  torrid 
heat  and  frigid  cold,  where  life  is  very  difficult  and  in 
some  cases  impossible.  There  are  also  large  areas  of 
sterility,  as  the  desert  of  Sahara,  and  many  dank,  noi- 
some, miasmatic  swamps. 

4.  A  serious  difficulty  is  the  large  amount  of  animal 
suffering  in  the  world,  due  to  the  constitution  of  na- 
ture herself.  The  carnivorous  species  seem  to  be  designed 
by  nature  for  catching,  holding,  slaying  and  devouring 
their  victims.  Note  the  talons  and  beaks  of  the  owls,  hawks 
and  eagles,  and  the  claws  of  all  the  felines.  These  in- 
struments are  just  as  highly  specialized  for  their  purpose 
as  the  eye  is  for  sight  and  the  ear  for  sound.^ 

5.  There  is  much  unavoidable  human  suffering  in 
the  world.  The  innocent  often  suffer  with  the  guilty, 
as  in  the  case  of  storm,  flood  and  war.  The  same  is 
true  of  the  many  diseases  to  which  human  beings  are 
subject.     Sooner  or  later,  too,  death  overtakes  all  men. 

On  account  of  these  difficulties  many  persons,  look- 
ing only  on  the  surface  of  things  and  making  mere 
pleasure  the  summum  bonum  of  life,  have  turned  athe- 
istic. The  theist  as  well  as  the  atheist  is  cognizant  of 
these  difficultes,  and  has  often  been  puzzled  by  them. 

2.  J.  S.  Mill,  in  his  "Three  Essays,"  makes  a  terrific  indictment  of 
nature  on  the  score  of  her  apparent  cruelty.  Naville,  in  "De  Maistre,"  is 
only  a  little  less  severe.  Tennyson,  "In  Memoriam,"  gives  us  the  gory 
phrase,  "nature  red  in  tooth  and  claw." 


132  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

While  it  is  no  mark  of  depth  of  thought  to  recognize 
them,  for  even  the  child  is  often  troubled  by  their  pres- 
ence and  prevalence,  yet  we  must  deal  with  them  frankly, 
and  must  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  facts.  So  we  turn 
to  the  positive  side  of  the  problem. 

III.     MITIGATING  EXPLANATIONS 

1.  Why    we    cannot    explain    away    all    the    dif- 
ficulties : 

(i)  We  can  explain  nothing  fully — time,  space, 
cause,  effect,  matter,  mind;  therefore  our  inabiHty  here 
is  no  exception  to  the  rule. 

(2)  If  we  could  explain  these  difficulties  perfectly, 
we  could  do  the  same  with  all  our  other  problems; 
then  where  would  there  be  any  room  for  faith?  Yet 
how  many  things  must  be  taken  on  faith  in  this  world! 
In  how  many  ways  we  must  trust  nature  and  our  fel- 
lowmen!  All  this  proves  that  the  present  regimen 
is  evidently  intended  to  develop  and  discipHne  our 
faith. 

(3)  Sin  has  come  into  the  zvorld.  This  is  not  a  mat- 
ter of  speculation.  Whether  we  are  Christians  or 
not,  we  must  admit  the  presence  and  fact  of  sin,  for  our 
consciences  attest  it.  This  fact  will  help  to  account  for 
the  disarranged  natural  order  for  the  present  age  or 
dispensation,  and  also  why  the  intellect  of  man  has 
become  obscured. 

2.  There  may  be  divine  goodness  and  wisdom  even 
where  they  are  not  perfectly  plain  to  our  beclouded  fac- 
ulties. God  may  simply  be  moving  "in  a  mysterious 
way  His  wonders  to  perform." 

3.  We  are  finite  and  the  world  is  subject  to  finity. 


Thesis  on  God's  Goodness  133 

So  far  as  we  can  see  in  the  present  order,  however  it 
may  be  by  and  by,  finiteness  impHes  imperfection. 

4.  Being  the  creatures  of  time  and  very  greatly 
limited  in  our  powers,  we  may  see  only  a  part  of  God's 
eternal  plan.  Perhaps  when  we  come  to  see  His  whole 
order  and  purpose,  we  shall  acclaim  His  infinite  benefi- 
cence. Is  it  not  better  and  braver  to  think  in  this  hope- 
ful way  than  to  abandon  ourselves  to  despondency  and 
cynicism  ? 

5.  The  doctrine  of  development  and  the  survival  of 
the  fittest^  if  it  is  the  true  theory,  proves  a  progressive 
order  moving  toward  a  benign  end.  Those  who  accept 
this  doctrine  ought  not,  therefore,  to  relinquish  belief 
in  God  and  His  goodness,  for  there  could  be  no  such 
beneficent  movement  if  there  were  no  purposeful 
mind  to  inaugurate  it  and  carry  it  to  the  desired 
end. 

6.  The  vast  majority  of  nature's  contrivances  and 
adaptations  are  beneficial.  If  this  were  not  so,  the  fit- 
test could  not  survive,  and,  indeed,  the  whole  world 
would  speed  to  ruin.  There  is  a  balance  on  the  side 
of  wisdom,  kindliness  and  order,  or  the  world  could  not 
continue.  A  majority  on  the  side  of  chaos  would  have 
wrought  havoc  long  ere  this. 

7.  Animal  tragedies  may  be  explained  by  the  fol- 
lowing alleviating  circumstances : 

(i)  There  is  more  pleasure  than  pain  in  the  sentient 
realm.  Any  one  who  is  a  student  of  nature  is  im- 
pressed with  the  general  air  of  joy  that  nature  and  all 
her  creatures  wear.  As  a  rule,  nature  is  less  cruel 
than  man.  With  possibly  an  exception  or  two,  there  is 
no  evidence  that  animals  torture  each  other.     That  sort 


134  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

of  wantonness  and  vindictiveness  seems  to  be  left  to 
man.  Even  the  cat  playing  with  the  mouse  perhaps 
does  not  intend  to  torture  its  victim,  but  simply  to  grati- 
fying its  playful  disposition. 

(2)  Death  makes  room  for  more  animals,  and  thus 
the  sum  total  of  sentient  happiness  is  increased;  for,  if 
all  survived,  the  world  would  soon  be  over-crowded. 

(3)  Speedy  death  is  the  general  order  in  the  animal 
world,  and  that  is  the  most  merciful  regimen  that  could 
have  been  devised,  providing  death  could  not  be  entirely 
avoided.  Suppose  that  a  slow  and  lingering  death  were 
the  usual  order  in  the  animal  creation,  how  much  greater 
would  be  the  amount  of  suffering! 

(4)  Perhaps  many  animals  are  not  extremely  setisi- 
tive  to  pain.  At  least,  such  is  the  belief  of  many  of  the 
most  eminent  naturalists.^  Wounded  animals  soon  fall 
into  a  kind  of  stupor,  as  if  nature  herself  provided  an 
anesthetic  for  her  sentient  children.  Nor  do  animals 
have  clear  ideas  of  death,  such  as  men  entertain;  and 
they  certainly  are  not  troubled  with  any  fear  of  what 
may  come  after  death. 

(5)  Here  we  offer  a  view  that  we  have  not  seen  sug- 
gested by  writers  on  Theism.  Personally  we  have  so 
much  faith  in  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  God  who  was 
able  to  make  this  wonderful  universe  as  to  believe  that, 
in  some  way  and  at  some  time,  He  will  mete  out  equal 
justice  to  all  his  sentient  creatures  which  have  ever  suf- 
fered unjustly.  While  we  have  no  oracular  declaration 
to  make,  nor  even  an  absolute  conviction  to  express,  we 
agree  with  a  recent  writer*   that  if  God  shall  see  fit  to 

3.  See  MiTart,  "Lessons  from  Nature,"  pp.  368,  369,  cited  by  Orr. 

4.  William  Hayes  Ward  in  "What  I  Believe  and  Why." 


Thesis  on  God's  Goodness  135 

bestow  immortality  on  the  best  part  of  His  animal  world, 
we  shall  at  least  find  no  reason  to  object  to  His  plan. 
By  so  doing  He  might  sometime  make  every  wrong  right 
even  in  the  animal  world.  There  is  some  hint  of  this 
doctrine  in  the  Bible,  which  speaks  of  a  millennial  age 
when  "the  wolf  shall  dwell  with  the  lamb,  and  the  leop- 
ard shall  lie  down  with  the  kid;  and  the  calf  and  the 
young  lion  together,  and  a  little  child  shall  lead  them. 
And  the  cow  and  the  bear  shall  feed :  their  young  shall 
lie  down  together;  and  the  lion  shall  eat  straw  like  the 
ox.  *  *  *  They  shall  not  hurt  nor  destroy  in  all 
my  holy  mountain;  for  the  earth  shall  be  full  of  the 
knowledge  of  Jehovah,  as  the  waters  cover  the  sea" 
(Isa.  II  :6-9). 

8.  It  should  be  remembered  that  pain  is  nowhere  in 
nature  ordained  for  its  own  sake,  but  is  an  incident  along 
the  way  of  progress.  This  may  be  an  index  that  the  ul- 
terior purpose  of  pain  is  disciplinary. 

9.  In  the  human  world  pain  has  its  uses; 

(i)     It  heightens  pleasure  by  contrast. 

(2)  It  warns  us  of  peril,  and  thus  helps  to  preserve 
health  and  life. 

(3)  It  leads   to  careful   study  and  observance   of 
nature's  laws. 

(4)  It  stimulates  men  to   exertion,   invention  and 
initiative. 

(5)  It  develops  the  noble  virtue  of  patience  and 
its  cognate  virtues. 

10.  Hardship  disciplines  men  in  strength  and  stur- 
diness;  without  it  they  would  be  weak  physically  and 
inane  morally. 


136  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

11.  Danger  develops  courage.  How  else  could  the 
heroic  virtues  be  cultivated  ?  Is  it  better  to  have  supine 
beings,  or  beings  who  are  morally  noble,  strong  and 
brave  ? 

12.  Mystery  in  the  world  and  in  human  experience 
calls  out  the  noble  virtue  of  trust  in  God.  If  we  could 
understand  all  things,  there  would  be  no  opportunity 
for  the  exercise  and  development  of  this  virtue.  Where, 
then,  would  be  the  heroes  of  faith  in  a  world  without 
trial  and  mystery?  In  general  it  may  be  said  that  the 
world  cannot  be  explained  without  taking  into  considera- 
tion moral  values ;  and  since  we  know,  as  has  been  seen 
in  the  Moral  Argument,  that  this  world  is  a  moral 
economy,  the  person  who  tries  to  explain  it  merely  as  a 
utihtarian  and  pleasure-giving  administration  will  be 
balked  at  every  step,  and  will  ultimately  land  in  pessi- 
mism. However,  if  moral  excellence  is  the  highest  ex- 
cellence, we  can  see  that  a  world  of  trial  and  mystery 
is  the  best  regimen  in  which  to  acquire  moral  discipline ; 
indeed,  how  could  true  moral  character  be  attained  with- 
out moral  testing?  Therefore,  whatever  else  may  be  said 
of  the  present  regime,  it  is  precisely  adapted  for  the 
highest  moral  purposes.  For  the  epicurean  and  hedonist 
it  is  not  a  satisfactory  world;  but  the  true  and  sturdy 
ethicist,  who  values  moral  achievement  above  mere  pleas- 
ure, has  no  reason  for  complaint.^  Thus,  respecting 
the  problem  of  God's  goodness  in  view  of  the  present 
order  of  the  world,  men  should  not  permit  themselves 
to  fall  into  pessimism.  This  leads  us  to  our  next 
division. 

5.  Most  searching  is  Sheldon,  "Unbelief  in  the  Nineteenth  Century," 
pp.  135-149;  also  Orr,  "The  Christian  View,"  etc.,  pp.  5i-57»  66-72,  167-170, 
186,  321,  401,  467. 


Thesis  on  God's  Goodness  137 

IV.     CONTRAST    BETWEEN    PESSIMISM    AND 
OPTIMISM 

1.  Characteristics  of  pessimism: 

(i)  It  exaggerates  the  evil  and  overlooks  or  mini- 
mises the  good  in  the  world. 

(2)  It  cares  only  for  temporal  and  sensuous  good, 
for  the  pleasurable,  and  fails  to  appreciate  moral,  spirit- 
ual and  eternal  values.  It  is  blind  to  the  moral  use  of 
discipline  and  hard  tasks. 

(3)  It  becomes  daunted  in  the  presence  of  difficult- 
ies instead  of  bravely  trying  to  surmount  them  and  find 
exhilaration  in  the  effort. 

(4)  It  means  the  eclipse  of  faith,  hope  and  love — 
that  splendid  triumvirate  of  virtues. 

(5)  It  is  another  name  for  moral  fiabbiness.  It 
is  given  to  complaint;  it  grows  more  and  more  cynical. 
It  gives  up  to  ennui,  becomes  blase.  Instead  of  plow- 
ing up  the  weeds  in  its  garden,  mellowing  and  fertilizing 
the  soil,  and  sowing  useful  seeds,  it  sits  down  and  moans 
because  nature  or  nature's  God  permits  weeds  to  grow. 
It  looks  upon  the  world  as  a  lapse  and  misfortune;  an 
economy  of  sorrow  and  evil.  Schopenhauer  said :  ''This 
is  the  worst  possible  world."  Von  Hartmann  was  not 
willing  to  go  quite  so  far,  but  his  view  was  doleful 
enough:  *Tf  this  is  not  the  worst  world,  it  is  at  least 
worse  than  none." 

2.  Characteristics  of  rational  optimism: 

(i)  It  recognises  the  evils  of  the  world  both  as 
reality  and  evil.  The  optimism  that  fails  to  do  this, 
or  that  calls  the  evil  good,  is  not  rational,  but  Utopian  and 
flighty. 


138  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

(2)  However,  rational  optimism  sees  and  cherishes 
the  good  in  the  world,  and  believes  that  it  predominates. 

(3)  In  so  far  from  spending  valuable  time  in  bemoan- 
ing the  evil,  and  speculating  about  its  cause,  it  seeks 
to  mitigate  and  reduce  it,  and  make  the  good  triumphant. 

(4)  It  sees  in  the  world  just  as  it  is  an  arena  for 
manly  conflict  and  a  school  for  the  discipline  and  devel- 
opment of  all  the  sterling  and  heroic  virtues. 

(5)  It  trusts  in  God  and  the  good,  and  is  sure  of  ulti- 
mate victory.  It  never  knows  defeat.  It  is  sustained 
by  faith,  hope  and  love.  Its  chief  refrains  are  the  fol- 
lowing :  "All  things  work  together  for  good  to  them  that 
love  God"  (Rom.  8:28).  "Our  light  affliction,  which 
is  but  for  the  moment,  worketh  for  us  a  far  more  exceed- 
ing and  eternal  weight  of  glory"  (2  Cor.  4:17).  It  takes 
to  itself  the  inspiration  of  William  Cowper's  impressive 
hymn : 

"God  moves  in  a  mysterious  way 

His  wonders  to  perform ; 
He  plants  His  footsteps  on  the  sea, 

And  rides  upon  the  storm. 

"Deep  in  unfathomable  mines 

Of  never- failing  skill, 
He  treasures  up  His  bright  designs. 

And  works  His  sovereign  will. 

"Judge  not  the  Lord  by  feeble  sense, 

But  trust  Him  for  His  grace; 
Behind  a  frowning  providence 

He  hides  a  smiHng  face." 


Thesis  on  God's  Goodness  139 

(6)  Therefore,  to  sum  it  all  up,  rational  optimism 
believes  in  the  infinite  goodness  of  God,  holding  that  He 
seeth  high  and  wise;  that  He  knows  the  end  from  the 
beginning,  and  so  cannot  be  balked  in  His  plans;  that 
He  does  all  things  well;  that  He  has  made  the  universe 
friendly,  even  though  we  cannot  always  understand  His 
ways;  that  He  will  "bring  good  out  of  evil  and  make  the 
wrath  of  man  to  praise  Him;"  that  He  will  ultimately 
cause  right  and  truth  to  triumph  over  every  foe. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

THE   DIVINE    RELATIONS 

I.  DEFINITION 

By  the  term  divine  relations  we  mean  God's  connection 
with  the  universe  which  He  has  created  and  which  He 
sustains. 

II.  CLASSIFICATION 
1.     Transcendence: 

This  means  that  God  is  greater  than  the  universe.  It 
is  finite;  He  is  infinite.  He  is  distinct  in  His  essence 
from  the  universe ;  not,  as  Pantheism  holds,  identified  or 
consubstantiated  with  it.  On  this  account  He  is  able  to 
exercise  perfect  control  over  it,  and  preserve  it  from 
destruction. 

As  a  personal  Being,  God  must  be  transcendent  re- 
specting His  cosmos.  If  He  were  identical  with  the  uni- 
verse, which  is  non-personal.  He  too  would  be  non-per- 
sonal. That  God  is  and  must  be  a  personal  Being  has 
been  proved  by  all  our  foregoing  arguments.  While  we 
cannot  comprehend  the  doctrine  of  the  divine  trans- 
cendence, we  at  least  have  an  intuitive  conception  of  it, 
and  reason  teaches  that  no  other  view  of  God  and  the 
world  is  tenable. 

140 


The  Divine  Relations  141 

2.     Immanence : 

By  this  term  is  meant  that  God  is  present  everywhere 
in  His  universe,  and  governs  and  cares  for  it  according 
to  the  laws  and  principles  which  He  has  ordained. 

The  proofs  of  God's  immanence  have  already  been 
presented  and  need  no  further  elaboration.  While  im- 
manence may  involve  mystery,  it  is  only  like  all  the- 
other  mysteries  that  surround  us.  The  physicist  teaches 
that  the  universal  ether  is  the  substratum  of  all  palpable 
substance ;  yet  we  cannot  understand  its  composition  nor 
the  forces  that  cause  it  to  produce  the  varied  phenomena 
of  the  material  universe.  So  the  immanence  of  the  per- 
sonal God  in  the  cosmos  may  involve  an  insoluble  mys- 
tery for  the  present;  yet  all  the  processes  of  reasoning 
lead  to  the  conclusion  that  God  must  be  a  person  and 
must  be  personally  present  in  every  part  of  His  universe. 


Thus,  in  conclusion,  reason  proves,  so  far  as  reason 
can  prove  any  proposition,  the  fact  of  the  divine  exist- 
ence in  two  ways:  First  positively  by  means  of  the 
several  arguments  employed  in  Part  II  of  this  work; 
second,  negatively  by  the  presentation  of  the  arguments 
which  show  that  all  anti-theistic  positions  are 
logically  untenable.  As  a  necessary  corollary  to 
the  positive  and  negative  arguments,  the  divine 
attributes  and  relations  are  also  established  by  the  rational 
process.  The  chief  purpose  of  this  book  will  be  accom- 
plished if  the  student  and  reader  have  been  led  to  real- 
ize clearly  and  positively  that  our  human  life,  in  spite 
of  all  its  limitations,  trials  and  mysteries,  is  more  than 
worth  while,  is  even  great  and  inspiring,  because  "God 


142  A  System  of  Natural  Theism 

is  in  heaven,  and  all's  well  with  the  world."  True,  there 
may  be  lacunae  in  many  a  logical  process;  yet  it  is 
broadly  and  sanely  rational  to  accept  that  doctrine  which 
affords  the  greatest  zest  and  incentive  to  the  develop- 
ment of  nobility  of  life  and  character;  and  surely  such 
moral  and  spiritual  uplift  dwells  most  congenially  with 
the  theistic  conception. 


INDEX 


Adaptation,  34,  39,  44,  45,  106,  130. 
Etiological  Argument,  49. 
Agnosticism,  6,  7,  39,  58,  72,  74,  92, 

115-117,    130. 
Animal  instinct,  2>7. 
Animal  suffering,  131,  133-135. 
Animism,  24. 
Anselm,  59. 
Apologetics,  7. 
Aristotle,  18. 
Atheism,  6,  20,  29,  30,  74,  75,  81,  82, 

84-89,  92,  108-114,  130,  131. 
Attributes,    the    divine,    122-139. 

Balfour,  A.  J.,  13,  64,  76. 

Berkeley,  119. 

Bible,  the,   15,  19,  26,  32,  69,   70,  80, 

83,  90,  91,  114,  118,  122,  135,  138. 
Biology,  2,7,  38. 
Brahm,  29. 
Buddhism,  29. 
Butler,  60. 

Cabanis,  87. 

Carus,  Paul,  125,  126. 

Causality,  law  of,  23,  30,  33,  39,  42, 

49-58,  63,  72,  85,  86,  89,  96,  110,  113, 

116,  120. 
Chance,  22,  39-41,  44,  46,  85. 
Chemistry  and  Physics,  2,7,  38. 
Christian    Theism     (Theology),    15, 

16,  19,  99,  114,  122. 
Christheb,  Theodore,  85,  93,  94. 
Cicero,  18. 
Colleges,  5,  7. 

Comte,  Auguste,  33,  54,  102,  117,  119. 
Conception  of  God,  21-27,  29. 
Conscience,  65-69,  121. 
Cosmological   Argument,    49-58,   62. 

63,  64,  65,  80,  118,  124. 
Cousin,  60. 

Cowper,  William,  138. 
Creation  and  evolution,  114. 


Degeneration,  26,  27,  113. 

Deism,  90-93. 

Dennert,  108. 

Descartes,  60. 

Design,  34-48,  78,  79,  106,  109. 

Dorner,  60. 

Dualism,  88,  100.  119,   120,  126. 

Ear,  eye,  etc.,  35,  2,6,  41. 

Edison,  16. 

Efficient   cause,  34. 

Egypt,  26. 

Epicureanism,  45,  52,  74,  136. 

Epistemology,     17,    18,     101-103,    106, 

107,  117,  118. 
Esthetical  Argument,  76-83,  124. 
Ethnology,  26,  28,  29,  31,  85,  86. 
Eutaxiological  Argument,  34. 
Evolution,   24,  25,   30,  31,  33.  41,   43, 

44,  57,  70,  71,  85,  108-114,  133. 
Experience,    17,    30,    53,    58,    61,    74, 

102,  104,  115,  118,  121. 

143 


Ex  nihilo  nihil  fit,  58,  80,  88,  99,  110. 

Fairbairn,  A.  M.,  26,  113. 

Fairhurst,  108. 

Feuerbach,  87. 

Fetichism,  24,  27,  113. 

Final  cause,  34. 

First   cause,   the,  21,  30,   44,  46,  49, 

55-57,  65,  126. 
Fisher,  Geo.  P.,  12,  60,  85,  94. 
Flint,  12,  84. 
Freedom  of  the  will,  69. 

Gaps   unbridged  by   evolution,  109- 

113. 
General  Argument,  28-33. 
God,  absolute,  21,  31,  59-63,  97,  127. 
—beneficent,  79,  122,   129,   130-138. 
—Creator,  17,  21,  23,  33,  55-58,  70-74, 

80,  82,  85,  90,  91,  108,  114,  116. 
—eternal,  5^,  56,  120,  123,  126. 
—immanent,  43,  90,  91,  94,  95,  120, 

141. 
-infinite,  21,  47,  48.  57,  93,  97,  127, 

128,  140. 
—intelligent,  21,  39-48,  85,  97,  109, 

124. 
—just,  129. 

— marks   of  handiwork,   17. 
—moral,   65,    66,    70-75,   82. 
—personal,  19,  20,  21,  33,  42,  46-48, 

49,  56,   57,   58,   65,  66,  70-74,  79, 

80,  85,  90,  91,  94,  97,  98,  99,  109, 

114,  116,  123-126,  140.  141. 
—self-existent,  56,  120,  123,  126,  127, 

129. 
— spiritual    substance,    126, 
— supreme,  21,  31,  85. 
—transcendent,   43,   90.   91,   94,   95, 

140,  141. 
— uncaused,  55,  56. 
— unus   et  unicus,  25,  126,   127. 
Goodness  of  God,  130-139. 

Haeckel,  Ernest,  33,  119. 

Hamilton,  Sir  WilHam,  60. 

Handiwork,  marks  of  God's,   17. 

Harris,  Samuel,  12,  52,  60,  85. 

Hedonism,  89,  136. 

Henotheism,  24. 

Hibben,  J.  G.,  52. 

Historical  data,  18,  19,  26,  28,  29,  112. 

Home,  92. 

Humanity,  religion  of,  20,  117,  118. 

Hume,  39,  42,  51,  59,  91. 

Idealism,  18,  54,  94,  100-107,  118,  120. 
Illusions,  53,  102,  103,  105. 
Image  of  God  in  man,  23. 
Immortality,  88,  99,  134,  135. 
Intuitions,  man's,   17,  18,  22,  23,  50, 

51-54,    61,  62,    78,  101-103,    106,  107, 

117,  118.  140. 
Introductory  data,  15-27. 

Kant,    18,  51,  52,  54,    71,  72,  102,    103, 
118. 


144 


Index 


Keyser,  L.  S.,  100. 

Legge,  James,  26. 
Leibnitz,  60. 
Leuba,  J.  H.,  5. 
Lindsay,  13,  60,  100. 

Materialism,  7,  30,  33,  44,  72,  82,  84- 

89,  94,  100,  119,  120. 
Matter  and  mind,  16,  87,  88,  95,  96, 

100,  119,   120,  126. 
Micou,    R.  W.,    13,  60,  64,  76,  85,  94, 

100,  108. 
Mill,  J.  S.,  39,  42,  51,  131. 
Missing  links,  111. 
Mivart,  44,  134. 

Monism,  84,  94,  100,  119-121,  126. 
Monotheism,  25-27,  29.   113,   126,   127. 
Moral    Argument,    64-75,  82,  88,  89, 

124,  136. 
Morality  and  Theism,  20,  74,  75. 
Moral  distinctions,  20,  29,  65,  66,  67, 

68,  70,  88,  94,  98,  107. 
Moral  nature,  man's,  65-69. 
Moral    order    and    economy,    69-74, 

136. 
Miiller,  Max,  26. 
Mystery,  136,  137. 

National    Geographical    Society,  31, 

32. 
Naville,  131. 

Need  of  a  work  on  Theism,  6,  7. 
Noumena,  52,   101-103,    105,   106,    117, 

118. 

Objections    to    Teleology  confuted, 

42-46. 
Ontology,  %. 

Ontological    Argument,    59-63,    124. 
Optimism,  46,   137-139. 
Organisms,  35,  36,  45,  130,  131. 
Orr,  James,  12,  26,  60,  85,  94,  108,  115, 

130,  134,  136. 

Pantheism,  20,  72,  92,  94-99,  100,  119, 

120,  126,  140. 
Patterson,  Alexander,  108. 
Pessimism,    46,    71,   81,    88,    129,    130, 

136,  137. 
Phenomena,  52,  101-103,  105,  106,  117, 

120. 
Philology,  25. 
Philosophy  and  Theism,  18,  20,  38, 

93,  95,  99,  100,  103,  104,  113,  117,  118, 

126,  128,  129. 
Plato,  42,  59. 
Polytheism,  24,  26,  27. 
Positivism,  18,  117-119. 
Psychology,  25,  38,  87,  88. 
Presumptive  proofs,  28. 
Purpose  of  this  book,  5-7,  141,  142. 

Questionaire,  a,  6. 

Ramsay,  F.  P.,  26. 


Reason,  16,  17,  22,  23,  141. 
Redemption,  122. 
Relations,   divine,   122,   140-142. 
Religion  and  Theism,  18,  19,  20,  27, 

31-33,  98,  112,  118. 
Renouf,  26. 
Repulsive,  the,  81-83. 
Revelation,  divine,  15,  19,  23,  90,  122. 

Schopenhauer,  137. 

Science   and   Theism,   18,  20,  21,  32, 

38,  41,  51,  93. 
Seminaries,  theological,  5,  7. 
Sheldon,  H.  C,   13,  85,   100,  108,   115, 

136. 
Sin,  32,  46,  132. 
Smith,  Goldwin,  20,  75. 
Snowden,  J.  H.,  100,  119. 
Socrates,  18. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  74,  75,  116,  124,  125. 
Spinoza,  94,  95,  96,  119. 
State,   the,  and  Theism,  20. 
Sublime,  the,  83. 
Sufifering.  the  problem  of,  131,  132- 

136. 
Summum  Bonum,  65,  131. 
Superpersonal,   God  not,   124-126. 

Teleological    Argument,    34-48,    78- 

81,  124. 
Tennyson,   131. 

Theism,    an    adequate    world-view, 

20,  23,  30,  41,  42,  51,  55,  56,  58, 

63,  72,  86,   87,   89,    104,    110,    113, 

114,  116,  120,  121,  124,  126. 

— comforting   world-view,   82,   132- 

139. 
—a   morally  uplifting  world-view, 

74,  75,  82,  89,  139,  141,  142. 
— definition,  15. 
—history,   18,   19. 
— importance,  5-7. 
— other  terms,  15. 
—relations,  19-21. 

Townsend,  L.  T.,  108. 
Tribal  or   national   gods,  24. 
Trust  in  God,  136,  138,  139. 

Universal  belief  in  God,  28-31,  85,  86, 

115. 
Universal    religious    instinct,  31-33, 

115. 
Unity  of  God,  25,  126,  127. 
Universe,  the,  21,  39,  45,  46,  47,  52-58, 

64,   65,  85,   86,  95,  97,    102,   103,   104, 

120,  123,  127,  128,  134,  139,  141. 
Urquhart,  John,  92. 

Valentine,  Milton,  12,  17,  24,  25. 

26,  28,  38,  ^9,  60,  64. 
Vogt,  Carl,  87. 
Von  Hartmann,  124,  137. 

Ward,  W.  H.,  13,  34.  134. 
Wright,  Geo.  F.,  108,  109. 
Wrong,  the,  72-74. 


DATE  DUE 

DEMCO  38-297 

